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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis takes a ‘law in context’ and ‘history of ideas’ approach to examining the emergence, 
elaboration and evolution of ‘economic and social rights’ as human rights, including how and why they 
came to be included in the international human rights regime.  The central thesis is that economic and 
social rights have been fundamentally shaped by the economic context and economic theories of the 
times in which they emerged and were elaborated.  I have argued these rights emerged, and were 
elaborated, in times of economic crises, as part of a (liberal) challenge to liberal legal and economic 
orthodoxies.  This thesis suggests that one important strand of the history of human rights lies in struggles 
within ‘western’ liberalism over rights, freedom and the role of the state in the economy. 
Challenging other histories of human rights, the first part of this thesis shows how the phrase ‘human 
rights’ emerged as part of a challenge to ‘property rights’ and laissez-faire constitutionalism in the United 
States during the Great Depression, shaped by the theories of the legal realists, institutional economists 
and later by economic Keynesianism.  The second part, drawing on newly discovered archival material, 
charts an untold story of how these US conceptions profoundly influenced the nature and scope of 
‘economic and social rights’ during the drafting of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).  The 
third part shows how economic and social rights were later elaborated by the UN Committee on ESCR, 
again in the context of economic crisis and again as a challenge to economic (neo)liberalism, this time 
shaped by heterodox economist, Amartya Sen.  However, some of the key theoretical insights that shaped 
these rights during the Great Depression have been lost, in ways that circumscribe their power to 
challenge economic (neo)liberalism and the ‘constitutionalisation’ of austerity in our own Great 
Recession. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
‘The peoples of the world, shaken by two world wars and a ruinous depression within a short 25 years, had discovered that 
neither peace nor freedom were possible to man in an industrial society without economic security. The … extension of economic 
rights to man without depriving him of his traditional rights of free speech, religion, assembly, and fair trial poses the dominating 
question of the next 100 years. Because it is inseparable from the attainment of peace, the question will occupy the center of the 
national and international political stage. To leave social and economic rights out of a modern bill of rights would be to stage 
Hamlet without the Dane. 
John R. Ellingston, Full Employment Act of 1945: Hearings1 
 
1.1  Histories of human rights, ESCR and economic crisis  
In his sweeping revisionist history of human rights, Samuel Moyn flamboyantly argues that the phrase 
‘human rights’ (as opposed to ‘rights of man’ or ‘natural rights’ or other formulations) entered the English 
language ‘unceremoniously, even accidentally’ in the 1940s in the wake of the second World War II.2 He 
contends that ‘Human rights entered history as a throwaway line, not a well-considered idea’,3 and crudely 
posits that it was only as the result of President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR)’s ‘careless phraseology’4 
that the phrase appeared in war-time rhetoric of the 1941 Atlantic Charter and the 1942 UN Declaration.  
Blithely dismissing much historical evidence on the 1940s,5 he declares that: ‘[a]s before in FDR’s Four 
Freedoms speech, the phrase entered not with a bang, but only in passing’.6 And with hubristic panache, 
Moyn continues that ‘[i]t seems unlikely that FDR – who apparently inserted the sentence in the final 
revision of the [UN] declaration – could have meant to introduce something conceptually new’.7 Human 
rights, Moyn insists, appeared in the 1940s only by ‘accident’. 
Dismissing many histories of human rights as little more than ‘hagiography', Moyn further asserts that 
reading World War II and its aftermath as the ‘essential sources of human rights as they are now 
understood is misleading’.8  He dismisses the period of the 1940s as irrelevant for the history of human 
rights, anachronistically asserting that ‘human rights as they are now understood’ can only trace their 
antecedents back to the 1970s (or 1977 to be more precise!).  But his argument rests rather narrowly on 
the assumption that what is new about ‘human rights’ is that they extend above and beyond the state, so 
the state can be held accountable by a supra-national entity.  For Moyn, the ‘central event in human rights 
                                                           
1 Ellingston 1945, 1249. 
2 Moyn 2012, 44. 
3 Ibid., 51. 
4 Ibid., 52. 
5 Key relevant works on human rights history in the 1940s include Simpson 2001; Glendon 2001; Brucken 2013; 
Whelan 2010; Anderson 2003a; Borgwardt 2007. 
6 Moyn 2012, 49. 
7 Ibid., 49 My italics.  Moyn also argues that, although the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights was an 
heroic achievement of diplomatic consensus, what is more interesting is why it remained so peripheral after that; 
why, as an NGO leader observed at the time, human rights ‘died in the process of being born’.  
8 Ibid., 45. 
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history is the recasting of rights as entitlements that contradict the sovereign nation-state from above and 
outside rather than serve as its foundation’.9  Thus Moyn sees histories that focus on other episodes or 
different definitions as failing to capture the ‘essential’ nature of human rights. 
Indeed, referring to the allegedly sudden and ‘accidental’ appearance of the phrase ‘human rights’ in the 
1940s, Moyn declares that ‘[i]t is astonishing that no evidence has been discovered to explain why and 
when the phrase appeared as it did’, suggesting that this lack of evidence is because the ‘search is based 
on the mistaken assumption that what is now so meaningful could not have emerged by accident’.10  
While strangely continuing to insist on this ‘accident’, he himself notes that the ‘first serious circulation’ of 
the phrase in the English language occurred during the 1930s in the United States when it was used as a 
phrase ‘in support of New Deal reform’.  Yet he dismisses this evidence as unimportant, on the peculiar 
basis that critics of US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, from both the right and the left, struggled to 
(re)appropriate this phrase, leaving the term ‘human rights’ with no agreed definition.11 Moyn also briefly 
acknowledges that during the 1940s in the international sphere, ‘especially after William Beveridge’s 
report urging a post-war world of guaranteed work and higher standards of living’, the meaning of ‘human 
rights’ became ‘synonymous with the central wartime promise of the Allied leaders for some sort of social 
democracy’.12 But rather than exploring why this was the case, and the implications for the history of 
human rights, Moyn quickly leaves these meanings behind in search of a definition of ‘human rights’ that 
more closely fits with his own. 
It seems odd however to deem these episodes as irrelevant, when surely the struggles over the definition 
of the term in that time might be important for the history of ‘human rights’?  Perhaps unpicking  the 
strands of this definitional struggle over ‘human rights’ in Roosevelt’s time might yield some useful 
insights?  My own intuitions, developed while reading the history of the Great Depression to better 
understand our contemporary Great Recession, drove me to explore this period as significant for study 
of economic and social rights.  This thesis therefore starts by exploring these specific episodes of the 
history of human rights that Moyn glosses over, looking at the evidence as to when and why the phrase 
‘human rights’ appeared as it did.  I show that teasing apart the struggles over the definition of the phrase 
‘human rights’ in the 1930s in the era of the Great Depression (and not only as it emerged in the war-
time context of 1940s) should be central to our understanding ‘human rights’, and especially to our 
                                                           
9 Ibid., 13. 
10 Ibid., 49. 
11 Ibid., 49–50 He argues that while Roosevelt supporters invoked ‘human rights’ in relation to the New Deal, 
there was competition over the term from the political right, when Herbert Hoover decried the New Deal for its 
interference with human rights in 1934, while from the political left, socialists criticized Roosevelt for saving 
capitalism and trampling on the human rights of workers. 
12 Ibid., 52. 
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understanding of how and why so-called ‘second generation’ economic and social rights13 came to be 
included in the 'international bill of rights’.   
Indeed, I suggest that - very far from being an ‘accident’ or the result of ‘careless phraseology’ -  the phrase 
‘human rights’ was deliberately and strategically forged in the New Deal era, in the context of a struggle 
against economic laissez faire constitutionalism and the struggle to establish new ‘economic and social 
rights’ on an equivalent basis to ‘older’, more established liberal rights to property and freedom of 
contract.   Thus, in my reading of the history of human rights (contra Moyn’s reading), what emerged as 
‘human rights’ in the 1930s and 1940s, was not only a new conception of state responsibility to a supra-
national body (although that definition was already quite clearly there by the 1940s, most notably in the 
work of Hersch Lauterpacht14).  Rather I show, in the first part of my thesis, that what put the ‘human’ 
in ‘human rights’ was precisely the elaboration of new set of ‘economic and social rights’ that sought to 
challenge liberal legal and economic orthodoxies and sought to ‘humanise’ the economy through a 
stronger role for the state in protecting people against the abuses and vicissitudes of ‘free’ markets.  This 
marked a radical shift in the liberal conceptualisation of the relationship between the state and its citizens 
that occurred at that time, setting the groundwork for the post-war shift towards ‘embedded liberalism’.15 
My larger thesis traces the emergence, elaboration and evolution of ‘economic and social rights’ as human rights 
in the modern international human rights regime.  In particular, my research aims to set the emergence 
and elaboration of these norms in their historical and economic context, to illuminate how and why these 
rights emerged and what this might add to our contemporary understanding of economic and social 
rights.  My central research questions were: 
1) How and why did ‘second generation’ economic and social rights come to be included in the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights? 
2) How have these rights been shaped by their economic context and the economic theories of 
the times in which they emerged and have later been elaborated?   
Although the emergence of these ‘new’ rights in the international human rights regime marked a distinct 
epistemological break with the classical western liberal rights-based tradition, it is historically inaccurate 
to assume, as much of the contemporary human rights literature still tends to do, that economic and 
                                                           
13 By ‘economic and social rights’, I refer to the human rights enshrined in Articles 22-28 of the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  I 
mean the same when I use the short form acronym ‘ESCR’. 
14 See Lauterpacht 1945. 
15 Ruggie used this term to describe the shift in the post-war liberal consensus that sought to ’re-embed- markets 
in their social context, following Polanyi who had warned of the earlier ‘dis-embedding’ of markets from social, 
religious and political controls. Ruggie 1982; Polanyi 1944; Marxist scholars by contrast read this shift as a 
compromise between the interests of capital and labour, see Harvey 2005. 
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social rights were included in the modern international human rights regime only on the insistence of the 
socialist states.16  It is also incorrect to insist that ‘western’ countries such as the US have always rejected 
ideas of economic and social rights, or what Craven called the ‘ideological conflict between East and 
West’ was so clear cut. 17  In fact notions of ‘second generation’ economic and social rights also emerged 
within ‘western’ liberalism, and their inclusion in the drafting of the UDHR and the ICESCR owes a 
substantial debt to the support of ‘western’ states, including the United States.  Indeed, as I argue below, 
one significant strand of the history of economic and social rights lies in Roosevelt’s New Deal liberalism 
and his re-definition of ‘rights’ and (economic) freedom - ideas which came to influence the drafting of 
the international human rights treaties, under the leadership of Roosevelt’s wife, Eleanor Roosevelt.18  
As I show in the second part of the thesis, economic issues – and indeed issues of ‘economic security’ 
and ‘economic rights’ – which were high on the domestic agenda of the US during the 1930s and 40s -
became a critical part of the international agenda at the end of the war in 1945.19  After the economic 
devastation of the Global Depression and the experience of total war, establishing institutions to 
guarantee ‘freedom from fear and want’ became central to the construction of the international 
architecture of a stable post-war order, just as establishing state obligations towards economic and social 
rights became central to the framing of human rights in the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
(UDHR). 
While many histories of the emergence of the international human rights regime of the twentieth century 
have been written,20 few have focused specifically on the emergence of economic and social rights21 and 
fewer still have fully analysed the emergence of these rights within their economic context.  Much of the 
literature on the drafting history of economic and social rights focuses narrowly on the drafting of the 
International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in the period between 1949 
and 1966, without looking back at the drafting of the UN Charter or the UDHR.22  It also tends to set 
the history of ESCR against the political context of the heightening of the tensions of the Cold War, 
contributing to a marked tendency to read the increasing US resistance to economic and social rights in 
this period, as evidence that the US has always rejected economic and social rights.23 If we look at this 
                                                           
16 See Whelan and Donnelly 2007. 
17 Craven 1995, 8. 
18 Glendon 2001. 
19 Borgwardt 2007. 
20 There has been a recent explosion of the literature on the history of human rights. See for example, Hunt 2008; 
Lauren 2003; Morsink 1999; Simpson 2001; For a recent revisionist thesis, see Moyn 2012; For a review of the 
recent historiography of human rights and debates over the ‘essence’ or ‘origins’ of rights, see Alston 2013. 
21 A notable recent exception includes Whelan 2010; Roberts also includes a chapter on ESCR in his recent 
history of the international bill of rights, but since he concentrates on the later 1940s without looking back earlier, 
he focuses largely on US opposition to ESCR rather than the more nuanced history addressed in this thesis - see 
Ch 6 Roberts 2015. 
22 Whelan for example examines the travaux preparatoires of the ICESCR in detail but does not look in detail at the 
travaux of the UDHR, missing key linkages between the two, see Whelan 2010. 
23 As Craven did, see Craven 1995. 
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history over a broader period of time however, it becomes clear that the US has not always resisted ESC 
rights, and that ‘western’ liberal theories of rights have not always precluded possibilities of these rights.24 
The insistence that economic and social rights arise only out of socialist thought, rather than also out of 
liberal thought, is an incomplete, and partial, history of these rights.  
This thesis offers a new perspective by setting the emergence, elaboration and evolution of economic 
and social rights in their economic context, and by extending the analysis over a broader period of time, 
tracing not only the travaux preparatoires of the UDHR and the ICESR, but also a  ‘pre-history’ of economic 
and social rights (as these rights emerged within ‘western’ liberalism in the context of the United States) 
as well as a ‘post-history’ (as they evolved in the later jurisprudence of the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) after it was established in 1987).  In drawing out this longer history 
with an economic lens, and on the basis of new primary material from the UN and US archives, this 
thesis throws new light on the history of human rights, relevant for a fuller appreciation of the drafting 
process and for a deeper understanding of the instruments.   
One central argument of this research is that ‘economic and social rights’ emerged in the United States 
during the Great Depression of the 1930s as part of a challenge to classical laissez-faire constitutionalism, 
shaped first by the theories of the legal realists and the institutional economists (the first ‘law and 
economics movement’) and then by the theories of Keynesian economists.  These ideas were then 
transmitted to the international level, influencing the drafting of the UDHR and ICESR in a number of 
significant ways (including with respect to Keynesian roots of the concept of ‘maximum available 
resources, and the exclusion of the right to property from the international bill of rights).  I then contrast 
this with how economic and social rights evolved in the jurisprudence of the CESCR after 1987, again in 
the context of the economic crisis, and again as part of a challenge to economic (neo)liberalism25, first in 
the crises of structural adjustment of the 1980s and then in the crisis of 2008 Great Recession, this time 
shaped by heterodox economist, Amartya Sen.  Recovering these debates helps to illuminate the 
philosophical underpinnings of economic and social rights, as they have emerged in liberal thought.  A 
secondary argument however is that many of the insights of the earlier period have been lost in this later 
period in ways that circumscribe the power of ‘economic and social rights’ to challenge economic 
(neo)liberalism and the ‘constitutionalisation of austerity’ in our own Great Recession.  
My work engages with the literature on the history of human rights, particularly with histories that look 
at the emergence of economic and social rights as international human rights.  An article by Whelan and 
Donnelly, and Whelan’s more detailed history that it draws from, covers some of the ground I cover 
here, including challenging the ‘myth of western opposition’ to economic and social rights.26  However, 
                                                           
24 This question is explored in more depth in this thesis, but see also the debate between Whelan and Donnelly 
2007; Kirkup and Evans 2009; Kang 2009; Whelan and Donnelly 2009b. 
25 The concept of ‘neoliberalism’ is touched on in Section 4 of this thesis, but for an overview see Harvey 2005. 
26 Whelan and Donnelly 2007; Whelan 2010. 
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Whelan does not put this history in its economic context nor looks at how economic theories shaped the 
conceptualisation of the rights over time.  And while Whelan looks in detail at the travaux preparatoires of 
the ICESCR, he never looks back at the travaux of the UDHR, missing a crucial piece of evidence on the 
US position that I unearthed in the UDHR archives, which would have strengthened his own argument, 
and which proves that the US had an impact on the drafting of ESCR that is far greater than commonly 
understood. 
Borgwardt’s history also covers some of this ground, linking the emergence of the phrase of ‘human 
rights’ to Roosevelt’s conception of ‘economic and social rights’ and the Depression era economy.27 
Borgwardt posits that the 1941 Atlantic Charter, the 1942 Declaration of the United Nations and the 
1945 UN Charter amounted to a ‘bold attempt on the part of Roosevelt and his foreign policy planners 
to internationalize the New Deal’.28  However, Borgwardt only covers Roosevelt’s war-time rhetoric on 
‘human rights’ over the period between 1941-1945, missing (like Moyn) Roosevelt’s earlier use of the 
term ‘human rights’ in the 1930s.  In addition, although Borgwardt sets her history of human rights 
against the economic context of the Great Depression, Jason Scott Smith suggest there is a gap in her 
analysis as she treats the New Deal in vague and sweeping terms as a ‘cognitive style’ that results in a 
‘short-changing of economic issues.’29 He points out that she manages to (mis)describe the Harvard 
economist Alvin Hansen ‘as an opponent of pump-priming when in fact he was a leading advocate of 
the Keynesian theory’ suggesting in turn that she ‘patently misunderstands Keynesian economic theory’.30  
While this may have been merely an editorial error,31 it is true that Borgwardt goes into little depth on 
Keynesianism.  By contrast, this thesis looks in greater detail at economic theories, including tracing the 
impact of Keynesianism on the emergence of economic and social rights and how Keynesian ideas fed 
into the drafting of the UN Charter and the international human rights instruments.     
Brucken also provides an excellent new, and very detailed history on the US position on human rights in 
the 1940s,32 but he focuses largely on the legal history, detailing for example the impact of the American 
Law Institute and the Commission for the Study of Peace on the US official position as drafted by the 
State Department lawyers.  But, because he focuses less on the economic context, he misses the 
contributions of economic institutions such as the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB) and how 
their bill of ‘Our Rights and Freedoms’ also influenced the US position and ends up overemphasising the 
dominant narrative of the United States as being consistently against economic and social rights. 
                                                           
27 Borgwardt 2007, 8. 
28 Ibid., 3. 
29 Smith 2006, 2. 
30 Ibid. 
31 See the source reference to Alvin Hansen in Borgwardt 2007, 137. 
32 Brucken 2013. 
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In engaging on economic issues, my work also seeks to reflect on contemporary debates in the literature 
on human rights and economics, and the ‘foundational tensions’ between them.33  It further aims to 
reflect on debates on the relationship between human rights and ‘neoliberalism’ or ‘market 
fundamentalism’.  There are two readings of this relationship in the current literature - one sees ESC 
rights as acting as an effective counternarrative or civilizing force against economic neoliberalism,34 while 
a second, opposite reading, sees human rights as complicit in the spread of the market system across the 
globe.35  Indeed, ‘[i]t is increasingly common to claim that international human rights law is a neoliberal 
phenomenon.36  But as Moyn has pointedly suggested, it ‘is a long way from historical ‘coincidence’ or 
companionship … to actual causality and complicity.’37   
Moyn himself is completely dismissive of human rights offering any robust political resistance to 
neoliberalism, since ‘human rights idioms approaches, and movements’ do not strive to address 
inequality, and ‘human rights offer [merely] a minimum of protection where the real significance of 
neoliberalism has been to obliterate the previous limitation of inequality.’38  Thus, he bombastically 
proposes human rights ‘stick to their minimalist tasks’ in part to ‘avoid drawing fire for abetting the 
stronger companion of their historical epoch.’39 Yet Moyn nonetheless recognizes that a more careful 
history of this relationship needs to be written.  He cites Mary Nolan’s comment that there ‘is no single 
relationship between human rights and market fundamentalism across countries and types of rights’40 
noting that the same observation applies across time: ‘The history of […this] distant companionship 
remains to be written.’41   
It is this task then that my work takes on, tracing the history of this relationship through the emergence, 
elaboration and evolution of economic and social rights from the Great Depression to the Great 
Recession.42 
 
                                                           
33 See for example Salomon and Arnott 2014; Branco 2009; Reddy 2011; Balakrishnan and Elson 2008a; 
Balakrishnan, Elson, and Patel 2010; Elson and Balakrishnan 2011; Dowell-Jones 2004b; Seymour and Pincus 
2008; Uvin 2014. 
34 See generally O’Connell 2007; Kinley 2009. 
35 Marks 2013; Brown 2004; Whyte 2017a. 
36 Moyn 2014, 147. 
37 Ibid., 150. Rather caustically remarking that ‘Marxists such as Wendy Brown, Susan Marks and others have 
offered indeterminate and unsubstantiated claims that do not suffice to plausibly elevate the chronological 
coincidence of human rights and neoliberalism into a factually plausible syndrome. 
38 Ibid., 151. 
39 Ibid., 151. 
40 Moyn 2014 citing ; Nolan 2011. 
41 Moyn 2014, 159. 
42 Moyn has also more recently taken on this task, though in a far less detailed way, as I reflect on in my 
conclusion.  See Moyn 2018. 
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1.2 The surprising influence of the United States on the UDHR and the ICESCR  
One of the original contributions of this research is based on my archival research into the primary 
materials in the travaux preparatoires of the UDHR and the ICESCR, where I unearthed a significant 
document which is mysteriously absent from other histories of human rights.43  
This document was a proposal made by the United States in July 1947 entitled ‘‘United States Suggestions for 
Articles to be Incorporated in an International Bill of Rights’.44  It sets out in detail a range of suggested civil and 
political rights, but also a full catalogue of economic, social and cultural rights - providing clear evidence 
of positive early support of the US administration for the inclusion of economic and social rights in the 
UDHR.  
Yet oddly, this July 1947 US proposal (and a similar proposal from June 1947) is absent from 
contemporary histories of human rights, including ‘definitive’ histories of the UDHR such as that by 
Morsink, as well as detailed histories of the ICESCR.45  It is even missing from ‘exhaustive’ commentaries 
on the ICESCR such as those by Craven and Sepulveda.46  Even stranger, is that the wording and 
provisions of this 1947 US text, is closer in content to the 1966 ICESCR than to the 1948 UDHR.  A 
number of concepts and phrases that were later to become part of the lexicon of the ICESCR, such as 
the ‘right to the highest attainable standard of health’ and the concepts of ‘maximum available resources’ 
and ‘progressive realization’ that came later to be enshrined in Article 2.1 of the ICESCR, appear to have 
roots in this 1947 US proposal.   What makes this 1947 text historically significant then, is not only that 
it belies standard assumptions about the US position on ESC rights, but also because substantial parts of 
the 1947 US wording on provisions on economic, social, and cultural rights came to be reflected in the 
1966 ICESCR.    
To find out more detail about this US proposal, I travelled to the US National Archives in College Park, 
Maryland, to explore the internal US government files covering the US drafting position during the 
drafting of the UDHR.  In the archives, I found the background to this document, including a set of brief 
position papers on each of the rights to be included in the UDHR as well as the official instructions sent 
to Eleanor Roosevelt for her role on behalf of the US in the drafting process.  In analysing these US 
archives alongside the UN archives, I found that the US position on ESCR was far more nuanced than 
standard narratives suggest, that there were differences amongst the US delegation and its advisers, and 
that the US position in fact shifted quite significantly over the short period of the drafting of the UDHR 
between 1947 and 1948 in response to both domestic and international pressures.   
                                                           
43 See Way 2014 This is also the subject of section 3.2.1 of this thesis. 
44 UN Doc E/CN.4/21, Drafting Committee on An International Bill of Rights, 1st Session: Report of the Drafting Committee 
to the Commission on Human Rights, July 1, 1947.  The US Suggestions can be found on pages 41-47 of this document. 
45 See for example Morsink 1999; Whelan 2010. 
46 Craven 1995; Sepúlveda 2003. 
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This document sits at the heart of my research which traces the story of this US proposal through the 
the drafting process of the UDHR and the ICESCR, but also backwards and forwards through history.  
Drawing on this original research, I show how the United States played a far larger role in shaping 
'economic and social rights' than is commonly understood, including in framing the nature and scope of 
ESC rights in the ICESCR, with a particular influence over the phrasing and meaning of Article 2.1 of 
the ICESCR.   
 
1.3 Methodology: Human rights in economic context 
This thesis takes a ‘law in context’ and ‘history of ideas’ approach to examining the emergence, 
elaboration and evolution of ‘economic and social human rights within the modern international human 
rights regime.  It aims to set ‘economic and social rights’ against the economic context in which they 
emerged and were elaborated - to juxtapose human rights and economic context – not to draw any strict 
causal links or correlations, but rather to see whether anything new can be drawn from this juxtaposition.    
It combines historical and archival research, with theoretical analysis of dominant ideas governing public 
philosophy, human rights and economics in different times and how these interrelate. It is necessarily 
interdisciplinary, drawing on the literatures of history, law and economics.  As this work ‘has less to do 
with legal method and more with the actors whose words and deeds are at the centre of the analysis’47, 
my materials are not primarily case law, but draw from primary sources such as speeches, press articles, 
materials from US Government and UN archives, as well as the secondary literature to capture how issues 
were defined and debated at the time these rights emerged and were elaborated.  
For the historical research on the emergence of economic and social rights in the 1930s, I made use of 
primary sources from press articles available in ProQuest, as well as secondary literature.  For their 
elaboration in the 1940s, I carried out significant research delving into the UN and US archives.  I used 
online archives wherever possible, but visited physical archives where documents were unavailable online. 
For the UN primary sources, I drew on the online archives of the travaux preparatoires of the UN Charter 
(UNCIO negotiations), the UDHR and the ICESCR, including documents of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly, but I also visited the 
physical UN repositories at the UN in both Geneva and New York.  For the US primary sources, I made 
substantial use of online US archives, including the US Department of State Bulletin and the Foreign Relations 
of the United States (FRUS), and also visited the physical archives at the US National Archives at College 
Park, Maryland.  
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For the more modern analysis of the elaboration of the rights from 1987 onwards, I used the online 
repositories of materials of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in their 
interpretation of the rights including their General Comments, Statements, Concluding observations and 
reports on their Days of Discussion.  For the overarching economic context, I made use of secondary 
material from histories of economic thought as well as histories of the New Deal era, and more recent 
literature, to interweave the history of the modern human rights regime its economic context from the 
Great Depression and the Great Recession.   
A key challenge in my work centred on historiography, and the contested nature of histories of human 
rights, as well as histories of the New Deal, given often conflicting accounts of the same data as they are 
interpreted through different framing concerns.  The legal historian Fisher has raised the tension that 
afflicts intellectual history between the concern that there ‘no full, unmediated, objective access to the 
past is possible’, yet ‘there is such a thing as the past, and not all historical interpretations are equally true 
to it.’48  The only way around this tension he suggests is to be reflexive and to recognise that all history 
is to some degree perspectival – ‘the manner in which the historian approaches and interprets the past is 
influenced by her own concerns and by the concerns of the community and period in which she lives’.49  
Fisher outlines four competing methodological approaches to intellectual history: structuralism, 
contextualism, textualism and new historicism – and suggests that textualists in particular contend that 
intellectual history should ‘become more openly perspectival and acknowledge that there are many 
plausible interpretations of any given document.’50  They also allow for more of a dialogue between the 
present and the past which ‘liberates histories to ask of old texts frankly anachronistic questions – 
questions that pertain to the historian’s current concerns and would have meant little to the authors of 
those texts.’51  I saw my own work as openly perspectival with presentist concerns –recovering some of 
the insights of the era of the Great Depression in order to reflect on our own Great Recession.   
In terms of methodology, I followed the approach of Quentin Skinner and the ‘Cambridge school’ of 
history.52  Skinner has argued forcefully against the practice of understanding (philosophical) texts 
ahistorically, as if they contain universal concepts unchanging over time.   Rather he calls for the radical 
contextualisation of texts and concepts; as a historian of ideas, he demands that ideas are located in the 
historical context in which they emerged and were elaborated.53  He argues that a full understanding of a 
text ‘can never be achieved simply by studying the text itself’, as philosophers (and human rights lawyers) 
often tend to do54, but requires an understanding of the context of the time in which the texts were 
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written.  Further, he argues that concepts or texts should be understood not simply in terms of what they 
‘mean’, but by what they were ‘doing’.  Building on John Austin’s theory of ‘speech acts’, which holds 
that all speech is an act that aims to serve a particular purpose, Skinner asks of historical texts:  What 
were their authors doing in writing them?  Who were they arguing against?   What change were they trying 
to effect?55 
I incorporated this approach into my work by asking of the actors and the texts in this story: What were 
they arguing against?  Who or what was their target?  What assumptions were they attacking?  What were 
they aiming to change?  What language were they using and what did this mean at the time?  And how 
might our own understanding of their actions or work shift if we look at the context in which they were 
undertaken?  Thus I asked for example: What were the institutional economists of the ‘first law and 
economics movement’ arguing against?  What was Roosevelt trying to do when he called for a ‘re-
definition of rights’?  What was Keynes doing when he called for ‘full employment’?  What ideas were 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights challenging in their early elaboration of the 
rights and how did they do this?  Keeping these questions in mind made it easier to grasp complex texts 
of economic and legal theory, and demanded understanding their political intent.    
Skinner makes the further important point that it is not enough to simply read off the ‘meanings’ or 
‘doings’ from the economic and social context in which arguments were made or texts written.  He argues 
it is critical also to ‘situate the text in its linguistic or ideological context’ linking it to other texts ‘written 
or used in the same period’.56  He demands that we look not only at context, but also at the ‘linguistic 
conventions’ that governed at the time - that is the linguistic and intellectual contexts in which the new 
ideas arose and the arguments on which the authors sought to have some impact.  Skinner thus speaks 
of the ‘wider linguistic context’ of utterances: the language conventions determining the expressions 
dominant at a particular time.  He suggests this may require looking at the ‘pre-history’ of the concept, 
that is, at the historical period that precedes the emergence of the concept.57  Skinner suggests that this 
contextual and linguistic approach can ‘free us to re-imagine [concepts] in different and perhaps more 
fruitful ways’.58 
Skinner’s approach to placing texts not only in their historical context but also in their linguistic context, 
proved fruitful for my research.  One striking example was that it pushed me to revisit the meaning of 
the strange phrasing in ICESCR Article 2.1 on the use of the ‘maximum available resources’.  As I was 
reading other texts ‘written or used in the same period’ (as Skinner suggests), I found this same phrase 
emerging across other texts also shaped by the discursive context of economic Keynesianism.  By 
situating the ICESCR (and the Universal Declaration which preceded it) within the historical context of 
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the Keynesian era in which these human rights documents emerged, and linking this to other 
contemporaneous texts and their ‘linguistic conventions’, I found evidence to suggest that, at least in its 
very initial formulation (in the 1947 US proposal mentioned above), the meaning of ‘maximum use of 
available resources’ was linked to Keynesian demands for the ‘full employment’  - that is, the ‘maximum 
use’ of all available resources (so ‘men and machines’ were not left idle).  This is significant since this not 
only challenges the apparent prosaicness of the literal meaning of these words, but it suggests that the 
idea of the ‘maximum use of available resources’ was not initially aimed as a limiting clause for the 
implementation of economic and social rights (in accordance with limited available resources) as it is 
commonly understood today.  Rather it was entirely the opposite - it was an exhortation for governments 
to intervene in the economy to spend more, to ensure the ‘maximum use’ or ‘full employment’ of all 
available unemployed resources.  It was, in other words, an exhortation to avoid austerity, to avoid strict 
balanced budgets - in short, to adopt counter-cyclical Keynesian fiscal policies.  The text (at least in its 
first incarnation) was ‘doing’ something very different from how it is now interpreted. 
However, I also show below how this economic understanding of the phrase - and even an awareness of 
this debate - quickly became lost and obscured in the international negotiations over the UDHR and the 
ICESCR as lawyers and diplomats took over from economists in the drafting process.  In my review of 
the travaux preparatoires of the UDHR and the ICESCR, I found that it was a futile task to search for any 
‘original’ meaning of a word or phrase in the negotiated international agreements, as multiple voices and 
multiple meanings competed to be heard, and no ‘original’ meaning of any word can be found except 
where there is a clear negotiation and a definition that is clearly recorded.  Nonetheless even as this 
Keynesian meaning appears to have been quickly lost, reading the phrase ‘maximum available resources’ 
with a Keynesian eye unsettles our contemporary interpretation of Article 2.1 and offers important 
insights worth recovering today for insights into our own economic crisis.  It also shows how it is 
important to reflect reflexively on how legal texts are shaped by the linguistic or discursive contexts in 
which they emerge, and analogously, how our own reading of the text is shaped by our own discursive 
context and disciplinary eye.   
Given my focus on this thesis on particular phrasings and on linguistic context, I use a (somewhat 
unconventional) approach of underlining words in my text and in quotations to trace and highlight 
particular phrasings.  I emphasise here then, that all the underlined text in this thesis marks my own 
emphasis, not the emphasis of the authors themselves.  I clarify this here to avoid repeating this in every 
citation.   
I would also clarify that in this thesis, I look at ‘economic and social rights’ as a group or ‘category’ of 
rights as they emerged in international law.  I do not look at the detailed histories of the different specific 
rights, such as the right to education, right to health or labour rights. Rather I focus on how and why this 
‘category’ of rights emerged as international ‘human rights’ at the international level in UDHR and the 
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1.4 Outline of the thesis 
After this introduction, the first part of this thesis, challenging Moyn’s revisionist assertion that ‘human 
rights’ emerged in the 1940s by accident, argues that the phrase ‘human rights’ emerged in the 1930s as 
part of a very deliberate challenge to liberal ‘property rights’ and laissez-faire constitutionalism in the 
United States during the Great Depression.  I show how the new ‘economic and social rights’ were shaped 
first by the theories of the legal realists and institutional economists and later by economic Keynesianism.  
The story starts with an overview of the legal realists and the institutional economists who made up what 
Hovencamp has called the ‘first great law and economics movement’ and what Fried calls the ‘progressive 
assault on laissez-faire’.61  I then show how these ideas influenced President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who 
called for a ‘re-definition of rights’ and a new constitutional economic order from his 1932 election 
campaign onwards, campaigning against ‘do nothing government’ by challenging laissez faire economics 
and the primacy granted to the classical liberal rights of life, liberty and property, culminating in what 
Ackerman has called the 1936 ‘constitutional moment’ and the 1937 ‘switch in time’ of the US Supreme 
Court.  Faced with another major economic recession that started in 1937, I then explore how Roosevelt’s 
‘new’ rights came to be increasingly influenced by Keynesian economic theory, largely through the work 
of his National Resources Planning Board, culminating in Roosevelt’s 1944 economic bill of rights and a 
draft 1945 Full Employment Bill that aimed to ‘constitutionalise’ Keynesian, anti-austerity fiscal policy as 
a duty of the (federal) government. 
The second part then traces how these domestic US conceptions then fed into the international level, 
through the 1945 UN Charter commitments to ESCR, larger freedom and full employment, and the 
placing of human rights squarely in the economic and social responsibilities of the new international 
organisation.  Drawing on the original archival material mentioned above, I then trace further how these 
US conceptions profoundly influenced the nature and scope of ‘economic and social rights’ as they 
emerged during the drafting of the 1948 UDHR and the 1966 ICESCR, including examining the 
Keynesian roots of ‘maximum available resources’ and exploring why the right to property was included 
in the UDHR but left out of both of the binding Covenants.  I suggest that formalising ESCR in the 
international human rights instruments was an attempt to ‘freeze’ the New Deal vision of ESCR and 
‘embedded liberalism’ into (international) law.  However, I also show how this was strongly contested in 
the US domestic context, with standard conservative tropes that ESCR (and thus Roosevelt’s rights) were 
alien and un-American and of communist influence, and I describe the eventual reassertion of the classical 
liberal rights to life, liberty and property and the re-emergence of (neo)classical economics and 
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(neo)liberalism, culminating in Reagan’s 1987 economic bill of rights, with four freedoms designed 
precisely to reverse Roosevelt’s.     
The third part then shows how these rights were later elaborated by the UN Committee on ESCR, again 
in the context of economic crises and again as a challenge to economic (neo)liberalism, first in the context 
of structural adjustment and later of the 2008 global financial and economic crisis.  I show how the 
Committee elaborated Article 2.1 in the context of structural adjustment, trying to prevent all-out 
retrogression by establishing a ‘minimum core’, and how the ‘respect, protect and fulfil’ framework 
implicitly contested the (neo)liberal ‘minimal state’ and the primacy of ‘negative’ rights.  Finally, I look at 
the AAAQ framework and show how the Committee’s early conceptualisation of the rights was 
influenced by the heterodox economics of Amartya Sen, including his concepts of entitlement, 
capabilities and ‘human development’.  However, I argue that many of the key theoretical insights that 
shaped these rights during the Great Depression have been lost, in ways that circumscribe their power 
to challenge economic (neo)liberalism, leaving ESCR a ‘powerless companion’ in the 
‘constitutionalisation of austerity’ in our own Great Recession. 
Ultimately, I show that the modern international human rights regime emerged in the post-war era not 
only as a response to the Holocaust or the experience of total war, but also as a response to the human 
misery of the Great Depression and its global impacts.  I show how ‘economic and social rights’ became 
international human rights, not only as an afterthought or on the insistence of socialist states, but because 
they were also central to shifts within ‘western’ economic liberalism.62  What was new about ‘human 
rights’ was not merely their appeal to a supra-state, international power, but a new conception of the 
(economic) responsibilities of the state towards its citizens.  I also seek to show that ESCR have emerged 
and been elaborated in times of economic crises, shaped by the theories of heterodox economics63, as 
part of a consistent (liberal) challenge to economic (neo)liberalism. 
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2. EMERGENCE: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
2.1 The Great Depression, the New Deal and ‘new rights’ in the United States 
Against Moyn’s assertion that ‘human rights entered history as a throwaway line’ through Roosevelt’s 
‘careless phraseology’ in the 1940s, this section details how President Franklin Roosevelt first called for 
a ‘re-definition of rights’ and came to use the phrase ‘human rights’ in the 1930s during the Great 
Depression, as part of a deliberate strategy to challenge to ‘classical laissez faire constitutionalism’ and to 
construct a new ‘economic constitutional order’.  I show how Roosevelt’s ‘new’ rights challenged the 
classical rights to life, liberty and property, adding new ‘economic and social rights’ to a revised list of 
liberal rights that he called ‘human rights’.  While Moyn suggests that ‘no evidence has been discovered 
to explain why and when the phrase appeared as it did’ and that the ‘search is based on the mistaken 
assumption that what is now so meaningful could not have emerged by accident’64 this section shows 
that, to the contrary, there is much historical evidence that suggests the emergence of ‘human rights’ in 
the New Deal era was very far from being an ‘accident’.  The fact that this understanding of ‘human 
rights’ may not fit with Moyn’s own definition of the phrase, does not make it a less important part of 
their history. 
This section of the thesis sets the emergence of economic and social rights in the United States in the 
context of the deep economic crisis of the Great Depression of the 1930s and the profound shift this 
precipitated in classical liberalism.  I first show how much of the groundwork for the emergence of ideas 
of ‘economic and social rights’ (in liberal thought in the United States) was laid in the ‘progressive assault 
on laissez-faire’65 at the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century by the American legal realists 
and institutional economists, a group which Herbert Hovencamp described as ‘the first great law and 
economics movement.’66  I then show how these ideas came to influence Roosevelt’s ‘redefinition of 
rights’ and the construction of the New Deal, culminating in the ‘greatest conflict of economic and 
constitutional philosophy of the times’ during the 1936 ‘constitutional moment’.   
The next section then explores how, after a precipitous fall into another severe recession in 1937, the 
Roosevelt administration came to be increasingly influenced by the economic theories of  John Maynard 
Keynes.  The conceptualisation of  Roosevelt’s ‘new rights’ also came to be grounded in Keynesian 
economic theory through the work of  Roosevelt’s ‘National Resources Planning Board’ (NRPB), 
culminating in Roosevelt’s 1944 ‘Second Bill of  Rights’, and in an attempt to ‘constitutionalise’ Keynesian 
economic planning in the draft Full Employment Bill of  1945.   
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2.2 Challenging classical liberal rights and constitutional laissez faire 
2.2.1 Roosevelt and the influence of the legal realists and institutional economists  
This story starts then with the ideas of the legal realists and the institutional economists and their attack 
on the ‘constitutionalisation’ of laissez-faire liberalism in both law and economics at turn from the 
nineteenth to the twentieth century.  I first argue that, just as the legal realists sought to challenge the 
deductive formalism of ‘law as science’ and its apolitical pretensions, the institutional economists sought 
to challenge a similar trend towards ‘economics as science’ and attempts to cast economic laws as 
inexorable, apolitical ‘laws of nature’.  Both criticised law and economics as increasingly unrealistic and 
irrelevant to the changing circumstances of the times.  I suggest below that both the legal realists and the 
institutional economists were attacking formalism, but many of them were attacking more than that; they 
were attacking what was being formalised.  They were attacking the formalisation, ‘naturalisation’ and 
constitutionalisation of laissez-faire liberalism, and the ‘naturalness’ and privileging of very restricted 
notions of classical liberal rights grounded in an absolute right to property and a derived right to freedom 
of contract.67  It was an attack as Horwitz has pointed out, against attempts to ‘freeze’68 particular ideas 
into unchanging legal doctrine and inexorable economic laws. 
In the face of the empirical brutality of industrialisation, the massive concentration of economic power 
and the ravages of increasing inequality, the legal realists like the institutional economists (following the 
‘progressives’ before them) sought to show that the law, like the market, was not natural, neutral or even 
necessary - both were historically contingent, socially constructed and mutually constitutive.  The laws of 
economics - and the distribution of wealth and power they implied - were not natural and inexorable but 
were socially constructed and thus could be changed - by changing the institutions or ‘working rules’ of 
the economy.  ‘Natural’ rights were not natural and ‘laissez-faire’ was a myth, since so-called ‘free’ markets 
were shot through with all sorts of coercion, most obviously the coerciveness of massive economic power 
of corporations and less obviously the coercion of the state through the enforcement and privileging of 
the peculiar rights to property and liberty of contract, to the exclusion of other kinds of rights.  These 
theorists thus challenged laissez faire liberalism, economic power and economic inequality, opening up 
new ways of thinking about rights, and setting the groundwork for the emergence of concepts of 
‘economic and social rights’ within ‘western’ economic liberalism. 
I then trace how these ideas came to be reflected in Roosevelt’s ‘redefinition of rights’ and in the 
legislative and administrative project of the New Deal of the 1930s, arguing that the New Deal in turn 
was partly an effort to shift what was being formalised through the ‘constitutionalisation’ or at the least the 
legislation of, different legal and economic rules and institutions, constraining markets and reflecting the 
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wider shift towards ‘embedded liberalism’.  I show how this culminated in what Ackerman has labelled 
the 1936 ‘constitutional moment’, and document how the press labelled this at the time as ‘the greatest 
conflict of constitutional and economic philosophy’, characterising Roosevelt’s challenge as a stark 
conflict between ‘human rights versus property rights’.  I also show how, while Roosevelt put this 
constitutional conflict at the centre of his 1936 election strategy, he chose not to directly attack the US 
Supreme Court (despite their overturning much of New Deal legislation as ‘unconstitutional’), but rather 
went after an organization called the ‘American Liberty League’, set up to protect the classical economic 
and legal orthodoxy.  It was only after Roosevelt won by a massive landslide in the 1936 election, that he 
more directly challenged the Supreme Court in his 1937 ‘court-packing plan’, precipitating the infamous 
‘switch in time that saved nine’ that marked a long-term shift in the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
philosophy, changing the direction of its judgements on New Deal legislation from 1937 onwards. 
The legal realists and the institutional economists - the ‘First Great Law and Economics 
Movement’ 
While American Legal Realism has been caricatured and even ridiculed as the ‘gastronomic theory’ of 
law, given Jerome Frank’s irreverent assertion that a judge’s decision could be determined by what he 
had for breakfast as much as by the ‘law’69 - the legal realist movement was in fact a profoundly unsettling 
challenge to contemporaneous legal orthodoxy that continues to have unsettling implications today.   
Although much of the legal literature sees legal realism as confined to the period between 1920 and the 
early 1930s on the basis of Karl Llewellyn’s rather idiosyncratic branding of the ‘movement’,70 I follow 
the wider definition adopted by Horwitz which includes a broader swathe of important American jurists 
from Supreme Court judges, Holmes to Brandeis to Cardozo and Frank, others such as Wesley Hohfeld, 
and the institutional economists, especially Richard T. Ely and John R. Commons, as well as Robert Lee 
Hale and Adolph A. Berle, covering a significantly longer period from approximately 1880 to 1930.71 
American legal realism was not, as Horwitz has pointed out, ‘a coherent intellectual movement’ and nor 
was it emblematic of a ‘consistent or systematic jurisprudence’,72 but it did have one key unifying thread, 
which was a broad attack on ‘legal formalism’ – or what Oliver Wendell Holmes acidly called ‘legal 
theology’73 and Jerome Frank later labelled ‘legal fundamentalism’.74 
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This ‘legal formalism’ is often characterised as that of Christopher Columbus Langdell, (appointed Dean 
of Harvard Law School in 1870) who argued that law should be seen as a science with the library of case 
law as its workshop,75 although somehow its principles should be based on the cases that were ‘right’ 
rather than the cases were ‘wrong’.76 Jerome Frank, in his irreverent style, contrasted ‘legal realism’ with 
‘legal Bealism’ after Joseph Beale (a member of Harvard Law School faculty from 1890-1937) who had 
called for laws based on the ‘purity of doctrine’, free from the ‘warping of bad precedent’.77  The 
underlying jurisprudential premise was that ‘there is such a thing as the one true rule of law, which being 
discovered, will endure, without change’ and that judges should base their decisions on this unchanging 
rule of law.78  Gilmore acerbically suggests that this concept of law had acquired such an ‘extraordinary 
hold’ on the legal and popular mind at the beginning of the twentieth century, that Benjamin Cardozo’s 
‘hesitant confession’ in his 1921 book The Nature of Judicial Process ‘that judges were, on rare occasions, 
more than simple automata, that they made law instead of merely declaring it’ was ‘widely regarded as a 
legal version of hard-core pornography’.79  
Many of the legal realists by contrast, suggested the judicial decisions should be understood sociologically, 
rather than relying on illusory deductive principles of law, that they should allow for the creativity of judges 
in the face of change, based on inductive analysis of concrete social reality and empirical evidence available 
from sociological and statistical data about the actual harms caused in particular cases.80  Decisions should 
also take account of the likely consequences of legal decisions, through an understanding of the social 
contexts in which the legal rules would operate.81 In other words, the ‘law in action’ and pragmatic, 
sociological reasoning was just as, if not more, important than the ‘law in books’ or reasoning from legal 
precedent.  Holmes was already suggesting this in 1897 in his Path of the Law where he declares:   
‘It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry 
IV.  It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the 
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.’82 
 
Institutional economics was similarly engaged in a ‘revolt against formalism’ that took place in economics, 
more or less at the same time that it was taking place in the law, between around 1880-1930.  The 
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institutional economists were made up by young American scholars after World War I, but drew heavily 
on the earlier turn-of-the-century economists such as Thorstein Veblen and John R. Commons.83 Like 
legal realism, institutional economics cannot be described as a coherent intellectual movement, and nor 
was it a systematic set of approaches to studying economics, but it similarly represented a profound 
challenge to contemporaneous economic orthodoxy.  Its key unifying thread was the challenge to the 
increasingly formalistic and mathematical doctrines in economics84 which institutionalists saw as 
‘unrealistic’. ‘Economic formalism’ was understood as the reductionist project of orthodox economic 
analysis using abstract deductive reasoning to derive a particular set of axioms that could then be 
formalised – mathematically - and generalised as universally applicable and unchanging in all contexts 
and all times.85 
The institutionalists disparaged the classical economists as being ‘extraordinarily incurious as to what was 
actually going on’86 and argued that this classical doctrine rested on assumptions that bore little relation 
to reality.  The institutionalists called for inductive analysis of the institutions of the actually existing 
economy, rather than the sterilities of static equilibrium theory.  Drawing from the earlier German 
historical school, they emphasised the dynamics of change, and the ‘need to use empirical data (rather 
than abstract ideas) to ground economic theories, and the necessity of paying particular attention to 
human institutions’.87 Drawing also from the earlier studies by Veblen, the institutional economists paid 
particular attention to the social construction of institutions and the ways in which they exercised 
economic power.  Following John R. Commons, they also focused closely on the legal-economic nexus 
and the peculiarly legal construction of economic institutions.88 Together with the legal realists, these 
economists made up ‘the first great law and economics movement.’89 
Revolting against the laws of laissez faire liberalism 
Under classical liberalism, it was assumed that state was the main threat to the individual through its 
potential to abuse its coercive power, and thus the role of the law was to set limits on the power of the 
state.  In laissez faire economic liberalism, this idea was extended to suggest that the state should be limited 
and refrain from abusing its power by avoiding arbitrary interference in the private sphere of the economy 
– including interfering with the so-called ‘natural’ rights to liberty and property.90 Classical economic 
liberalism (then, as now) was grounded in the notion of the ‘self-regulating market’ which, if left free 
from interference by the state, would automatically create a harmony between individual interest and 
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social welfare through the operation of an ‘invisible hand’.91 In this view, the unhindered operation of 
the market would automatically result in the best possible outcome - both in terms of the most efficient 
distribution of resources, and in terms of the most ‘just’ distribution of resources – since it results from 
the neutral operation of neutral market forces (as opposed to coercive redistribution by the state).92 
Under the ‘marginalist revolution’ that occurred at the end of the nineteenth century, it was also argued 
that the competitive market would pay labour an amount exactly equal to the value each individual added, 
so in the absence of monopoly, wages could never be unjust.93  It was argued that since free markets 
operated by voluntary exchange, they could never be coercive.  Any economic power that might exist 
through monopoly was assumed away since it would always be automatically dissipated by the workings 
of competition in the market mechanism. The state should refrain from interfering with the operation of 
this market mechanism, which would operate perfectly in the absence of interference, and any form of 
state intervention (regulation or redistribution) which would likely have unexpected and unjust 
consequences.94 
At the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, the classical economists sought to cast the laws 
of economics as ‘natural’ and discoverable like the laws of physics – and argued that it was the duty of 
the state to allow the operation of these immutable, inexorable economic ‘laws of nature’.  Classical 
economic theory, in works such as Herbert Spencer’s 1851 Social Statics and 1891 Justice (where Spencer 
coined the expression before Darwin of the ‘survival of the fittest’) grounded this version of liberalism 
in the sacredness and inviolability of the rights of property and the freedom to exchange that property.95 
As Kennedy points out, the classicists emphasised the ‘naturalness’ of existing institutions, the ‘freedom’ 
of economic processes – and they spent little time providing actual sociological or economic evidence 
for their claims, but rather spent time seeking to convince readers of the naturalness of the existing 
economic order, the ‘sacredness’ of property, the ‘absoluteness’ of property and contract rights and the 
‘justice’ or ‘fairness’ of the ‘natural outcomes’ of the workings of these ‘free’ processes.96 
At that time however, this form of classical liberalism was increasingly under pressure in the face of brutal 
economic conditions and rapidly rising inequality.  In the midst of rapid industrialisation and the 
consolidation of enormous corporate economic power in industry and finance combined with cut-throat 
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competition, social tensions were running high.  Daily life was hard and workers faced long hours, low 
wages, and often dangerous industrial accidents and unsanitary conditions– trade unions had started to 
challenge employers for better working conditions and wages, and social reformers were calling for 
changes to improve living conditions.  Throughout the period from 1880-1930, which was wracked by 
economic crises, there was an ebbing and flowing in administrative and legislative attempts to challenge 
the power of large corporations and to provide more rights and benefits to working people, but this faced 
powerful resistance - including resistance of the federal and state courts in the United States, which 
overturned much social legislation on the basis of its ‘unconstitutionality’.  As the ever-insightful Holmes 
dryly observed in 1897, ‘people who no longer hope to control the legislatures, […] look to the courts as 
expounders of the constitutions and in some courts, new principles have been discovered outside the 
bodies of those instruments, which may be generalized into acceptance of economic doctrines that 
prevailed about fifty years ago.’97 
One case that has long served as a lightning rod of the legal realist debate is that of Lochner v. New York 
(1905) of the US Supreme Court.  In that case, the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional the 1895 New 
York State Bakeshop Act which limited the working hours of bakers to 60 hours per week for health 
reasons.  Despite receiving evidence that workers were required to work excessive hours in appalling 
sanitary conditions that severely affected their health, the Court struck down the regulation, on the basis 
that the workers had freely entered into their work contract, and the state and the law had no business 
meddling with people’s right to buy and sell their own labour under conditions of ‘freedom of contract’:  
‘There is no reasonable ground, on the score of health, for interfering with the liberty of the person or the 
right of free contract…. Nor can a law limiting such hours be justified a health law to safeguard the public 
health, or the health of the individuals…. Section 110 of the labor law of the State of New York, providing 
that no employees shall be required or permitted to work in bakeries more than sixty hours in a week, or ten 
hours a day, is .... an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right and liberty of the 
individual to contract in relation to labor, and, as such, it is in conflict with, and void under, the Federal 
Constitution.’98 
 
Justice Holmes’ in his (1905) minority dissent criticised the Court’s reading of the freedom of contract as 
a ‘perversion’ of the meaning of liberty in the fourteenth amendment, one that reflected laissez faire 
economic theory.  He argued that the Court had decided the case on the basis of ‘an economic theory 
which a large part of the country does not entertain’ and that the ‘Fourteenth Amendment does not enact 
M. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics’, insisting that ‘[A] Constitution is not intended to embody a particular 
economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez 
faire.’99 Critical scholars, such as Duncan Kennedy, have pointed out that ‘freedom of contract’ is not 
expressly protected in the Constitution, thus the Court ‘invented’ this right of freedom of contract by 
reading it into the ‘due process clause’ – reflecting the  ‘right-wing judicial activism’ of the Court during 
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the ‘Lochner era’.100 Holmes at the time warned against the Court’s constitutionalisation of  laissez faire, 
not because he was particularly progressive (he wasn’t), but rather because he did not believe that one 
particular set of logical axioms could ever resolve fundamental conflicts over legal theories or values.101 
Holmes insisted that ‘General propositions do not decide individual cases’ reflecting the reaction against 
general deductive propositions and anticipating the challenge to legal formalism.  In his 1897 Path of the 
Law, he argued that ‘The danger of which I speak… is the notion that a given system, ours, for instance, 
can be worked out like mathematics from some general axioms of conduct’.102   
Writing in the context of rapid industrialisation and the rising inequality that was generating such social 
struggle, the legal realists, like the institutional economists, took forward this revolt against laissez faire 
constitutionalism, reacting at the moves of the judiciary to strike down social legislation.  More than 
attacking formalism then, they were attacking what was being formalised.  They were also doing more than 
that – they were setting the groundwork for a new vision of rights and (economic) liberalism, by 
challenging the central tenets of classical laissez faire liberalism.  While the legal realists attacked the tenets 
of ‘classical legal thought’, the institutional economists attacked the key tenets of ‘classical economic 
theory’.103  In particular, they challenged the apparent neutrality and ‘naturalness’ of laissez faire principles.  
They showed that, despite the efforts of the legal and economic orthodoxies to present the state and the 
law as neutral, in fact both the state and the law were heavily implicated in structuring the ‘working rules’ 
of the economic game through the ways in which they coercively enforced private power - and the state 
and the law were thus heavily implicated in the distribution of wealth and economic power.   Aside from 
the explicit references in Holmes’ dissent, these themes can be seen across a range of legal realist writings, 
including for example, those of Roscoe Pound, Walter Wheeler Cook, Morris Cohen and John Dawson 
and the writings of the institutional economists Robert Hale and John R. Commons.104 All of these 
worked in different ways to challenge classical liberalism, its peculiar legal institutions of property and 
contract, and the inequalities of wealth and power that these institutions were so manifestly producing.  
Their work undercut the key tenets of the classical liberalism by showing how the state, through its 
peculiar legal institutions coercively created markets in ways that were historically contingent and socially 
constructed, and thus could be changed.  They also argued that the assumed neutrality of these 
institutions was a myth - Robert Hale for example showed that it was the particular kinds of legal rules 
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enforced by the state that determined the distribution of income and wealth.  Commons also argued that 
‘the economists have taken the laws of private property for granted, assuming that they are fixed and 
immutable’, when such laws are in fact, and should be understood, as ‘changeable’ as the rules of property 
have a ‘profound influence on the production and distribution of wealth.’105  To suggest then that judges 
and the law should not be involved in decisions of distributive justice, was to fundamentally deny that 
judges and the law were already thoroughly implicated in the extant distribution of wealth, through their 
enforcement of the peculiar institutions or ‘entitlements’ of property and contract. 
From this perspective, laissez-faire was a myth and free markets were not really ‘free’; they were shot 
through with the coercion of the state, by its enforcement and privileging of these rights to property and 
liberty of contract - institutions that were historically specific, developed and designed to support the 
market economy.106 This insight worked to break down the sharp distinction between the public and 
private spheres, arguing that the state was fundamentally implicated in all ‘private’ transactions.107  Laissez-
faire did not and could not exist because the market was not ‘self-regulating’, it was regulated by the state 
through the law of property and contract.   
John R. Commons’ work on the legal-economic nexus showed how the law and markets were mutually 
constitutive, and how the state itself determined the ‘working rules’ of the economic game, thus 
structuring apparently ‘free’ markets and their outcomes.  Private power was largely constituted and 
enforced by the public power of the state through the law – Commons even argued that the state itself 
‘consists in the enforcement by physical sanctions of what private parties might otherwise endeavour to 
enforce by private violence.’108  From this perspective, the liberal dichotomy between state and market 
was false and the issue was not one of more or less government, or more or less interference in the 
economy, but rather a political question of ‘how the ubiquitous authority of government is to be exercised 
within the economic system: who is to be exposed to the coercion of whom, and to what extent’.109 
As Morris Cohen noted ‘...in enforcing contracts, the government does not merely allow two individuals 
to do what they have found pleasant to their eyes.  Enforcement, in fact, puts the machinery of the law 
in the service of one party against the other.’110  Or as John Dawson put it, the doctrine of laissez faire left 
‘individuals and groups [free] to coerce one another, with the power to coerce reinforced by the agencies 
of the state itself’.111 
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The realists challenged empty notions of formal equality in the context of unequal economic power 
between powerful employers and their workers.  Writing on Adair v. United States (1908) in which the 
Supreme Court again relied on the notion of ‘freedom of contract’ to strike down legislation to limit 
‘yellow-dog’ contracts (which prohibited workers from joining a union),112 Roscoe Pound despaired at 
how the Court could insist on ‘freedom of contract’ and on the essential equality between the massive 
railroad corporation and individual workers ‘in the face of practical conditions of inequality....  Why is 
the legal conception of the relation of employer and employee so at variance with the common knowledge 
of mankind?’113  Writing on Ritchie v. People (1895) when the Supreme Court of Illinois struck down a 
statute limiting working hours for women and children in factories and workshops (to make it unlawful 
for employers to force employees to work 16 hour days),114 Commons cited an opinion piece published 
in the Chicago Times Herald which declared: ‘There is a ghastly sort of irony in the attempt of the Supreme 
Court to explain or excuse its decision upon the plea that it is protecting the rights of the weak individuals 
with labor to sell’.115 
Many of these theorists thus suggested that the notion of formal equality presupposed by the courts 
completely ignored the manifest inequality between workers and employers.  When the courts argued 
that workers entered freely into the yellow-dog contracts, the court was clearly failing to reflect on the 
extent to which workers were acting from necessity rather than from choice, in the context of their 
massively unequal bargaining power.  The realists suggested then that, in their formalistic pretence of 
protecting the freedom of both sides, the courts’ insistence that the state refrain from interference in 
cases such as Lochner or Adair, was an obfuscation of their privileging of the rights of the stronger party 
against the weaker party.  Laissez faire principles simply meant leaving the powerless at the mercy of the 
powerful, and the courts prohibited the state to intervene to assist the powerless.   
As Commons argued, the issue was not one of freedom per se, but whose freedom; ‘that is: freedom for 
the employers to command employees to work 16 hours per day versus freedom for the employees from 
injurious commands of their employers.’116  In such decisions, the courts were making a political choice 
between competing interests and conceptions of liberty.  As John Dawson noted, there was a choice 
between a ‘freedom of the ‘market’ from external regulation’ or the freedom of individuals achieved 
through ‘regulating the pressures that restricted individual choice’ through concepts such as duress.117  
The relevant question was not whether or not there was regulation (as clearly the enforcement of property 
and contract constituted regulation, just as much as any limitations on those rights would constitute 
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regulation).  The relevant question was the ‘rules of the game’ and how those rules or institutions 
structured whose interests and rights were being protected and what distribution of power was being 
enforced.   
Although classical theory assumed that only state power was coercive, with the increasing concentration 
of economic power, it had become clear that private power could be equally, if not more, coercive.  The 
rising power of corporations was a particular concern of the classic 1932 work, The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property, by Adolphe Berle and Gardiner Means (who were later both to become key actors in the 
Roosevelt administration) which looked at the rise of the corporation through an economic and legal 
lens, concerned that ‘the power attendant upon such concentration has brought forth princes of industry’ 
and the separation between ownership and control had eliminated some of the traditional controls on 
that power.118 
These theorists challenged laissez faire by focusing on economic power and economic inequality, in ways 
that began to conceive of the possibility of protecting individuals against corporate power, using state 
power to secure freedom of individuals from coercive market power rather than freedom of the market 
from the state.  It was not the market, or the corporations, that were in need of protection from the state, 
it was the workers and ordinary people who needed protection from market power.  Thus, rather than it 
being the duty of the state to protect the laissez faire workings of the inexorable, economic ‘laws of nature’, 
it should be the duty of the state to use, what Galbraith later called its ‘countervailing power’,119 to protect 
the weak and powerless against private economic power.  The liberal duty to refrain from interference in 
the market economy was a myth, as the state was already systematically intervening in the economy; what 
was important was the duty to change the ‘working rules’ and institutions of the economy.  This began 
then to shift notions of the role of the state in the economy, as well as to open up new ways for thinking 
about rights. 
Revolting against the construction of particular rights as ‘natural’ rights 
The legal realists and institutional economists were not socialists, they were liberals - but they were seeking 
a new kind of liberalism and a law and economics that, as Pound famously exhorted, put the ‘human 
factor in the central place.’120  As liberals, they were not against the right to property in toto, rather they 
were attacking the ‘absoluteness’ that was granted to the right to property and the derived right to free 
exchange, at the expense of any other kinds of rights.  They challenged the ‘naturalisation’ and 
‘constitutionalisation’ of very peculiar, and historically contingent, notions of rights of property and 
contract, which had emerged out of natural law doctrine, and were now being presented as ‘natural’ rights 
beyond the reaches of legislative limitations.  Pound, for example criticised Herbert Spencer’s invocation 
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of the inviolability of rights of property and the right of free exchange of that property as ‘natural rights’ 
in Spencer’s 1891 Justice, as relying on an outdated natural law jurisprudence that tried to present those 
rights as absolute and inherent, regardless of actual legislation.121 
Holmes had also pointed out that not all rights could or should be traced back to conceptions of absolute 
property rights or freedom of contract.122  He suggested that the insistence of classical legal thought on 
maintaining the fiction of neutrality through insisting on the freedom of contract of both parties in cases 
such as Lochner, amounted to an avoidance of the recognition that economic struggles involved a conflict 
of rights, with legal rights on both sides of the struggle – the legal rights of the employers were in conflict 
with legal rights of the workers.  For Holmes, this implied the need to recognize rights of both parties 
and to consciously choose between these conflicting rights, through a conscious balancing process, rather 
than through the unarticulated prejudices of legal orthodoxy.123   
Robert Hale argued that, while the right to property is a negative right against the state for the property-
holder, it is not only a negative right against forcible dispossession; it is also a positive right that uses the 
coercion of the state to protect the property-holder against any non-property holder that might need or 
wish to use the property.124  For those who are non-owners of property this is extremely coercive, as if 
the non-owner has no land on which to produce food, the law ‘coerces him into wage-work under penalty 
of starvation’, regardless of the type of wage-work or the coerciveness and unfairness of the demands of 
any particular employer – the worker is hardly ‘free’ not to work in the industrial age.  More heretically, 
Hale even suggested that state power might be used to limit the bargaining power of powerful and to 
create greater bargaining power and ‘freedom’ for the powerless:  
‘.. by judicious legal limitation on the bargaining power of the economically and legally stronger, it is 
conceivable that the economically weak would acquire greater freedom of contract than they now have--
freedom to resist more effectively the bargaining power of the strong, and to obtain better terms.’125 
 
The institutional economist, John R. Commons argued that classical notions of rights based on Locke’s 
‘life, liberty and property’ had become outdated since the Lockean proviso was evidently no longer 
applicable – ‘…. in the nineteenth century, [….] those who did not have rights of property could move 
west and get them.  It is missed in the twentieth century when those who are short on rights are compelled 
to make terms with those who have them’.126  Commons even suggested that in the context of 
industrialisation, with no Lockean proviso, there is no choice but to work, and thus he suggested that 
‘the right to work’ should have the status of a property right, with compensation for injuries and the loss 
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of employment  - and he put this theory into practice by drafting the first legislation on workers 
compensation in Wisconsin (which later served as inspiration for New Deal legislation).127  Indeed, 
Commons was even an early progressive era proponent of the right to work as a ‘human right’, stating in 
his 1893 that: 
‘The right to work, for every man that is willing, is the next great human right to be defined and 
enforced by the law’128 
Applying Wesley Hohfeld’s nuanced categorisation of rights and duties, Commons further argued that 
rights could not be reductionistically derived from the rights of property and contract, but were made up 
of very different ‘legal rights, duties, liberties and exposures’ enforced by the state.129  The ways in which 
rights were legally defined in particular times and particular places thus determined the ways in which 
markets worked.  So-called ‘free’ exchange was fundamentally determined by the ways in which these 
legal rights were allocated, which structured each party’s bargaining power, and thus fundamentally 
shaped distributional outcomes.   Initial legal entitlements would determine the distribution of wealth 
and power.130  However, because the state created the rights through the law, these institutions, or 
‘working rules’, were contingent and could be changed to produce different distributional outcomes.   
These challenges to the ‘naturalness’ of property rights, to the illusion of ‘freedom of contract’ for those 
without bargaining power, and the recognition of the coercive nature of ‘private concentration of 
economic power’131 gradually opened up to a reworking of ideas of rights within the liberal tradition, on 
the basis that ‘Rights… [and] liberty of the individual must be remolded from time to time’132  to meet 
the changing economic reality and the changing political or economic threats to individuals.    
I argue then that the theorists of what Hovencamp has called the ‘first great law and economics 
movement’ were attacking the formalisation, ‘naturalisation’ and constitutionalisation of laissez-faire 
liberalism and the primacy of the classical liberal rights to property and liberty (understood as freedom 
of contract).  They were suggesting that legal institutions, nor the market, were natural, neutral or even 
necessary – both were historically contingent, socially constructed and indeed mutually constitutive.  The 
laws of economics – and the distribution of wealth and power they implied - were not natural and 
inexorable but were socially constructed and could thus be changed.  Designing and creating new 
‘institutions’ or ‘working rules’ of the economy could shift the balance of power for a more equal 
distribution of wealth.  At the same time, ‘natural’ rights were not natural and laissez faire was a myth.  In 
the face of the economic power and economic inequality inherent in laissez-faire constitutionalism, these 
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theorists challenged the role of the state in enforcing these rights and suggested that the state could 
enforce new kinds of rights, institutions or ‘entitlements’.  These ideas, which set the groundwork for the 
emergence of economic and social rights, came to be reflected in Roosevelt’s ‘re-definition’ of rights and 
the legislative and administrative project of the New Deal of the 1930s.  
The influence of the legal realists and institutional economists on Roosevelt’s ‘new’ rights and 
the New Deal ‘constitution’ 
Against the backdrop of the Great Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression and mass poverty and 
unemployment that followed it, Franklin D. Roosevelt won the United States presidential election of 
November 8 1932 in a landslide against his opponent, the Republican President Herbert Hoover.  After 
the election of Roosevelt, many of the influential legal realists and institutional economists of these earlier 
intellectual debates (and their disciples) became key actors in the legislative and administrative project of 
Roosevelt’s New Deal of the 1930s. Progressive lawyers and economists schooled in the ideas of the legal 
realists and of the institutional economists flooded into the administration and were able to put their 
ideas into practice.  Massive legislative and economic change was made in the first 100 days of the 
administration that sought to instantiate a new legal and economic orthodoxy - the New Deal was 
effectively an attempt to fundamentally change what was being formalised in the materialisation and 
legislation (if not constitutionalisation) of a new (more ‘human’) liberal orthodoxy.  
Although, historians of the New Deal have argued that it was not consistently underpinned by any 
economic philosophy,133 a number of scholars have detailed how many of the ideas of the institutional 
economists and legal realists shaped much of the New Deal thinking on rights, as well as the legislative 
and administrative efforts to establish new ‘institutions’ – including unemployment insurance, workmen’s 
compensation, Social Security, labor laws, the regulation of public utilities and plans for health 
insurance.134  John R. Common’s pioneering practical experiments in Wisconsin served as an influential 
model for New Deal experimentation,135 and Commons’ students, such as Edwin E. Witte, Arthur J. 
Altmeyer and Wilbur Cohen played leading roles in the Roosevelt’s Committee on Economic Security, 
developing the federal Social Security programme and drafting the 1935 Social Security Act136 which 
aimed at ‘protecting the individual against the major economic hazards of modern life’137.   
Adolph Berle and Rexford G. Tugwell became members of Roosevelt’s original ‘Brains Trust’ and Wesley 
Mitchell came to play a leading role in Roosevelt’s National Resources Planning Board, as did Gardiner 
Means (a leading advocate of the ‘structuralist’ or ‘planning’ approach that influenced the early New Deal 
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and sought to ‘restructure’ the institutions of the economy).  Berle and Means’ 1932 classic book, The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property also influenced the intellectual grounding of the New Deal.  Felix 
Frankfurter and his ‘boys with their hair on fire’, including Tommy Corcoran and Benjamin Cohen, 
became central to the drafting of New Deal legislation (and both Berle and Cohen were also later to play 
a key role in the US State Department’s engagement in drafting the international bill of rights).138 
Many of the concerns of the legal realists and the institutional economists can be seen reflected in the 
political speeches and ‘fireside chats to the people’ of Franklin Roosevelt during the 1930s and 1940s.  
Coming to power amid the devastation of the Great Depression, Roosevelt’s election campaign 
challenged the failures of President Herbert Hoover to address mass unemployment and misery that 
afflicted millions of Americans.  The Great Crash of 1929 (which wiped out the savings of much of the 
population) and the Great Depression that followed (which left more than a quarter of the population 
unemployed and millions queuing up in breadlines and soup kitchens across the United States), was 
widely blamed on the rampant speculation of rapacious bankers, as was the concentration of economic 
power and the deepening inequality during the ‘Gilded Age’ of the 1920s. 
Roosevelt ridiculed the laissez-faire philosophy of Hoover’s ‘hear-nothing, see-nothing, do-nothing 
Government’139 as spectacularly failing to prevent the rampant speculation on the stock markets that 
produced the 1929 Great Crash, and for spectacularly failing to save people from despair and hunger in 
its aftermath.  He excoriated the ‘economic royalists’ who descended on Washington to beg for 
government help out of the depression, despite their claims to support laissez faire policies – ‘The same 
man who tells you that he does not want to see the government interfere in business…. is the first to go 
to Washington and ask [for help]’140   And he defied the view that it was the duty of the state to allow the 
inexorable operation of the immutable, inexorable economic ‘laws of nature’.   
‘Our Republican leaders tell us economic laws--sacred, inviolable, unchangeable--cause panics which no one 
could prevent. But while they prate of economic laws, men and women are starving. We must lay hold of 
the fact that economic laws are not made by nature. They are made by human beings.’141 
 
From 1932, at the start of his election campaign, and onwards Roosevelt called for a ‘redefinition of 
rights’, a new ‘economic constitutional order’ and an ‘economic declaration of rights’.  In a 1932 campaign 
speech, reportedly drafted mostly by Adolph Berle,142 he insisted that ‘The task of statesmanship has 
always been the re-definition of these rights in terms of a changing and growing social order.’143  In that 
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speech, Roosevelt challenged the classical liberal rights to life, liberty and property, recasting the right to 
life: ‘Every man has a right to life; and this means that he has also a right to make a comfortable living’.  
He also challenged the primacy of property rights, calling for the regulation of the speculators, financiers 
and the ‘princes of property’, and reminding everyone that property rights were a creation of government.  
Echoing Berle’s academic work, he warned that ‘industrial combinations had become great uncontrolled 
and irresponsible units of power within the State’ and ‘if the process of concentration goes on at the same 
rate, at the end of another century, we shall have all American industry controlled by a dozen 
corporations…. Put plainly, we are steering a course toward economic oligarchy, if we are not there 
already.’144  Rather than it being the duty of the state to protect the laissez faire workings of the inexorable, 
economic ‘laws of nature’, he emphasized the duty of the state to challenge the economically powerful 
corporations and the financial system that had created the crisis, and to act to protect ordinary people. 145  
Berle himself explained in 1933 that the New Deal was conceptually based on a ‘recognition of the fact 
that human beings cannot indefinitely be sacrificed by millions to the operation of economic forces’ and 
that it would use the ‘counterbalancing’ power of the state against corporations to ‘grant to every one 
economic security, a chance for self-fulfilment and a right to live’.146  Roosevelt also called for expanding 
the narrow conception of liberal freedom, emphasizing that ‘Necessitous men were not free men (sic)’ 
and called for a ‘greater freedom’ that would integrate the idea of economic security:   
‘I am not for a return to that definition of liberty under which for many years a free people were being 
gradually regimented into the service of the privileged few. I prefer and I am sure you prefer that broader 
definition of liberty under which we are moving forward to greater freedom, to greater security for the 
average man than he has ever known before in the history of America.’147 
 
As Foner argues, Roosevelt self-consciously appropriated and re-described ideas of liberty and 
(economic) freedom.  He abandoned the term ‘progressive’ and chose to use the term ‘liberal’ instead to 
describe his programme, transforming the conception of liberalism ‘from a shorthand for weak 
government and laissez-faire economics into belief in an activist, socially conscious state, an alternative 
both to socialism and to unregulated capitalism’.148 He recast the idea of ‘freedom’ and  juxtaposed a 
vision of liberty, or ‘greater freedom’ with the older notion of freedom of contract which only served the 
interests of the ‘privileged few’.  But rather than replacing the liberal, individualist rights, the New Dealers’ 
‘constitutional revolution’, proposed adding ‘new rights’ to the list of classical rights for a more expansive 
vision of freedom.149  Forbath points out the right to work was also at the heart of Roosevelt’s vision of 
economic security and part of the 1935 Social Security Act that sought to guarantee the ‘opportunity to 
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make a living - a living decent according to the standard of the time’.  Roosevelt re-described the role of 
the state to include ‘inescapable obligations’ to ‘protect the citizen in his right to work and his right to 
live’.150 
As Milkis has also argued: ‘..an understanding of rights dedicated to limiting government gradually gave 
way to a more expansive understanding of rights, requiring a relentless government identification of 
problems and the search for methods by which these problems might be solved.’151  Although these ‘new 
rights’ never reached the status of constitutional rights in the US,152 this was part of what Sunstein has 
called a ‘crucial national judgement made during the Depression: the individual rights, properly 
conceived, included not merely the common law catalogue of private interests, but also governmental 
protection against many of the harms and risks of the market economy.’153   
However, Roosevelt faced increasingly vociferous opposition from anti-New Dealers who charged him 
with ‘making ‘a vast shift’ away from the ‘American concept of human rights’154.  Frequently finding 
against the administration, the US Supreme Court also overturned much early New Deal legislation, as 
the struggle over the New Deal became increasingly a struggle over the definition of ‘rights’ and the 
definition of ‘freedom’, especially ‘economic freedom’ within the Depression economy.   
 
2.2.2 The 1936 Constitutional moment: ‘human rights’ versus ‘property rights’ 
Between 1933 and 1936, the Supreme Court issued at least six major rulings holding New Deal legislation 
unconstitutional, largely on the basis of their violation of the ‘constitutional’ precepts of the right to 
property and the right to freedom of contract, although their judgements were usually framed more 
obliquely through notions of ‘due process’ and the ‘commerce clause.’155  It was not until after 
overwhelmingly winning the 1936 election, when Roosevelt threatened his 1937 ‘court packing’156 plan if 
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the Supreme Court continued to defend the principles of laissez-faire constitutionalism’157 that the ‘nine 
old men’ of the Supreme Court began to shift away from the old legal and economic orthodoxy and 
stopped striking down New Deal initiatives on the basis of their ‘unconstitutionality’.158 
As Forbath has argued however, much of the debate over the New Deal ‘constitutional philosophy’ took 
place not within the Supreme Court itself, but within Congress, in the executive branch and the broader 
public sphere.159  With increasing intensity after the Schechter decision against the National Recovery 
Administration160 despite the persistence of high unemployment, some members of Congress started to 
call for constitutional amendments that would integrate New Deal philosophy explicitly in the 
Constitution.  Congressman Maverick for example suggested that ‘the time has come to extend the Bill 
of Rights to embrace such guarantees as ‘the right to honest work’, an industry-wide ‘minimum standards 
of hours, wages and fair competition’, and the like.’161 
Roosevelt was however wary of trying to ‘constitutionalise’ his new rights, demanding rather that the 
Supreme Court practice judicial restraint and not obstruct democratic legislation.  Forbath suggests that 
the New Dealers, like the legal realists and progressives before them, were convinced that ‘rights should 
be understood in terms of social context and social policy, redeemed and defended through legislative 
deliberation and enactment’, but that they should be ‘kept out of the hands of the legalists and 
formalists’.162  To do otherwise would give the judges and the courts the opportunity to define these 
rights in terms of their ‘inherited and hostile judicial constructions of those very provisions.’163  The New 
Dealers still however worked to counter the ‘old Constitution’s account of economic liberty with a new 
one’ and increasingly framed their public policies in terms of ‘new’ economic and social rights, and 
institutionalised a new role for the government in New Deal legislation.164  
By the time of the 1936 election, Ackerman has controversially argued that Roosevelt brought the choice 
directly to the people, asking them to choose between the constitutional philosophy of the Supreme 
Court and the constitutional philosophy of the New Deal, in what Ackerman calls the 1936 ‘constitutional 
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moment’. 165  Ackerman argues that Roosevelt gave the people a clear choice between a Republican 
definition of liberty ‘tightly linked to principles of limited government, freedom of contract and private  
property’ versus a New Deal definition that ‘modern freedom could only be achieved through the state 
and not against it’, and it was ‘with such questions ring in their ears, Americans went to the polls - and 
gave Roosevelt and the New Deal Congress the greatest victory in American history.’166  Thus the New 
Dealers, in this ‘crushing victory in the Presidential and Congressional elections of 1936.... claimed a 
mandate from the People for their activist vision of American government.’167 And he suggests that even 
though the New Dealers did not formally amend the Constitution, the Court’s later ‘New Deal opinions 
have operated as the functional equivalent of formal constitutional amendments.’168  
However, this element of Ackerman’s thesis has been widely challenged, particularly since Roosevelt 
avoided directly confronting the Supreme Court in his 1936 election rhetoric.  Goldstein has proposed a 
more nuanced view of this thesis – he argues that Roosevelt certainly did make this stark choice over 
constitutional philosophies the centre of his 1936 election campaign, not by directly taking on and 
attacking the Supreme Court, but rather by campaigning instead against a recently established 
conservative organisation, the American Liberty League.  From this perspective, the 1936 election was a 
dispute not between the President and the Court, but between the President and the Liberty League. 169  
The Liberty League served a perfect proxy for the Court, as its distinctly conservative philosophy centred 
around re-establishing the primacy of property rights and freedom of contract, providing a clearer target 
than the more legally complex decisions of the Court.  It was also a much easier political target.   
Goldstein points out that the popular constitutional rhetoric of the 1936 presidential campaign differed 
from the ways in which lawyers discussed constitutional doctrine, just as it differed from the details of 
the landmark decisions of the Supreme Court of the time.  ‘To lawyers and law professors, the central 
constitutional issues of the 1930s addressed the breadth of the Commerce Clause and General Welfare 
Clause and the degree of deference owed to Congress over the reasonableness of federal laws.’  This did 
not mean however that the simpler, popular debate was not a debate over constitutional philosophy.   
And, as I show below, this debate came to be characterised in the press at the time, as a debate over 
‘human rights versus property rights’.  As the New York Times foresaw already in 1934, the clash between 
the Liberty League and the New Deal was to ‘precipitate the greatest conflict of constitutional and 
economic philosophy of the times’.170    
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The American Liberty League’s crusade against Roosevelt’s ‘new’ rights 
The American Liberty League was set up in August 1934, by extremely wealthy and powerful business 
leaders, including the Du Pont family, Alfred P. Sloan, president of General Motors, Edward F. Hutton 
chairman of General Food and J. Howard Pew, president of Sun Oil, as well as a range of conservative, 
anti-Roosevelt Democrats including Jouett Shouse, John Raskob, John David and Alfred E. Smith.171  Its 
explicit purpose was to defend the ‘traditional’ rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution – and 
to challenge the constitutional validity of the New Deal.   
The Liberty League emphasized that its objective was to ‘to teach the duty of government, to encourage 
and protect individual and group initiative and enterprise, to foster the right to work, earn, save and 
acquire property, and to preserve the ownership and lawful use of property when acquired.’172  Its first 
statement of principles also appealed to religion, comparing the Tenth Commandment and with the Fifth 
Amendment of the US Constitution - ‘The one reads: ‘Thou shalt not covet they neighbor’s house’, while 
the other reads: ‘No person shall be deprived of life liberty or property without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation’.173  
At its launch in 1934, Roosevelt immediately publicly ridiculed the League – suggesting it was a church 
devoted to upholding only two of the Ten Commandments and its tenets seemed to be ‘Love thy God, 
but forget thy neighbour’, and suggesting that the wealthy men of the League loved their property but 
little else.   The Wall Street Journal, like other press articles at the time, recorded Roosevelt as criticising 
the Liberty League for laying ‘too much stress on property rights and too little on human rights.’174 
Between 1934 and 1936, the League organised to defeat Roosevelt through a massive public campaign 
to ‘educate the American public on the evils of the New Deal’.175  It vociferously attacked the ‘radical, 
socialistic and un-American values’ of the New Deal through 135 pamphlets, newsletters, legal reports, 
speeches and radio addresses, attacking Roosevelt personally, as well as the constitutional validity of the 
New Deal.  In advance of the 1936 election, the Liberty League built up more financial resources and 
more staff in Washington than the Republican party itself.  Rudolph records that between August 1934 
and November 1936, the League made the front page of the New York Times thirty-five times, and in the 
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absence of strong and organized Republican campaign in the election, the press looked to the Liberty 
League for opposition to New Deal legislative proposals.176 
Its key message was articulated in terms of a commitment to individual liberty and economic freedom, 
protecting ‘natural’ rights especially the right to property and calling on the state to refrain from 
interfering with economic liberties and allow the operation of ‘natural’ economic laws. It warned that 
American constitutional values were under attack177 and that the New Deal threatened to ‘destroy the 
essential features of our government’ and ‘substitute Americanism with Totalitarianism.’178  The League’s 
‘Lawyers Vigilance Committee’ participated directly in litigation against the New Deal legislation, with its 
legal briefs combating the ‘new and virtually unlimited powers of regulation.’179   
The Liberty League also tried to (re)appropriate concepts of economic freedom and (re)define 
Roosevelt’s use of ‘human rights’ again in terms of property rights:  ‘[e]conomic freedom was the 
foundation of all other liberties’180 and that ‘human rights and property rights are inseparable and the 
right to own property is among the most important of human rights.’181  One Liberty League pamphlet 
articulated rights as the ‘natural’ rights given by God: ‘The Constitution affirms that certain rights are 
reserved to the people, that is to say, are recognized to have been in the possession of the people before the 
establishment of Government’ arguing that recent (New Deal) laws ‘are absolutely in violation of all of 
our previous concepts of individual liberty and constitutional rights.’  But ‘Each day, thank God, our 
courts are rescuing us from these assaults on our human rights’.182 
Goldstein suggests that it was easy for Roosevelt’s campaign team to make the Liberty League ‘the villain 
in a grand constitutional drama’.  The fact that it was founded and funded by millionaires like the Du 
Ponts, powerful economic actors widely blamed for the Great Depression but also seen to be benefiting 
from the theories of unpopular ‘let-alone’ laissez faire economics, left the Liberty League vulnerable to 
public criticism.  In the absence of any obvious concern with the massive social dislocation and economic 
distress caused by the Great Depression, the Liberty League’s message failed to resonate with the 
‘common man’ (sic) whose rights they were nonetheless supposedly fighting for.183  Throughout the 1936 
election campaign, Roosevelt took every opportunity to ridicule the League and to portray the 
Republicans as their servants.  Roosevelt’s Campaign Director, James Farley, even declared that the 
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Liberty League should be called the ‘American Cellophane League’ because ‘first, it’s a Du Pont product 
and second, you can see right through it’.184  Roosevelt’s Director of Press operations, Charles Michelson, 
elaborated later that the campaign had decided to keep the Liberty League ‘before the public… as the 
symbol of massed plutocracy warring on the common people.’185   
In his 1936 State of the Union address, although he didn’t mention it directly, Roosevelt’s attack on 
‘entrenched greed’ was widely understood to be a direct attack on the Liberty League, as he set out the 
constitutional debate: 
‘You, the members of the Legislative branch, and I, the Executive, contended for and established a new 
relationship between Government and people…... It goes without saying that to create such an economic 
constitutional order, more than a single legislative enactment was called for. 
To be sure, in so doing, we have invited battle. We have earned the hatred of entrenched greed… They seek 
the restoration of their selfish power.  Yes, there are still determined groups that are intent upon that very 
thing. Rigorously held up to popular examination, their true character presents itself. They steal the livery of 
great national constitutional ideals to serve discredited special interests.’186 
 
As Goldstein points out, Roosevelt in this speech offered a point by point rebuttal of the Liberty League’s 
assertion that the regulatory powers of the (federal) government conflicted with individual liberty and 
state’s rights.187  While the Liberty League emphasized that the Constitution served to protect people 
from the tyranny of the state, especially the federal state, Roosevelt contended that the Constitution 
should serve also to protect people against the tyranny of economic power and economic exploitation. 
When the Liberty League countered with a well-received speech from anti-Roosevelt democrat, Al Smith, 
which was initially perceived to have weakened Roosevelt, campaigners for Roosevelt managed to turn 
this around, acerbically pointing out how Smith delivered his speech in a resplendent ballroom to wealthy 
businessmen, including twelve members of the Du Pont family with the press estimating that the wealth 
of the Liberty League leaders at the dinner exceeded more than one billion dollars.  Goldstein argues that 
it was the public turn against the Liberty League and its philosophy that contributed to Roosevelt’s 
massive win at the polls.   
Roosevelt won the election with a landslide victory, carrying 46 out of 48 states, over 98% of the electoral 
vote and more than 60% of the popular vote. Accepting the Democratic nomination as Presidential 
candidate on June 27 1936, he again was assumed to be attacking the wealthy members of the Liberty 
League, when he stated that the task of government was to challenge the ‘economic royalists’ who limited 
economic freedoms: 
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‘…the privileged princes of these new economic dynasties, thirsting for power, reached out for control over 
Government itself. They created a new despotism and wrapped it in the robes of legal sanction. In its service, 
new mercenaries sought to regiment the people, their labor, and their property. 
For too many of us the political equality we once had won was meaningless in the face of economic 
inequality. A small group had concentrated into their own hands an almost complete control over other 
people's property, other people's money, other people's labor — other people's lives. For too many of us 
life was no longer free; liberty no longer real; men could no longer follow the pursuit of happiness…Against 
economic tyranny such as this, the American citizen could appeal only to the organized power of 
Government.  
The royalists of the economic order have conceded that political freedom was the business of the 
Government, but they have maintained that economic slavery was nobody's business. They granted that the 
Government could protect the citizen in his right to vote, but they denied that the Government could do 
anything to protect the citizen in his right to work and his right to live.’188 
 
Although Roosevelt himself did not immediately frame his ‘new’ rights to work and to live as ‘human 
rights’, as I show below, the press at the time did start to use the phrase ‘human rights’ to distinguish 
Roosevelt’s rights from the Liberty League’s ‘property rights’.  Roosevelt himself also eventually started 
to use the phrase ‘human rights’ in this context from 1936 onwards, well before his war-time invocation 
of this phrase in the 1940s.   
Popular constitutional philosophy - debating ‘human rights’ versus ‘property rights’ in the press  
In his history of human rights, Moyn refers to the explosion of the use of the phrase ‘human rights’ in 
the New York Times in 1977 as significant evidence of the emergence of the concept at that point in 
time.189  Borgwardt by contrast, in her history of the first appearance of the term ‘human rights’, argues 
that, if were an exact moment when the term human rights acquired its modern meaning, this must date 
to Roosevelt’s wartime rhetoric on human rights, and notably the signing of the ‘Declaration by the 
United Nations’ in 1 January 1942 (and she identifies the meaning of the team as extending beyond 
traditional political rights to include a vision of economic justice, as well as encapsulating the domestic 
and international relevance of New Deal principles).190 As evidence, she notes that the New York Times 
Index for 1936 contains no reference to ‘human rights’ at all, and finds only two relevant articles in the 
index for 1937 on property rights and on labour rights (with a gradual growth in the number of index 
references after which  show how the use of the phrase was well under way by the end of the war.)   
My own research suggests however that the phrase ‘human rights’ was in frequent use in the press and 
popular rhetoric in the 1930s well before its wartime usage in the 1940s, with press articles frequently 
summarising this ‘constitutional conflict’ in terms of ‘human rights’ versus ‘property rights’.191  It may 
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not yet have made its way into the NYT index, but it was in frequent use  in articles - it was even ‘in the 
air’ as one letter to the press complained ‘Through the intellectual fog which blankets the land, we hear 
the sounding  phrase ‘Human Rights before property rights.’’192  This appears to be partly as, before he 
was later discredited, the catholic priest and campaigner Charles E. Coughlin put the ‘supremacy of 
human rights over property rights’ as the core purpose of his National Union for Social Justice193.   
However, the phrase ‘human rights versus property rights’ also became shorthand for Roosevelt’s New 
Deal rights as part of the ‘greatest constitutional conflict of economic and constitutional philosophy of 
the times’.  The question ‘Shall human rights supersede property rights?’ was noted in the press as one 
of the fundamental issues at stake in the 1936 election.194  Indeed, by the time of the 1936 elections, the 
press was even reporting that Western New York Young Republicans were urging the Republican party 
platform to ‘place human rights above property rights, but should not lose sight of property rights’195 - 
although the Republican Party Platform of 1936 did no such thing, arguing rather that the New Dealers 
insisted on passing laws ‘contrary to the Constitution’, and that people’s rights and liberties were ‘today 
for the first time threatened by the Government itself.’196   
Roosevelt himself was clear that the New Deal was aimed at challenging legal and economic orthodoxies, 
and this would necessarily have to be through the law.  In an open letter seeking the support of an 
important labour leader of the time, Major George L. Berry, Roosevelt wrote: ‘we have endeavoured to 
correct through legislation certain of the evils in our economic system….’ And ‘I have implicit faith that 
we shall find our way to progress through law’.  He recognised that it was certainly not the ‘wage earners 
who cheered when the laws were declared invalid [by the Supreme Court]’ and emphasised the need  ‘to 
preserve human freedom and enlarge its sphere’, ‘to prevent forever a return to that despotism which 
comes from unlicensed power to control and manipulate the resources of our Nation’ to work for ‘the 
same ideal - the restoration and preservation of human liberty and human rights’.197  In committing the 
labour vote to Roosevelt, Berry responded: ‘It is my judgement that the workers, who constitute the great 
overwhelming majority of our citizens, will not tolerate the return of a leadership in political or economic 
life who contemplate or think or practice the philosophy of human rights being subordinate to property 
rights.’198 
After Roosevelt’s overwhelming win in the 1936 election, even the British press was reporting this as a 
win for human rights over property rights.  Writing in the British Observer, Lord Lothian (who later 
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became British Ambassador to the United States) remarked that even in the midst of the failures of some 
of his measures (such as the NRA) and the Supreme Court declaring them unconstitutional, Roosevelt 
‘never swerved from his central faith that in crisis the State must save the citizen’ and ‘never ceased to 
denounce the iron law of laissez-faire, that property rights must come before human rights.’199  He 
suggested that this did ‘not mean that America is going Marxist’, but it did mean that the United States 
would expand ‘public enterprise…, diminish by taxation the share taken by the rentier, ....expand social 
services and endeavour to make sure that every citizen has a chance to work and make a decent living 
thereby.’  The 1936 election Lothian concluded was ‘no longer a vote against Hoover; it was a vote for 
the New Deal, for the ending of laissez-faire and the era of unbridled capitalism in the United States.’200 
While Roosevelt kept his focus on the American Liberty League during the 1936 election campaign, after 
the election the judges of the Supreme Court were not to escape an attack.  After Roosevelt’s massive 
electoral win, he proposed in February 1937 the ‘Judicial Procedures Reform Bill of 1937’, generating a 
constitutional crisis in what came to be called his ‘court-packing plan’.   Explaining this plan (which 
Ackerman suggests may have been inspired by the ‘Lords-packing’ by the UK Prime Minister in response 
to the Lord’s veto of Lloyd George’s budget201) Roosevelt argued that this would be more effective than 
any constitutional amendment.  In his March 9 Fireside Chat, he emphasised that his administration had 
‘begun a program of remedying those abuses [of power] and inequalities to give balance and stability to 
our economic system to make it bomb-proof against the causes of 1929’ Crash, but that the Courts had 
‘cast doubts on the ability of the elected Congress to protect us against catastrophe by meeting squarely 
our modern social and economic conditions’.  Ever ‘since the rise of the modern movement for social 
progress through legislation, the Court more often and more and more body asserted a power to veto 
laws passed by Congress’.  He explained that, while the Democratic party had proposed a constitutional 
amendment to challenge the Court’s interpretations and enable the government ‘to regulate commerce, 
protect public health and safety, and safeguard economic security’, it would take months or years to get 
an amendment and then more months and years to get it through Congress.  And he was afraid that even 
if it was passed, a conservative judiciary might mis-interpret it: 
 Even if an amendment were passed…. Its meaning would depend on the kind of Justices who would be 
sitting on the Supreme Court bench.  An amendment, like that rest of the Constitution, is what the Justices 
say it is rather than what its framers or you might hope it is.’202 
 
Roosevelt’s ‘court-packing plan’ was not well-received by the political class, though in the press this 
constitutional conflict was again characterised in terms of ‘human rights versus property rights’.  For 
example, at the height of the sit-down strike wave and major labour unrest that were rocking the 
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country,203 the press recorded how the labour movement strongly backed the court-packing plan, 
repeatedly accusing the Court of putting property rights before human rights.  Reporting on a Carnegie 
Hall labour rally, the press recorded complaints against the ‘judicial lame ducks’, ‘usurpers of power’, 
‘impeders of progress’ and the ‘one-time corporate lawyers whose judicial point of view was one with the 
‘vested interested which have ever held human rights less sacred than property rights’ – and that the nine 
old men were ‘blind to the fact that a new generation had repudiated their outworn economic and social 
philosophy’ and were interpreting the Constitution ‘as an antique protection of the vested few instead of 
a modern document for the liberation of all the people.’204   
Supporting the court-packing plan, United States Senator Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin also 
‘ridiculed the idea that the founding fathers wished to prevent the State of New York from enacting a 
Minimum Wage Law for Women’.205  Others suggested that ‘recent American jurisprudence was literally 
unintelligible except upon the assumption that the Constitution intended that judges should permanently 
safeguard the rights of property as understood in the age of laissez faire.’206  Henry Ward Beer, President 
of the Federal Bar Association of New York, was also reported as insisting that corporation lawyers were 
opposed to the plan because it represented ‘a fight for human rights over property rights’.207  Meanwhile 
US Senator Robinson, also supporting Roosevelt, argued that the Court had ‘become economists’: 
‘Since [in many cases], the United States Supreme Court has departed from anything related to a fixed body 
of law except by the most tenuous thread, and has become a body engaged in the practice of economics, it 
becomes highly relevant to know just what kind of economic theories the members of that court hold.208 
 
In March 1937 however, in what came to be called ‘the switch in time that saved nine’, the balance of the 
Supreme Court shifted suddenly as Associate Justice Owen Roberts switched sides to strike down the 
Court’s earlier judgement in Adkins v. Children's Hospital (which had held that minimum wage laws were a 
violation of the Fifth Amendment’s ‘due process clause’) and to uphold the constitutionality of 
Washington state's minimum wage law in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.  This was to be the first case in a 
long-term shift.  As Kennedy points out, Roosevelt ‘lost his battle to expand the Court, but won the war 
for a shift in constitutional doctrine.’209 Ackerman suggests by the early 1940s, the new ‘New Deal 
jurisprudence of  the Supreme Court had ‘not only rejected leading decisions of  the old regime, like 
Lochner v New York... [But] transformed Lochner into a symbol of  an entire constitutional order that had 
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been thoroughly repudiated by the American people.’210 Roosevelt’s ‘human rights’ had thus triumphed 
over that ‘the iron law of  laissez-faire, that property rights must come before human rights’. 211 
 
2.3 Challenging classical laissez-faire economic orthodoxy 
2.3.1 The 1937 Roosevelt Recession and the influence of  Keynesian economic theory 
By March 1937 then, Roosevelt had apparently won the ‘greatest conflict of  economic and constitutional 
philosophy of  the times’, but by mid-1937 he was facing another problem.  After a marked economic 
recovery up until then, in the spring of  1937 the American economy suddenly experienced another sharp 
downturn.  Economic output collapsed and unemployment jumped back up from 14.3% in May 1937 to 
19% by June 1938. 
It was after this precipitous fall into another severe recession - and not long after the 1936 publication 
of  the John Maynard Keynes’ General Theory of  Employment, Interest and Money - that the Roosevelt 
administration came to be increasingly influenced by the economic theories of  Keynesianism.212  
Conceptions of  Roosevelt’s ‘new rights’ came to be grounded in Keynesian economic theory culminating, 
through the work of  Roosevelt’s ‘National Resources Planning Board’ (NRPB), in Roosevelt’s 1944 
‘Second Bill of  Rights’, and in an attempt to ‘constitutionalise’ Keynesian economic planning in the draft 
1945 Full Employment Act.   
In the section below, I first explore Keynes’ economic theory, arguing that Keynes’ argument for ‘full 
employment’ was not merely an attack on classical laissez faire economic orthodoxy, it was an attack on 
free-market capitalism for its failure to make the maximum use of  available resources.  In the context of  massive 
unemployment, Keynes argued that free markets were clearly not ensuring that all resources were 
efficiently and fully employed.  He saw mass unemployment and idling factories as an inefficient waste 
of  resources; ‘Let us be up and doing, using our idle resources to increase our wealth’213 he argued and, 
if  the private sector could not or would not spend or invest enough to ensure the ‘full employment’ of  
all available resources, then the state should step in to fill the breach.  Keynes’ 1937 ‘General Theory’ 
produced a paradigm shift in orthodox economic theory, challenging classical prescriptions of  fiscal 
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conservatism, balanced budgets and austerity and advocating government intervention in the so-called 
‘free market’ economy. 
I then trace how Roosevelt’s 1944 ‘Economic Bill of  Rights’ drew from a new bill of  rights proposed by 
an agency in his administration, the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB), which first outlined a 
set of  economic and social rights in its reports and pamphlets of  between 1941 and 1943.  I show how 
the NRPB conceived of  ‘economic and social rights’ as a bundle or ‘package’ of  rights deemed essential 
for the post-war domestic context, which should be ‘progressively realised’ through an integrated 
approach of  a full employment policy linked together with a deepening of  social security programmes.  
Far from being considered costly, with a Keynesian framing, the implementation of  this bundle of  rights 
were seen as self-sustaining and, indeed, essential to ensuring the stability of  the economic and political 
system.  Austerity was seen as a waste of  resources.  Keynesianism was considered more conservative 
than the earlier institutionalism, but it challenged the dominant economic view of  the need for fiscal 
responsibility and balanced budgets, charging that counter-cyclical government spending was critical to 
‘saving capitalism from itself ’ by securing full employment and protecting people against the endemic 
instabilities of  the economic system.   
Surprisingly, as I will also develop further in later sections, the evidence suggests that it was the NRPB’s 
advocacy of  the concepts of  ‘progressive realisation’ and the (maximum or) ‘full use of  resources’ that 
later inspired US proposals on economic and social rights in the negotiations over the Universal 
Declaration, and which eventually resulted in Article 2.1 of  the International Covenant.  I later suggest 
then, that it was through a circuitous route of  this Keynesian impact on US planning for the national and 
international order and through early US interventions in the drafting of  the UDHR, that these phrases 
were to enter the lexicon of  economic and social rights as they became international human rights.   
John Maynard Keynes: the ‘most eminent economist’ of  the twentieth century 
Rather self-deprecatingly, and disingenuously for someone who took, according to his contemporary 
rival, Friedrich Hayek, ‘a certain puckish delight in shocking his contemporaries’,214 Keynes compared 
himself  a ‘Cassandra’ who ‘could never influence the course of  events in time’215.  Yet, he became 
influential precisely for his prescience in predicting in his Economic Consequences of  the Peace that the terrible 
terms of  the Versailles Peace Agreement would push Germany and its people into despair and into the 
hands of  fascism and war.  Already predicting the Second World War he wrote in 1919: ‘Men will not 
always die quietly’216   
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But it was for his 1936 book, The General Theory of  Employment, Interest and Money, and his devastating attack 
on the classical economists as ‘Candides’ (because they ‘teach that all is for the best in the best of  all 
possible worlds provided we will let alone’217) that Keynes was to have most influence, with his ‘new 
economics’ eventually coming to dominate economic policy-making from the Great Depression in the 
1930s until the beginning of  the 1970s.  As J.K. Galbraith argued, with the General Theory, Keynes dealt a 
‘lethal blow’ to classical conclusions and the publication of  his book was an ‘event in the history of  
economics comparable in significance to the publication of  the Wealth of  Nations in 1776 and the first 
edition of  Capital in 1867’.218   
Keynes’s impact was profound in the midst of  the Great Depression, because he challenged ideas of  ‘do 
nothing’ government and set out an economic case for urgent government action to pull economies out 
of  Depression.  Contrary to the classical economists who argued that free markets were self-regulating 
and tended naturally towards equilibrium in the absence of  state interference Keynes (believing, like 
Marx, that capitalism was intrinsically unstable) countered that there was no automatic equilibrium, so 
governments could and should intervene in the economy.  While the classical economists counselled 
governments to stand back and wait for the depression to work itself  out (over the long run), Keynes 
counselled more government spending especially in times of  economic crisis – ‘The boom, not the slump, 
is the right time for austerity’ he argued.  In the long run, everyone would be dead, so it was simply not 
possible to follow laissez faire prescriptions and leave people starving in the streets.   
Ultimately Keynes’ work provided ‘the first widely accepted economic justification capable of  supporting 
expanded public intervention in the economy’.219  Keynesianism was nonetheless a broader intellectual 
movement than Keynes himself  alone, as there were many economists who ‘pre-Keynesed Keynes’ 
during the 1920s and 1930s and many further elaborated these ideas in both the US and the UK, as well 
as elsewhere, after the publication of  General Theory.220  And in many senses, the reality of  the Great 
Depression, and the prolonged mass unemployment and evident poverty and suffering that it caused, 
had already forced governments to start taking action – regardless of  the prescriptions of  formal 
economic theory.  As Bailey suggested in relation to his influence on the US, ‘Keynes was not the inspired 
prophet of  a new mystical theology.  He was the great verbalizer and rationalizer of  a theoretical attitude 
which was being forced, by the cold facts of  the depression experience, upon a number of  European 
and American economists.’221   
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Keynes’ argument for positive state action to secure ‘full employment’ was significant as an attack on 
classical economic theory and on ‘laissez-faire economic liberalism’, but I also argue below that it was 
more than that – it was an attack on the failure of  ‘free markets’ to make the maximum use of  available resources.  
As Bailey explained, writing in 1946, notably using the phrase ‘maximum utilisation of  resources’: 
‘Keynes’ General Theory, one of the great watersheds in the history of economic thought, was an attack upon 
the ‘classical’ and ‘neoclassical’ economic thought that the free market capitalistic economy was a self-
adjusting mechanism which tended to produce a condition of full employment and maximum utilisation of 
resources…[Classical theory] was a neat theory, but to many it seemed hardly adequate to meet the 
demonstrated facts of life in the Britain of the twenties and thirties and the America of the thirties, where, 
theory or no theory, a vast amount of involuntary unemployment existed and the economic system showed 
few signs of moving automatically toward the full utilization of resources.’222 
 
Challenging ‘natural rights’ and revolting against the formalisation of  ‘automatic equilibrium’ 
Keynes had long argued against ‘do nothing’ prescriptions of  orthodox economists in times of  economic 
crisis, and their belief  that markets would eventually automatically self-adjust - in his 1923 Tract on 
Monetary Reform he insisted that that: ‘Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if  in the 
tempestuous seasons they can tell us that when the storm is past, the ocean is flat again.’ 
He was an admirer of  the earlier institutional economists, including of  John R. Commons223 and like 
them, challenged ideas of  ‘natural liberty’ and ‘natural rights’.  In his 1926 essay on ‘The End of  Laissez 
Faire’, for example, he had challenged ideas of  ‘natural liberty’ and classical postulates of  the ‘invisible 
hand’, suggesting dramatically that: ‘There is no design but our own… the invisible hand is merely our 
bleeding feet moving through pain and loss to an uncertain… destination.224  In addition, he insisted that:  
‘It is not true that individuals possess a prescriptive ‘natural liberty’ in their economic activities.  There is no 
‘compact’ conferring perpetual rights on those who Have or on those who Acquire.  The world is not so 
governed from above that private and social interest always coincide.  It is not so managed here below that 
in practice they coincide.  It is not a correct deduction from the principles of economics that enlightened 
self-interest always operates in the public interest.’225 
 
Like the institutionalists and their ‘revolt against formalism’, Keynes was deeply critical of  the increasing 
formalism and mathematisation of  economics as a discipline, and the idea that economics could find 
inexorable natural or mechanical laws.  He criticised ‘mathematical charlatanry’ and the idea that 
economics could be a value-free science like physics, arguing that ‘economics is essentially a moral science 
and not a natural science.  That is to say, it employs introspection and judgements of  values.’226  He argued 
that economics could not be reduced to simple mathematical models that bore little relation to reality, 
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and (sounding relevant still today) suggested: ‘Too large a proportion of  recent ‘mathematical’ economics 
are mere concoctions, as imprecise as the initial assumptions they rest upon, which allow the author to 
lose sight of  the complexities and interdependencies of  the real world in a maze of  pretentious and 
unhelpful symbols.’227  He sought to show that the a priori assumptions of  classical economics bore little 
relationship to reality, arguing that the classical model was a special case that did not reflect ‘the economic 
society in which we live, with the result that its teaching is misleading and disastrous if  we attempt to 
apply it to the facts of  experience.’228    
Keynes’s target in his 1936 General Theory of  Employment, Interest and Money, was what he termed ‘classical 
economic theory’, which he understood as the broad sweep of  orthodox economic thought from Smith 
and Ricardo onwards, which had counselled mostly minimal state intervention in the economy.229  But 
Keynes’ target more precisely was to unsettle what had come to be called by his time ‘neoclassical 
economic theory’, which was formalising the precepts of  classical laissez-faire liberalism into 
mathematical models centred on an assumption of  an automatic tendency to equilibrium.230  He 
suggested that belief  in ‘some law of  nature’ guaranteeing full employment and optimal use of  resources 
was ‘nonsense’, arguing against the classical economists who had long tried to force the facts of  the real 
world to fit the theory: 
‘The classical theorists resemble Euclidean geometers in a non-Euclidean world who, discovering that in 
experience straight lines apparently in parallel often meet, rebuke the lines for not keeping straight as the 
only remedy for the unfortunate collisions which are occurring.  Yet, in truth, there is no remedy except to 
throw over the axiom of parallels and work out a non-Euclidean geometry.  Something similar is required 
today in economics.  We need to throw over… the classical doctrine and to work out the behaviour of a 
system in which involuntary unemployment in the strict sense is possible.’231 
 
Challenging the ‘natural’ tendency of  free markets to achieve ‘full employment’ 
After the long years of  mass unemployment during the Depression in the 1930s, and his earlier experience 
of  a long period of  stubborn unemployment in the UK in the 1920s in the aftermath of  the First World 
War, Keynes, faced with the self-evident fact of  ‘men without jobs and factories not producing,’ pilloried 
the belief  of  the classical economists in the impossibility of  involuntary unemployment and mocked the 
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classical faith in the automatic tendency of  the market to ensure the full employment of  all available 
resources: 
‘To suppose that there exists some smoothly functioning automatic mechanism of adjustment which 
preserves equilibrium if only we trust to methods of laissez-faire, is a doctrinaire delusion which disregards 
the lessons of historical experience without having behind it the support of sound theory.’232  
 
For Keynes, the assumption of  the classical economists that the economy would always self-adjust to an 
equilibrium of  full employment was simply wrong as evidenced by the facts on the ground: 
‘.. It is not very plausible to assert that unemployment in the United States in 1932 was due either to labor 
obstinately refusing to accept a reduction of money-wages or to its obstinately demanding a real wage beyond 
what the productivity of the economic machine was capable of furnishing…. These facts from experience 
are a prima facie ground for questioning the adequacy of the classical analysis.’233 
 
But to make his case, Keynes could not merely present the empirical evidence – that had never been 
enough to produce a paradigm change in economics.  Rather Keynes had to challenge the theoretical 
underpinnings of  classical theory.  This required challenging an arcane but central theoretical tenet of  
classical economics – Say’s Law.  This ‘Law’ named for the economist Jean-Baptiste Say (1767-1832), was 
a counterintuitive assumption that Keynes pithily summarised as the faith that supply creates its own 
demand.234  It encapsulated a supply-side belief  that, out of  the act of  production (supply), enough 
demand would always be automatically generated that would be sufficient to purchase the total supply of  
goods produced.  Thus, in classical theory, it was theoretically impossible to have general overproduction 
of  goods in the economic system, and concomitantly impossible to have a shortage of  purchasing power 
(or aggregate demand).  Economists held to the truth of  Say’s Law by assuming that periods of  
depression or recession were merely temporary fluctuations of  the business cycle, from which the 
economic system would always automatically self-adjust back to the fundamental equilibrium.  And partly 
because of  its counterintuitive nature, this peculiar notion of  Say’s Law ‘became the index of  decent 
sophistication in economics.  It was the ultimate test by which reputable scholars were distinguished from 
frauds and crackpots, those of  vulnerable mind who could not or would not see how obviously 
production created its own demand.’235  But Keynes sought to take this assumption on, arguing to the 
contrary that there could be a shortage of  demand, particularly in aggregate, and it was precisely this lack 
of  aggregate demand that produced the persistence of  the unemployment.  He turned economics on its 
head by arguing that the economy was driven by demand, rather than by investment, and that without 
sufficient demand, the economy could get stuck at what he called an ‘underemployment equilibrium’.236  
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Keynes also saw mass unemployment and idling factories as an inefficient waste of  resources; ‘Let us be 
up and doing, using our idle resources to increase our wealth’237 he argued and, if  the private sector could 
not or would not spend or invest enough to ensure the ‘full employment’ of  all available resources, then 
the state should fill the breach.  As he sets out at the beginning of  his General Theory, he saw his book as 
being about asking ‘what determines the actual employment of  available resources’ and saw ‘available 
resources in the sense of  the size of  the employable population, the extent of  natural wealth and 
accumulated capital equipment’,238 so that to him the maximum use of  available resources would mean 
full employment not only of  people, but also of  factories and other available natural resources.  He 
challenged the classical assumption of  the automatic use of  the maximum of  available resources:  
‘It may well be that the classical theory represents the way in which we should like our economy 
to behave.  But to assume that it does is to assume our difficulties away.’239   
 
Contra the classical economists, he suggested that the economy: ‘...seems capable of  remaining in a 
chronic condition of  subnormal activity for a considerable period without any marked tendency either 
towards recovery or towards complete collapse.  Moreover, the evidence indicates that full, or even 
approximately full, employment is of  rare and short-lived occurrence.’240  Keynes’ argument then was 
that government could and should intervene in the economy to ensure full employment, or in other 
words, to ensure the maximum use of  available resources.  This fundamentally challenged the laissez faire 
notions, since it argued that free markets were failing to achieve the full and efficient use of  all available 
resources.  Governments could and should intervene in the economy to smooth out and compensate for 
the intrinsic instabilities of  free market capitalism.  The state should invest enough to bring an end to 
unemployment and ensure the economy was operating with the maximum use of  all available resources.  
These ideas were later translated into more specific calculations for a ‘full employment budget’. 
Keynes also fundamentally challenged the classical view that governments should balance their budgets 
at all times, never spending more in revenue than was received in taxes.  Keynes argued that austerity, or 
cutting back government spending, in the midst of  a depression or a recession would push the economy 
further into the underemployment equilibrium from which it might never recover.  The only way to jolt 
the economy back to life would be for governments to spend more, to stand in for the private sector that 
could not or would not invest to create jobs, in order enable consumers to spend and to generate the 
‘effective demand’.   In the midst of  a depression, this might mean governments spending money they 
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didn’t have but this did not matter; budgets could move into deficit in a recession and into surplus in a 
boom.  It was thus an argument for counter-cyclical deficit spending in times of  economic crisis and for 
balancing the budgets over a longer time horizon to smooth out the booms and busts and instabilities of  
the economic system.  As Galbraith summarised for Keynes’ philosophy:   
‘The essentials of his case were simply and forthrightly designed to release anti-depression policy from its 
classical constraints.  The modern economy, he held, does not necessarily find its equilibrium at full 
employment; it can find it with unemployment – the underemployment equilibrium.  Say’s Law no longer 
holds; there can be a shortage of demand.  The government can and should take steps to overcome it.  In a 
depression, the precepts of sound public finance must give way to this need.’241 
 
While he did not argue directly for redistribution to the poor and unemployed, and is widely described as 
an elitist, rather than as an egalitarian,242  Keynes did argue that ‘The outstanding faults of  the economic 
society in which we live are its failure to provide for full employment and its arbitrary and inequitable 
distribution of  wealth and incomes’243 and, although he did not want to overthrow capitalism, he called 
for ‘gradually getting rid of  many of  the objectionable features of  capitalism’.  He called for government 
spending to be focused on the creation of  jobs, to ensure incomes in the pockets of  ordinary people, in 
the hope that they would spend it to increase ‘effective demand’ to drive the economy.244  In this, his 
theory followed the earlier ‘underconsumptionists’ who had argued that capitalism’s tendency to produce 
extreme inequalities in wealth was a weakness of  capitalism itself, as it left the majority with incomes too 
low to purchase the goods the capitalists were trying to sell.245  Keynes agreed that wages and incomes 
were too low – or non-existent in the case of  the unemployed – and while his answer was to stimulate 
employment through government spending (which he called the ‘socialisation of  investment’), he also 
saw the need for additional policies for increasing people’s incomes:  
‘I should support at the same time all sorts of policies for increasing the propensity to consume.  For it is 
unlikely that full employment can be maintained, whatever we may do about investment, with the existing 
propensity to consume.  There is room, therefore for both policies to operate together; - to promote 
investment and, at the same time, to promote consumption….’246 
 
Keynesian economic theory thus provided an economic justification for state intervention in the economy, 
but it also opened the way for a justification of  other redistributive social policies (including the welfare 
state along the lines suggested in 1942 by William Beveridge),247 as these policies could be justified in 
terms of  increasing the ‘propensity to consume’ or in other words, increasing the amount of  money in 
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ordinary people’s pockets.248  In his aim to ‘save capitalism from the capitalists’, he saw this as central to 
the survival of  capitalism: 
 ‘Whilst therefore, the enlargement of the functions of government, involved in the task of adjusting to one 
another the propensity to consume or the inducement to invest, would seem to a nineteenth century publicist 
or to a contemporary American financier to be a terrific encroachment on individualism, I defend it, on the 
contrary, both as the only practicable means of avoiding the destruction of existing economic forms in their 
entirety and as the condition of the successful functioning of individual initiative.’249 
 
Thus his theory was considered both revolutionary and reactionary at the same time.  It was considered 
revolutionary by economists in its profound challenge to the classical laissez faire precepts of  economic 
theory, and by conservatives who deemed it an attack on the underpinnings of  capitalism itself.  But for 
socialists and many progressive theorists, it was seen as thoroughly reactionary in its hope to save 
capitalism from itself, despite its admission of  the intrinsic instabilities of  ‘free market’ capitalism. 
 
2.3.2 Post-war planning, the NRPB and Roosevelt’s 1944 ‘Second Bill of  Rights’ 
Keynes (whose ideas had developed well before the publication of  his 1936 classic) was in direct contact 
with the Americans right from the start of  the Presidency of  Franklin Roosevelt.  In 1933, he wrote ‘An 
Open Letter to President Roosevelt’ urging him to set an example for the world by trying ‘new and bolder 
methods’ within ‘the framework of  the existing social system’, suggesting that otherwise ‘rational change 
will be gravely prejudiced throughout the world, leaving orthodoxy and revolution to fight it out’.  He 
urged ‘[t]he objective of  recovery is to increase the national output and put more men to work’, calling 
for a government expenditure to stimulate ‘purchasing power’ by taking on debt rather than charging new 
taxes and by accelerating capital expenditure so at least ‘the country will be better enriched by such 
projects than by the involuntary idleness of  millions’.  
However, President Roosevelt, like many of  his advisors in the US Treasury, was still convinced on 
coming to power in 1933 that balanced budgets were sounder economic policy250 and was slow to 
challenge the balanced-budget orthodoxy that most orthodox economists prescribed.251  For most of  his 
first term, the administration did borrow heavily and expanded public spending, but Roosevelt insisted 
that this was only on an ‘emergency basis’ and that he would return to balancing the budget as soon as 
was feasible.  After the 1936 election, three years of  relative improvement in the economy and a sense 
that the economic crisis was over, (and reacting to virulent criticism from Republicans) Roosevelt resolved 
to finally balance his budget.  In 1937, he moved to scale back public spending as well as simultaneously 
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introducing a new payroll tax, bringing the federal budget into virtual balance.252  But almost immediately, 
the economy was thrown back into recession - unemployment levels suddenly exploded back up and the 
‘depression came roaring back with a vengeance’.253   
After a young, but influential, economist in the administration, Laughlin Currie, in a paper entitled 
‘Causes of  the Recession’ explained the 1937 recession in Keynesian terms, this became ‘the central 
document in the battle for new federal spending’254 and the administration expanded public spending 
again, this time challenging the opposition’s insistence on the need for a balanced budget with Keynesian 
economic theory.  As Roosevelt explained in a 1938 radio address that ‘in a sincere effort to bring 
Government expenditures and Government income into closer balance’, he had made a mistake by 
decreasing government spending, and although it would cost now to get out of  the recession, government 
spending was necessary and justified:  
 ‘Lost working time is lost money. Every day that a workman is unemployed, or a machine is unused, or a 
business organization is marking time, it is a loss to the Nation. Because of idle men and idle machines this 
Nation lost one hundred billion dollars between 1929 and the Spring of 1933, in less than four years.’255 
 
By the later 1930s, as Rutherford has pointed out institutionalist ideas on planning as a solution to 
economic crises and business cycles faltered within New Deal thinking and came to be replaced by 
Keynesianism.256.  As Bailey argued at the time, ‘the 1937 recession came to be explained on the basis, 
not that government spending had failed, but that it had not been tried on sufficient scale.  Budget 
balancing as a goal came to be discredited, and a vast literature began to grow around the idea that public 
borrowing for the purpose of  increasing investment and consumption would so raise the national income 
that the increasing debt burden could be carried with relative ease.’257  In addition, in this context, the  
‘redistribution of income through steeply graduated income taxes, inheritance taxes, and 
undistributed profits taxes, came to be recognized, not simply as a matter of social justice, but as 
a positive economic good – since as Keynes had pointed out, high income groups save 
proportionately more (and consequently spend proportionately less) of their income than low 
income groups.’258   
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Roosevelt’s National Resources Planning Board and promotion of  the ‘full use of  available 
resources’ 
It was Roosevelt’s National Resources Planning Board (NRPB) that was to take these Keynesian ideas 
forward, developing America’s equivalent to the UK’s ‘Beveridge plan’, and eventually linking these ideas 
to Roosevelt’s conception of  economic and social rights.  
The NRPB was a small agency that grew out of  an earlier National Planning Board established in 1933 
at the beginning of  Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal administration to carry out studies and policy 
proposals on a wide range of  issues related to social and economic trends for long-range planning 
purposes.259  In 1939, as the Second World War was breaking out in Europe, the NRPB was moved 
directly into the Executive Office of  the President and by November 1940 and - in the context of  rising 
fears that the end of  the war might bring another economic depression as the end of  the first world war 
had -  Roosevelt tasked the NRPB with developing proposals on how to prevent a post-war economic 
depression.260   
Although the NRPB’s earlier thinking had been closely aligned with the economic institutionalists and 
structuralists, including Wesley Mitchell and Gardiner Means, after the ‘Roosevelt Recession’ of  1937 the 
NRPB had shifted towards Keynesianism.261 With the increasing involvement of  leading economist, 
Alvin Hansen – later labelled the ‘American Keynes’ - it became ‘one of  the great centers of  Keynesian 
thinking’, with Keynesian policies profoundly influencing its reports and policy proposals.262  As Brinkley 
suggests: 
‘All but unnoticed during most of its ten-year life, the NRPB managed for a brief moment in the midst of 
the war to articulate a coherent liberal vision of the future, a vision that inspired broad, even rapturous 
enthusiasm among full-employment enthusiasts and many others.’263   
 
Many of  the NRPB’s publications emphasised the need to plan for full employment to avoid another 
Depression, as well as to avoid another world war in the future.  If, as Skinner has suggested, we look at 
the ‘linguistic conventions’ of  the time, it is also possible to trace the development of  Keynesian ideas 
of  the ‘maximum use of  available resources’ through these publications making the link to full 
employment and the ‘full use of  resources’.   
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A pamphlet written by Alvin Hansen in 1941, entitled After Defense – What?’ emphasised, for example, 
the need to ensure ‘full employment’ or the ‘full use of  our resources’ not only to win the peace but to 
prevent another depression after the war: 
‘We shall soon have full use of our resources – material and human – to win the war.  We will need full use 
to win the peace.  Our people do not intend to let an economic depression, unemployment and ‘scarcity in 
the midst of plenty’ ever again threaten our growing standard of living or our economic security.  If the 
victorious democracies muddle through another decade of economic frustration and mass unemployment, 
we may expect social disintegration and sooner or later, another international conflagration.  A positive 
programme of power-war economic expansion and full employment is imperative….’264 
 
In the same 1941 pamphlet, Hansen emphasized that ‘The great problem we face when the war ends is 
to move over from a system of  full employment for defense to a system of  full employment for peace; 
without going through a low employment slump,’265 emphasising the real threat of  social unrest if  the 
government failed to act: ‘If  so we shall be back again in the valley of  the depression, and a terrific new 
strain will be thrown on our whole system of  political, social, and economic life.  The American people 
will never stand for this.: Sooner or later they will step in and refuse to let matters work themselves out’.’266 
Another pamphlet written by Hansen for the NRPB entitled After the War – Full Employment also addressed 
fears that the end of  the war would bring another depression – ‘The fact is that many people dread to 
think of  what is coming.  Businessmen, wage earners, white-collar employees, professional people, 
farmers all alike expect and fear a post-war collapse; demobilization of  armies, shutdowns in defense 
industries, unemployment, deflation, bankruptcy, hard times....’ but ‘if  appropriate action is taken, there 
is no necessity for post-war collapse’.  Thus, he questioned classical economic precepts on government 
debt:  
‘Everywhere it is said, and constantly reiterated, that we must tighten our belts and pay off our Government 
debt when peace returns.  When is it desirable to pay off part of the debt.  Certainly not when there is danger 
of an impending depression… Under certain conditions…. it would be quite unsound policy to retire the 
debt.  Financial responsibility requires a fiscal policy (including governmental expenditures, loans and taxes) 
designed to promote economic stability.  It would be quite irresponsible to cut expenditures, increase taxes, 
and reduce the public debt in a period when the effect of such a policy would be to cause a drastic fall in the 
national income.  Equally it would be financially irresponsible to raise expenditures, lower taxes, and increase 
the public debt when there is a tendency towards an inflationary boom.’267   
 
Alvin Hansen argued for a ‘compensatory and developmental program’ that would avoid the waste of  
resources, smoothing out the economic cycle through government expenditure.  He called for the 
retention of  a progressive tax structure, a reduction in consumption taxes, a program of  public 
improvement projects, an expansion of  social welfare spending as well as international cooperation on 
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employment for ‘the effective worldwide use of  productive resources.’268  Going beyond Keynes, he also 
called more for a redistributive role of  the state269, arguing that government expenditure should be used 
to address the needs that the market system failed to meet: 
‘In the past, we have for the most part permitted the economic order to serve us as best it could on the basis 
of the automatic functioning of this mechanism. If it gave us good times, we were thankful. If it gave us bad 
times, we accepted this as an inevitable concomitant of a system of free enterprise operating under the price 
system. And we allowed the system itself to determine the distribution of the product and the direction of 
demand.  
Half of the population might be housed inadequately in terms of minimum standards of sanitation and 
health. If the automatic functioning of the mechanism did not create an economic demand for housing, 
houses necessary to meet those minimum standards were simply not built. A large portion of the population 
might be quite inadequately fed in terms of minimum nutrition standards. Yet despite the capacity of the 
system to supply an adequate nutrition standard, if the economic demand were not created through the 
automatic functioning of the system, nothing was done about it. We looked to the economic order to satisfy 
the needs, desires, and aspirations of human beings as conditioned by the process of innovation, education, 
and cultural development. But if those needs were not adequately satisfied, we accepted the result with a 
stern, ascetic fatalism.’270 
Contradicting economic orthodoxies that government spending would displace private sector spending 
and act as a drag on economic growth, he also argued that, although these programmes were costly, they 
would eventually pay for themselves as they would generate greater wealth in the economy: 
We can afford as high a standard of living as we are able to produce. We cannot afford to waste our resources 
of men and material.... we cannot afford idleness. The idleness of the decade of the thirties was responsible 
for the loss of $200 billion of income. The public expenditures required to rebuild America, to provide 
needed social services, and to maintain full employment can be provided for out of the enormous income 
which the full utilization of our rich productive resources (material and human) makes possible.  
The costs of producing this income are merely payments to ourselves for the work done. There is not—
there cannot be—any financing problem that is not manageable under a full- employment income. ...From 
an income so vast we can raise large tax revenues—large enough to service any level of debt likely to be 
reached and to cover all other government outlays... it is not necessary or desirable under all circumstances 
to finance all public expenditures from taxes. Whether taxes should equal, fall short of, or exceed 
expenditures must be decided according to economic conditions.’271 
 
These themes and ambitious policy proposals were also reiterated in statements and speeches by other 
NRPB members.  Charles E. Merriam for example, emphasized that the NRPB’s post-war plans included 
not only plans to build up the nation’s infrastructure, but also detailed plans on health (including ‘a plan 
to ensure that every person in the United States receives medical attention he requires in order to maintain 
bodily health’) on education (with ‘the goal of  our educational efforts the 100 per cent provision of  
training for every child and youth’), and social security (including compensation schemes for work injury 
of  death, unemployment compensation, old age and survivor’s insurance, care for the blind, the 
handicapped, and dependent children etc.).272  Merriam also emphasized that this would all be based on 
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full employment which would minimize dependency on public welfare, using language on the ‘maximum 
use of  resources’:  
‘We propose to plan our national activities so that they will ensure the maximum utilization of our most 
important resource of all – manpower.  If we do so, we may look forward to a minimum of dependency 
upon general public welfare measures.  We wish to use all who are capable of and available for work in our 
national productive effort.’273 
 
Merriam also reiterated that government expenditures were necessary, not a waste of  resources: 
‘Attention given to education, to health, to recreation is not spending, but investment in human 
resources… .Full employment and continuing income are not forms of  national waste which must be 
cut down, but forms of  national saving of  our basic resources.’274  Merriam further emphasized that ‘The 
full employment we Americans seek must be, at the same time, free employment, unless we are to accept 
a new kind of  economic slavery and lose those freedoms without which even material prosperity is not 
worth the price to men who cherish freedom and the dignity of  man’275. 
The NRPB’s National Resources Development Report of  1942 (transmitted to FDR in December 1941) 
lists five key objectives, that explicitly calls for ‘full employment’ and the ‘progressive realisation’ of  the 
promises of  American life and basic freedoms:   
1.   We must plan for full employment, for maintaining the national income at 100 billion dollars a year, at 
least, rather than to let it slip back to 80, or 70, or 60 billion dollars again. In other words, we shall plan to 
balance our national production-consumption budget at a high level with full employment, not at a low level 
with mass unemployment.  
…4.   We must plan to enable every human being within our boundaries to realize progressively the promise 
of American life in food, shelter, clothing, medical care, education, work, rest, home life, opportunity to 
advance, adventure, and the basic freedoms.276 
 
The same report argues: ‘...we cannot afford to waste our resources of  men (sic) and material.  We cannot 
afford to use them inefficiently.  We cannot afford idleness, the idleness of  USD 200 billions of  income.  
The public expenditures required to rebuild America, to provide needed social services and to maintain 
full employment can be provided for out of  the enormous income which the full utilization of  our 
productive resources, material and human, makes possible.’277  
It also links its five key objectives to a list of  nine rights, explaining the need for new rights and freedoms 
in ways that link to this Keynes-Hansen full employment vision:  
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‘… there should be no unemployment while there are adequate resources and men ready to work and in 
need of food, clothing and shelter.  It is to meet this new turn of events, that the new declaration of rights 
is demanded.’278 
 
At the time, in the midst of  the Second World War (when it was not so much a communist threat on the 
minds of  the planners, but rather the fascist threat from Nazi Germany), Charles W. Eliot, Director of  
the NRPB, on May 27 1942 suggested viscerally that these rights would give hope at home and abroad:   
‘When Hitler surrenders or when he blows his head off, we Americans must know what we are going to do 
next… The other day. I read in the newspaper a story from Germany which some of you may have seen, 
about organization and labor under the ‘new order’, which ended with a statement that under the Nazi code 
‘nobody has any rights—only duties’. I venture to think that if we can make the realization of our rights 
seem practical and probable in the United States, we can then use this statement of ‘Our Freedoms and 
Rights’ to arouse hope and faith among the freedom-loving peoples in the conquered countries and even in 
the Axis countries.  Ideas and hope can be just as effective as bullets in winning battles.’279 
 
 
‘People who are out of  a job are the stuff  of  which dictatorships are made’:  A ‘bundle’ of  
rights for an ‘American Beveridge Plan’ 
 
The NRPB thus came to articulate a clear American conception of  economic and social rights vision, 
expanding Roosevelt’s ‘four freedoms’, and providing much of  the inspiration for Roosevelt’s later 1944 
‘Second Bill of  Rights’.  Indeed, it was the NRPB’s Chair (Frederic Delano) who had first proposed the 
idea of  an ‘economic bill of  rights’ to Roosevelt in 1939, expanding on this idea in a 1940 memo to 
Roosevelt and NRPB members then presented a full proposal for an ‘Economic Bill of  Rights’ in person 
to Roosevelt at his home on June 29, 1941.280  The NRPB’s vice-chair, Charles Merriam, had also outlined 
the beginnings of  this new ‘economic bill of  rights’ in his 1941 Godkin lecture on democracy at 
Harvard.281 
Between 1941 and 1943, the NRPB published a series of  major reports, as well as popular pamphlets, 
and numerous statements and speeches on proposals for post-war planning, which all set out a 
commitment to ‘Our Rights and Freedoms’, with its five key objectives and list of  nine rights, grounded 
on Keynesian-style economic policies.282  As noted above, the NRPB’s texts made regular and repeated 
references to the importance of  the ‘full use of  resources’, as well as the need for ‘progressive realization’ 
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(which I argue later came to influence the US position in the drafting of  the UDHR and appear to be the 
roots for Article 2.1 of  the ICESCR).   
Extract from NRPB’s National Resources Development Report for 1943, p.3 
 
By far the most ambitious of  the NRPB’s reports was its National Resources Development Report for 
1943’.283  This consisted of  two reports that had earlier been presented to Roosevelt in 1941, but in the 
aftermath of  the attack in Pearl Harbour and with his attention taken by international matters in the 
midst of  war, he did not release them to Congress until 1943.   The 1943 report included a National 
Resources Development Report which set out plans for post-war resource planning as well as a 400,000-page 
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long report entitled Security, Work and Relief  Policies (put together by the English social security specialist, 
Eveline Burns, then a professor at Columbia University) with a detailed review of  existing social 
assistance policies and recommendations for the future.  The depth and breadth of  the Security, Work and 
Relief  Policies report and its proposals for a post-war social security system meant that it was widely dubbed 
the ‘American Beveridge Plan’, after the nearly contemporaneous publishing of  a report in the UK on 
social insurance by Sir William Beveridge of  the London School of  Economics.284   
This American report actually preceded the Beveridge report and it was Beveridge that drew on the 
NRPB’s reports for inspiration for both his 1942 report on social insurance and his 1945 report on full 
employment, rather than the other way around.285  The primary author of  the US report was an English 
economist, Eveline Burns, who had a doctorate in economics from the London School of  Economics 
and Brinkley records that was some communication between the two efforts, with Beveridge making a 
well-publicised visit to the United States in May 1943 to publicise his report and meet with members of  
the NRPB.286  In contrast to the UK report however, the NRPB’s proposals were ‘fully rooted in the full 
employment concept from the start’287 and grounded on a firm conception of  economic and social rights. 
Enthusiastically reiterating the NRPB’s list of  rights and linking it both to the concept of  full employment 
and Roosevelt’s 1941 ‘Four Freedoms’ and his conception of  freedom from fear and want, the 1943 
report asked:   
‘How can these aims be realized in practice? We know that the road to the new democracy runs along the 
highway of a dynamic economy, to the full use of our national resources, to full employment and increasingly 
higher standards of living.’ And that ‘Enough for all is now possible for the first time in our history….[but] 
there are no automatic devices in our system that will insure fair distribution of income... or guarantee full 
use of resources…. One of the most important economic facts we have learned in the past decade is that 
fiscal and monetary policy can be and should be used to foster an expanding economy… It has taken total 
war to reveal to us the capacity of our production, once it is fully energized… Little vision is required to see 
that our [economy] can be made to produce plenty for peace as well as plenty for war… We have not yet 
even approached the limit in our inventive ability and organizational capacity.  On the contrary, we have just 
begun to utilize our vast resources.’288 
‘If we can organize and implement our resources and our ideals, we shall witness an unlocking of the latest 
force of production, …  At last in the history of man’s (sic) upward climb, freedom from want and fear is 
within his reach.’289 
 
The 1943 report stressed that ‘[o]ne of  the most important economic facts we have learned in the past 
decade is that fiscal and monetary policy can and should be used to foster an expanding economy.’290 And 
it emphasized the key to ‘winning the war’ and ‘winning the peace’ was full employment – ‘The economic 
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and social stability of  the United States, as of  other countries, depends in great measure on our capacity 
to prevent mass unemployment’.291  It set out detailed plans for promoting ‘private enterprise’ while 
preventing abuse of  economic power (and preventing ‘the rise of  new industrial oligarchies’), ensuring 
fiscal policies for full employment, plans for infrastructure development and public construction, and 
plans for social services and social security, including on education, health, nutrition and medical care, 
jobs for all, and social security against fear of  old age, want, dependency, sickness, unemployment and 
accident.292  The second report also called for a comprehensive range of  social policies from social welfare 
to public health and education provision, again framed in Keynesian terms – the future would require an 
‘increasing emphasis on policies aimed at the prevention of  economic insecurity through a fuller 
utilisation of  our productive resources including labour, and by more comprehensive measures to 
improve the health of  our people.’293 
The NRPB conceived of  its ‘Bill of  Rights’ as a ‘bundle’ of  rights that would be implemented as a 
package, grounded in a broader macroeconomic policy of  full employment.  Full employment would 
keep the cost of  social security low, as the vast majority of  people would have an income sufficient to 
afford the necessities of  life without the need for a safety net.  From this perspective, the new ‘economic 
and social rights’ would serve both protect people from the vicissitudes of  the inherent instabilities in 
the market economy, and to reduce those market instabilities, promote both greater growth and higher 
standards of  living for all. It made clear that social security policies were only one part of  this broader 
macroeconomic approach in which the first priority would be that the ‘economy must provide work for 
all who are able and willing to work’: 
‘Full economic activity and full employment are our first need.  Stabilizing the income flow through a social 
insurance system is second.  The third requirement is that an adequate general public assistance system 
provide for those accidental and incidental needs that neither a work program nor an insurance system can 
supply.  But a fourth element is closely related.  We have become aware of the need of low-income persons 
for higher levels of services: access to education, to medical care, to recreation and cultural facilities, to 
adequate housing and other community facilities… [they must be] made available to all.  High national 
productive efficiency can be achieved only by a wide diffusion of these services.’294 
 
In the face of  massive conservative opposition to an ambitious role for the New Deal state (and more 
explicitly the role of  the executive and the federal state), the NRPB was consistently careful to frame 
social benefits as contributing to higher economic growth, and insisted it was consistent with America’s 
‘system of  free enterprise’, while unabashedly pressing for a greater government spending and for the 
better planning in the use the country’s abundant ‘national resources’.  Keynesianism thus provided a 
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framework for the NRPB to promote controversial social and economic policies by arguing that they 
were actually essential to economic growth and essential to the survival of  capitalism.  
But this was not reactionary enough for the conservative opposition who increasingly harangued the 
NRPB for its heretical policies of  full employment and a full range of  economic and social rights.  In the 
aftermath of  the publication of  the NRPB’s 1943 report, it was violently attacked as unrealistic and 
fiscally irresponsible295  and denounced by conservatives as being ‘socialist, fascistic and medieval’ all at 
the same time.296  In part in reaction to its expansive vision of  ‘Our Freedoms and Our Rights’, and in 
part in reaction to a fear of  Roosevelt’s efforts to strengthen executive power at the expense of  the 
legislature and the judiciary, a Congress increasingly dominated by anti-New Dealers, eliminated the 
budget of  the NRPB, killing it dead a mere ten weeks after the issue of  its 1943 report.297  The grand 
ambition of  the NRPB ’s list of  rights was narrowed down to what eventually became the GI bill of  
rights (framed as Borgwardt suggests more as a reward than an entitlement),298 with the generous 
provision of  benefits limited to veterans seen as a less controversial measure for easing the post war 
employment problem.   
Roosevelt nonetheless resuscitated the NRPB vision in his January 11, 1944 State of  the Union address, 
outlining a ‘Second Bill of  Rights under which a new basis of  security and prosperity can be established 
for all’, and listing a series of  rights which cleaved closely to the inspiration of  the NRPB’s list of  rights.  
As part of  his war-time rhetoric he sought to define these as objectives not only of  the post-war domestic 
order but also the international order.299  As Roosevelt declared:  
‘We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist without economic 
security and independence. ‘Necessitous men are not free men.’ People who are hungry and out of a job are 
the stuff of which dictatorships are made.  In our day, these economic truths have become accepted as self-
evident. We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security and 
prosperity can be established for all regardless of station, race, or creed.   
Among these are: 
-The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines of the Nation; 
-The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation; 
-The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a return which will give him and his family a 
decent living; 
-The right of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an atmosphere of freedom from unfair 
competition and domination by monopolies at home or abroad; 
-The right of every family to a decent home; 
-The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health; 
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-The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment; 
-The right to a good education. 
All of these rights spell security. And after this war is won we must be prepared to move forward, in the 
implementation of these rights, to new goals of human happiness and well-being.’300 
 
Roosevelt’s calls since 1932 for a ‘re-definition’ of  classical liberal rights, and a new ‘economic 
constitutional order’ thus culminated in this ‘Second Bill of  Rights’, which reflected a call for a decent or 
adequate standard of  living for all (going beyond merely ‘minimum standards’301) as well as institutionalist 
concerns to limit monopoly and economic power. 
However, in the face of  a broadening backlash in Congress that had turned the tide against the New 
Deal, Brinkley argues however that this ringing commitment of  Roosevelt amounted to merely an 
‘isolated rhetorical gesture’.302  It fell on infertile ground in a moment when,  as Brinkley also relates, a 
new House Special Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities had already launched investigations 
of  liberals and progressive reformers in an attempt to discredit the New Deal, accusing New Dealers of  
being communists and radicals.303  He cites As I. F. Stone as warning as early as 1943, the New Deal 
agencies were already starting to ‘commit hara kiri’ to protect themselves against Congress: 
‘New Deal agencies are quietly beginning to commit hara kiri as progressive instruments of government... 
bringing in conservatives and getting rid of progressives… in order to shelter themselves against 
Congressional inquiry, denunciation, or budget curtailment… One observes a subtle but unmistakable shift 
of power within the agencies from progressive subordinates to those that are middle-of-the-road or 
reactionary.’304 
 
2.3.3 The draft 1945 Full Employment Bill: Constitutionalising Keynesian fiscal policy? 
 The death of  the NRPB also did not spell the end of  efforts to push for Keynesian economic policy 
however, as leadership of  the discussion of  domestic post-war economic policies shifted to the Bureau 
of  the Budget.305 In August 1944, the Keynesian economists in the Budget Bureau set to work on drafting 
an American white paper on full employment, under the coordination of  Alvin Hansen.  This sought to 
establish a formal government responsibility for economic stabilization to address booms and busts 
though fiscal policy, making an ambitious proposal for a ‘Fiscal Authority’ - that would operate as an 
administrative agency for fiscal policy in a similar way to the Federal Reserve Board’s power to set 
monetary policy. The draft report of  August 17, 1944 proposed: 
‘It will be necessary to set up… a national investment board or a fiscal authority to cooperate closely with a 
joint congressional fiscal committee.   The national investment board or fiscal authority should be allowed 
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to adjust and fluctuate the total expenditure so appropriated according to the requirements of economic 
stability.’306 
 
In 1944, the issue of  full employment became a critical issue in that Presidential election, with the 
Democratic National Convention adopting a platform which began with the words: ‘The Democratic 
Part stands on its record in peace and war.  To speed victory, establish and maintain peace, guarantee full 
employment and provide prosperity…’307  Even the Republican Party did not reject the goal of  full 
employment outright, although it carefully articulated a more conservative view that ‘we shall promote 
the fullest stable employment through private enterprise’ while explicitly setting out to reject ‘the theory 
of  restoring prosperity through government spending and deficit financing.’308   
There were also efforts to ‘constitutionalise’ an obligation of  the federal state to ensure ‘full employment’ 
and to guarantee the right to work.  In January 1945, Senator James E. Murray (Democrat of  Montana) 
introduced a draft ‘1945 Full Employment Bill’ to Congress (as S.380).  This did not quite go as far as 
proposing a new Fiscal Authority, but it did aim to entrench the obligation of  government to assure full 
employment, giving the President the responsibility to ensure full employment and to submit a 
Keynesian-style ‘National Production and Employment Budget’ to Congress each year.309   
Murray, the sponsor of  the bill, in a symposium organized in December 1945 the American Political 
Science Review presented it in terms of  the need to address destabilising inequality by putting income in 
the pockets of  those who would spend it, warning that a post-war depression would risk the world sinking 
into another global ‘holocaust’: 
‘America has triumphed in the greatest war of all history, but we have yet to face the major enemy at home 
– unemployment and all the tragic waste and misery occasioned by it… It became apparent in the last 
depression – and all experts agree – that there is something wrong with the distribution of income in our 
economy.  Purchasing power tends to become clogged and to pile up in idle hoards.  Not enough of the 
income... gets into the hands of those who will spend it...The results are less output, fewer and smaller 
incomes, a decrease in jobs, slowing down of the wheels of industry, depression, mass unemployment…. 
This country cannot afford again to go into a depression such as we experienced in the pre-war decade.  
Mass unemployment would mean discontent, disunity, and an irreparable loss in physical wealth and in 
moral well-being.  An unemployment crisis in America would spread like wildfire throughout the world.  It 
would bring forth dumping, higher tariffs, export subsidies, blocked currencies, and every other new and 
old type of economic warfare.  And this would inevitably wreck our plans for an effective international 
security organization, turn back the clock of progress, and plunge us into another holocaust of blood, 
suffering and chaos.’310 
 
Murray continued that the bill would require the calculation of  an estimated ‘full employment economic 
budget’ to secure full employment.  In a depression when the market failed to secure full employment, 
‘it would be the President’s duty to propose stimulation of  the economy by actions of  the Federal 
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Government… (and there) would be a statutory obligation which Congress would be powerless to 
dodge’.311  The draft Full Employment Bill stated that in the event that budget estimates foresaw that 
aggregate demand would be insufficient to sustain a ‘full employment volume of  production’, the 
President would be obliged to submit a program to offset this gap.  Similarly, the President was instructed 
to act in a boom to ‘forestall inflationary economic dislocations’, giving a mandate for counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy where the budget should not be balanced on an annual basis but on a cyclical basis to stabilise 
the booms and busts of  the economy.   The drafters of  the bill were concerned to prevent a post-war 
employment problem and, ‘in terms of  economic philosophy, they shared in the belief  that the 
compensatory fiscal ideas stemming from the Keynesian-Hansen analysis were sound.’312 
Bailey’s definitive and colourful analysis of  the legislative battle over the Full Employment bill sets this 
in the context of  the contemporaneous global policy climate,313 as well as domestic fears that the end of  
the war would bring a return to that mass unemployment, along with shifting conceptions of  the role of  
the state and economic rights:  
‘The experience of the great depression forced the federal government to extend its functions and 
responsibilities. [The] change in public attitude about the legitimate sphere of federal activity in economic 
affairs, and the public’s broadening conception of economic rights, were necessary prerequisites to, as well 
as products of, the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt.  Without this change, there would have been no 
Full Employment Bill of 1945.’314 
 
As Bailey points out, the draft Full Employment Bill aimed to set out a statement of  an economic right 
and a federal obligation, along with an economic program, and governmental mechanisms for the 
implementation and enforcement of  that program.315  The bill committed ‘the federal government to 
undertake a series of  measures to forestall serious economic difficulty – the measure of  last resort being 
a program of  federal spending and investment which was to be the final guarantor of  full employment; 
and finally to establish a mechanism in Congress which would facilitate legislative analysis and action, and 
fix legislative responsibility for the carrying out of  a full employment policy.’316    
Early drafts of  the bill had included very clear language on rights and obligations.  The December 18, 
1944 draft of  the bill for example, echoed Roosevelt’s 1944 speech and NRPB language on the right to 
work, stating that in its Section 2 that: ‘2(a) Every American able to work and willing to work has the 
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right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or offices or farms or mines of  the 
nation [and] 2(b) It is the responsibility of  the Government to guarantee that right by assuring continuing 
full employment.’317 But much of  this language was already watered down by the introduction of  the Bill 
as S.380 on January 22, 1945.  While the language of  rights retained, the language on obligations was 
watered down to read not ‘responsibility’, but ‘it is the policy of  the Government’.318  As part of  an effort to 
pre-empt obvious objections in the Senate, overarching introductory text was also added to insist on the 
‘policy of  the United States to foster free competitive enterprise’.   
During the congressional hearings on the Bill, in an interesting link between the domestic full 
employment discussions, and the simultaneous initiatives to produce draft international bills of  rights 
(for the 1945 UN Charter discussions – as described in the next section), was made by John R. Ellingston, 
a member of  the American Law Institute’s drafting committee on the Statement of  Essential Human 
Rights and a member of  the Commission to Study the Organization of  the Peace.319 Ellingston was asked 
to speak at the 1945 Hearings on the Full Employment Bill to explain why the right to work was important 
and why it had been included in the American Law Institute’s  Statement of  Essential Human Rights.320   
Ellingston explained that, although ‘the United States gives no constitutional recognition to social and 
economic rights, it has in the last dozen years passed a major amount of  legislation to secure such rights 
to its citizens’’ including in the Social Security Act, the Minimum Wage Act and many others. He insisted 
that rights and freedoms must change ‘with changes in the material conditions of  human existence’.  
Rehearsing arguments that sound familiar today, in his statement, Ellingston emphasised that economic 
and social rights imposed both positive and negative duties upon the state.  Full employment would 
constitute a directive to the government to take positive action, and although this appeared to clash ‘with 
the traditional legal habit of  looking upon rights as negative, that is as restraints on government’, this was 
because ‘traditional legal thought has been encouraged to test a right by its immediate judicial 
enforceability’321.  Ellingston argued against this orthodox legal view that assumed only the courts had 
the authority on defining what rights are (as opposed to the legislative or executive branches of  
government).  He suggested on the contrary that the legislative and executive branches also had an equal 
role.  He further argued that the test of  what constitutes a ‘right’ need not be that it is capable of  being 
enforced immediately by the courts, rather he suggested (in a contemporaneous phrase important for its 
reference to ‘progressive realisation’) that ‘rights’ should also include ‘goals to be progressively realised’.  
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 ‘The right work, like other social and economic rights cannot be secured overnight.  The placing on the 
state of the duty to see that the right is made effective offers the only guarantee that such purposeful effort 
will take place.’322   
 
Ellingston criticised lawyers for effectively supporting the status quo by not supporting ESCR: ‘The 
opposition to governmental protection to the right to work... comes in the main from those trained in 
the law’ as well as those with a ‘traditional fear of  government... and government planning’ which might 
lead to tyranny323  Yet he insisted this argument could no longer hold, given the evidence that the 
government had completely taken over economic production during the war without resorting to tyranny, 
and had managed to raise the standard of  living for millions of  families to higher than anything known 
before.324  Challenging ‘industrialism’s chronic crisis of  want in the midst of  plenty, the delivery of  
multitudes of  people to the chaos of  insecurity and fear’325 and ‘the major objection to the provision of  
government is based on fear of  deficit financing’, Ellington called for business to see that ‘permanent 
prosperity depends upon securing to everyone the right to work.  The reason is that mass production 
simply will not take place without mass consumption.  Mass production without mass consumption is a 
contradiction in terms.’326 Thus he argued ‘there is perhaps only one thing worse than continued deficit 
financing by government and that is the incomplete use of  our productive men and machines’.327   
In its early stages, the draft Full Employment Bill was warmly welcomed, including by economists, and 
much positive support for the Bill was expressed during the Senate hearings in summer 1945, with the 
Senate adopting a revised version of  the bill in September 1945.  However, Bailey suggests that this was 
because the conservative business opposition was late to mobilize its forces of  opposition. 328  Once the 
bill arrived in the House of  Representatives (introduced as HR 2202 by Congressman Wright Patman of  
Texas), the opposition mounted, and under increasing pressure from business lobbying, the Republican 
opposition joined with conservative democrats (the so-called ‘Dixiecrats’ who had little enthusiasm for 
expanding the role of  government after the end of  the war329) to water down the bill, insisting it stop 
short of  a commitment to ‘full employment’ and eliminating much of  the mandate for policies to control 
the ‘national budget’. Their only concession was to allow for the creation of  a Council of  Economic 
Advisers, which would not have any operational powers, but could submit reports to Congress.   
Some of  the increasingly loud opposition to the bill was framed in economic terms, with fears the 
implementation of  the new bill would bring inflation and undermine business confidence.330  Orthodox 
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economists, who disagreed with Keynesianism, also insisted that monetarism and monetary stabilization 
was the better course.331  But other conservative opposition was more virulently ideological, insisting with 
standard tropes of  American conservatism that the Bill was ‘alien’ and ‘un-American’, and that it would 
lead to totalitarianism or ‘state socialism’ and was based on ‘dangerous’ economic theories.   Alluding to 
the stark warning of  Friedrich Hayek’s recently published 1944 book ‘The Road to Serfdom’, these objections 
rejected the very possibility of  ‘planning’ for economic stability, and described full employment as a road 
to tyranny, not a free society, linking it to Soviet-style communism.  These groups insisted that the Bill 
was an affront to the freedom of  free enterprise – the US Chamber of  Commerce for example, insisted 
in December 1945: ‘This Chamber deplores, and will actively oppose any effort, whether direct or 
indirect, to substitute for our tried and proven American system of  free enterprise either new or old 
theories of  economics, regardless of  the sources of  the effort or its Utopian objective.’332  In another 
diatribe, the Ohio Chamber of  Commerce warned that the Bill was ‘[l]abeled in fraud and deception as a 
bill designed to preserve private enterprise, [but] if  enacted, it would be the scaffold on which private 
enterprise would be dropped to its death.’333  Pamphlets from the Committee on Constitutional 
Government described the Bill as ‘Russian spawn’ that would ‘turn America permanently from 
constitutional private enterprise toward a system of  collectivist statism’.334 
By the time the Bill had passed through both houses and was eventually approved in 1946, all references 
to rights, obligations and even to ‘full employment’ were dropped, including from the bill’s title.  The 
draft 1945 Full Employment Bill was adopted as the re-named ‘Employment Act of  1946’.  The original 
Section 2 of  the bill on rights and obligations became unrecognizable, although the painful redrafting 
still gives a sense of  Keynesian policy in its directive to use all its available resources to ‘promote 
maximum employment, production and purchasing power’: 
‘Sec 2.  The Congress hereby declares that it is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal 
Government to use all practicable means consistent with its needs and obligations and other essential 
considerations of national policy, with the assistance and cooperation of industry, agriculture, labor, and 
State and local governments, to coordinate and utilize all its plans, functions, and resources for the purpose 
of creating and maintaining in a manner calculated to foster and promote free competitive enterprise and 
the general welfare, conditions under which there will be afforded useful employment for those able, willing 
and seeking to work, and to promote maximum employment, production and purchasing power.’335  
 
With the adjective ‘full’ stripped from its title, and commitments on rights and the obligation to engage 
in Keynesian fiscal policy stripped from its content, the Employment Act of  1946 cleared both houses 
of  Congress in February 1946 and was signed into law by President Truman on 20 February 1946.  But 
the attempt to ‘constitutionalise’ the responsibility of  the federal government to spend in times of  
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recession and save in times of  expansion was largely lost.  While the 1945 Bill had spelled out the 
responsibility of  the President to prepare a  ‘full employment budget’ or more precisely, a ‘National 
Production and Employment Budget’ with estimates and a program on what investment would be 
necessary to fill the gap to ensure a ‘full employment volume of  production’, the final bill by contrast 
substantially reduced these responsibilities, calling on the President merely to present an economic report 
to Congress reviewing the situation of  employment, production and purchasing power and a program 
for carrying out the policy, but without spelling out the details.336   
Raymond Moley, of  Roosevelt’s Brain Trust, called the final passed bill the ‘Fool Employment Act,’ and 
described it as a ‘legislative monstrosity with the body of  a wren and the head of  a parrot.’  As Barber 
notes,  
‘this outcome was bitterly disappointing to the Keynesians who had set the original ball rolling…. the Bureau 
of the Budget staff seriously considered advising President Truman to exercise the veto.  In the end they did 
not, as although the bill no longer gave a strong mandate, but rather a set of suggestions, they considered 
that the statute that affirmed governmental responsibility for ‘maximum employment, production and 
purchasing power’ could still be regarded as an achievement.’337 
 
Keynesian economic policy nonetheless went on to shape domestic economic policy for the next 30 years.  
Arguably, Keynes’ approach to taming the instabilities of  the market system, and the adoption of  a limited 
social safety net as an ‘automatic stabiliser’ in downturns, along with the retention of  progressive forms 
of  taxation, was to produce a period of  rapid economic growth in the United States, alongside much 
lower levels of  economic inequality, that lasted from the 1940s until the 1970s.   
Keynesian ideas of  ‘full employment’ were also to shape visions for the post-war international order in 
what Borgwardt has termed ‘A New Deal for the world’.338  Even as Congress worked to water down the 
draft Full Employment Bill at home, the concept of  ‘full employment’, along with Roosevelt’s vision of  
‘human rights’ and his ‘larger freedom’ from both fear and want was being etched into the constitution 
of  the post-war international economic and social order: the 1945 UN Charter.   
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3. ELABORATION: DRAFTING OF THE UDHR AND THE ICESCR 
Economic issues – and ideas of ‘economic and social rights’ as part of a ‘larger freedom’ and ‘full 
employment’ - were high on the US domestic agenda and became part of the international agenda at the 
end of the war in 1945.339  After the economic devastation of the Great Depression and the experience 
of total war, establishing institutions to guarantee ‘freedom from fear and want’ ‘for all the men (sic) in 
all the lands’340 became central to the construction of the international architecture for a stable post-war 
order, just as establishing state responsibilities towards economic and social rights became central to the 
framing of the 1948 Universal Declaration.   
While many historians, including Morsink, see the birth of the UDHR in the emergence of a ‘shared 
revulsion against the horrors of the Holocaust’,341 I locate the birth of the international human rights 
regime also in the shared miseries of the global Great Depression, and the urgency to never repeat it.342  
Thus Roosevelt’s ideas of human rights and (economic) freedom, understood in terms of an expanded 
conception of liberal freedom as including both ‘freedom from fear and want’, economic security and 
full employment, came to be etched into UN Charter and subsequently in the UDHR and ICESCR. 
This history explored below shows that, although the inclusion of ‘second-generation’ economic and 
social rights in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights did mark a distinct epistemological break 
with the classical ‘western’ liberal rights-based tradition, it is historically inaccurate to assume, as much of 
the contemporary human rights literature still tends to do, that economic and social rights were only 
included in the UDHR only on the insistence of the socialist States.  It is also incorrect to insist that 
‘western’ countries, such as the United States, have always rejected ideas of economic and social rights.343  
In fact, as I have shown above, one important strand of the history of these rights lies in Franklin 
Roosevelt’s re-definition of rights.  As I explore in more depth below, using previously unexamined 
archival material, these US conceptions were also to profoundly influence the drafting of the international 
bill of rights, shaping the nature and scope of economic and social rights in their elaboration as 
international human rights.   
 
  
                                                           
339 Borgwardt 2007. 
340 This phrase comes from the sixth principle of the 1941 Atlantic Charter agreed between Winston Churchill 
and Franklin Roosevelt, see Ibid. 
341 Morsink 1999. 
342 Although mobilising for war had effectively ended the Depression of the 1930s, there remained deep 
concerns that the end of the war and de-mobilisation of soldiers and factories would bring mass unemployment 
again in the 1940s.  Many argued that the postwar economic order – on both the international and domestic 
contexts – had to be organized to stop this from happening.  There was also a widespread concern avoid a return 
to the destructive economic warfare which characterized international relations during the Depression. 
343 Whelan 2010. 
75 
3.1 From the UN Charter to the UDHR 
3.1.1 ESCR, larger freedom and full employment 
Even as Congress was moving to oppose and dismantle much of the New Deal at home, Roosevelt's 
‘vision of economic and social rights’344 fed into the 1941 Atlantic Charter, the 1942 UN Declaration and 
the 1945 UN Charter, amounting to what Borgwardt has argued was a ‘bold attempt on the part of 
Roosevelt and his foreign policy planners to internationalize the New Deal’, at least at the level of rhetoric 
if not in practice.345   
In his State of the Union address on January 6, 1941, Roosevelt had called for a new world order founded 
on four ‘essential freedoms’: the freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want and 
freedom from fear’346, and that ‘Freedom means supremacy of human rights everywhere’347  The Atlantic 
Charter issued by Roosevelt and Churchill on 14 August 1941 defining the Allied war aims made the 
expansive rhetorical promise of a peace that would ensure ‘all the men (sic) in all the lands may live out 
their lives in freedom from fear and want’.348  The 1942 Declaration by the United Nations, which set 
out the basis for cooperation of the Allied nations (signed then by 26 governments), also more explicitly 
set out the commitment to fight for victory to ‘preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as 
well as other lands’.349   
The Roosevelt administration also called for a ‘greater freedom’ must include political freedom as well as 
economic freedom understood in terms of protecting people’s ‘economic security’.  As then Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull declared:   
‘Liberty is more than a matter of political rights, indispensable as those rights are.  In our own country, we 
have learned from bitter experience that to be truly free, men must have as well, economic freedom and 
economic security – the assurance for all alike of an opportunity to work as free men in the company of free 
men (sic); to obtain work through the material and spiritual means of life; to advance through the exercise 
of ability, initiative and enterprise; to make provision against the hazards of human existence… We know 
that in all countries there has been – and there will be increasingly in the future – demand for a forward 
movement of social justice.  Each of us must be resolved that, once the war is won, this demand shall be 
met as speedily and as fully as possible.’350 
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By 1944, Roosevelt had put forward his ‘Second Bill of Rights’ in the 1944 State of the Union address.  
Emphasising that ‘freedom from fear is eternally linked with freedom of want’ he suggested his post-war 
plans - both domestically and internationally - could be summed up in one word: ‘Security.  And that 
means not only physical security which provides safety from attacks by aggressors, it also means 
economic security, social security, moral security – in a family of Nations.’  And he explained further, 
before listing his economic bill of rights:  
‘People who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made.  In our day, these 
economic truths have been accepted as self-evident.  We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of 
Rights….’351 
 
Roosevelt played a key role at the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks Conference and in drawing up plans for an 
international organization, but he was never to see these plans come to fruition.  Less than two weeks 
before he planned to open the 1945 United Nations Conference on an International Organization 
(UNCIO), Roosevelt suffered a massive stroke and died suddenly on 12 April 1945, just 12 days before 
the start of the conference.  But his Vice-President, Harry S. Truman, immediately took over the 
Presidency and pressed ahead with the conference that was held from 25 April to 26 June 1945 in San 
Francisco.   
In many ways, the San Francisco conference served as a eulogy to Roosevelt.  Many of the opening 
speeches paid him tribute, with the representative of Lebanon, Charles Habib Malik (who was later to be 
a key part of the negotiations over the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) declaring for example: 
‘It is impossible, Mr Chairman, to be present here in this gathering without thinking of President 
Roosevelt… We in Lebanon have deeply grieved his loss.  We have come to know that, when freedom 
and justice were in question, he was sure to be their champion.  No greater and more fitting homage can 
be done President Roosevelt than for all of us, great or small to bend every effort to produce a world 
Charter embodying the supreme principles he so dearly loved.’352 
US Secretary of State Mr. Edward Stettinius in his address to the first plenary session of the conference 
recalled ‘We are united above all in the necessity to assure a just and an enduring peace in which the 
peoples of the world can work together to achieve at last freedom from fear and want’, noting ‘our 
common understanding that economic security goes hand in hand with security from war’.353 Stettinius 
recalled that the purpose of the meeting as ‘writing the constitution of a world organization for the 
maintenance of peace’354 and recalled how economic issues were important for the prevention of war: 
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“Wide-spread economic insecurity and poverty, ignorance and oppression breed conflict and give aggressors 
their change.  Measures for security against aggression, not matter how effectively contrived, will not alone 
provide the assurance of last peace.  We have also to work effectively in close cooperation together toward 
rising standards of living and greater freedom and greater opportunity for all peoples of race and creed and 
color.’355 
 
It was South Africa’s Field Marshal Jan Smuts (ironically given his role in apartheid South Africa)356 who 
drafted the UN Charter’s preamble, re-emphasizing this need for the UN ‘to promote social progress and 
better standards of life in larger freedom’.357  In the drafting of the Charter, the representative of New 
Zealand also (though unsuccessfully) called for the insertion of a clause to define ‘fundamental freedoms’ 
explicitly in terms of Roosevelt’s ‘Four Freedoms’: ‘All members of the Organisation undertake to 
preserve, protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular the rights of 
freedom from want, freedom from fear, freedom of speech and freedom of worship.358   
Like Stettinius, many delegations insisted that the UN address economic and social issues to prevent war.  
As the representative of India elaborated:  
‘It is economic injustice, and even more, social injustice, that has bred for all time in the past the great causes 
of war, and had led to these great Armageddons.  Therefore, in this hour, when nations are going through 
the rack of conquest and have much more emphasis laid on security and armed strength to prevent 
aggression, let us not forget for a moment the vast emphasis that has to be laid on the causes that lead to 
war, economic and social injustice.’359   
 
Egypt concurred: ‘The world has learned by painful experience that economic unrest and social troubles 
always are at the bottom of international disorders and that the best way to prevent war and maintain 
peace is to provide the world with a working system of cooperation.’360  The French delegate even 
suggested that ‘if the Economic and Social Council is successful in its task of preparing the future basis 
of peace by securing effective international cooperation to insure the rights of man (sic) and to ensure 
the essential freedoms, then we consider that we will never need the coercive measures which are 
provided under other parts of the Charter through the Security Council.’361 
Australia placed a particular focus on international economic cooperation as a key role for the UN, 
proposing its ‘full employment pledge’.362   H.V. Evatt, then an Australian delegate to the UNCIO, later 
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explained Australia’s position, placing their conception of human rights firmly in the context of ‘freedom 
from want’ and ‘full employment’ in a 1946 article on ‘Economic Rights in the United Nations Charter’: 
‘The great threat to human freedoms which we have been combating for five years arose out of and was 
made possible by an environment dominated by unemployment and lacking freedom from want.  The 
Charter as finally drafted, while placing primary emphasis on security and freedom from fear, also recognizes 
that there can be no freedom from fear without the observance of fundamental human rights based on 
freedom from want and on increasing living standards.’.363   
 
Evatt continued that ‘The Charter now demonstrates that it is now fully realized that security alone is no 
guarantee of human rights; the Charter places at the forefront, and as a prior condition of the observance 
of human rights, the objective of ‘full employment’.  In the post-war context, Australia’s position was 
that ‘without policies of full employment being following simultaneously, there can be no easy solution 
to national economic problems.’  It was Australia’s belief that ‘full employment, that is the right to work 
on reasonable terms and under reasonable conditions, is fundamental to any kind of individual freedom… 
in the absence of full employment there can be little progress in education, health, working conditions, 
and other social circumstances on which human freedoms depend.’364 
While other delegations emphasised that it was critical to include full employment on the theory that if a 
nation did not maintain full employment it would upset world peace, the US delegation365 was more 
ambivalent during the San Francisco conference, with its delegation divided on the issue of ‘full 
employment’.366  The US archives show one member of the US delegation remarking, with reference to 
the contemporaneous domestic debates over the draft 1945 Full Employment Bill, that ‘this country is 
split wide open on the issue of full employment’ and another that the phrase ‘full employment’ was a risk 
as it would prejudice passage of the UN Charter in the US Senate.367  Other members of the US delegation 
disagreed however – one arguing that the US could not possibly come out publicly against the concept, 
since ‘the words ‘full employment’ had become an American idiom, a way of stating a fundamental 
aspiration’ and it would be problematic for the administration to be caught on the wrong side of public 
opinion, ‘on the side of the devil’.368   
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The American position coalesced in favour of an alternative phrase of ‘high and stable levels of 
employment’,369  though if that was not possible, then ‘full employment’ should be stated as an aim, but 
not a function of the organization.  John Foster Dulles later remarked that President Roosevelt had 
endorsed the US position on full employment and was in favour of retaining the words in the Charter, 
but this should be subject to a domestic jurisdiction clause.370  Senator Vandenberg still feared that it 
would be difficult for him to support this position, since ‘Sidney Hillman and Henry Wallace… could 
use this clause to promote their own economic theories’.371   With strong opposition from other 
delegations, led by Australia and New Zealand, the US lost the battle for its phrasing, and ‘full 
employment’ was included in the Charter, but the US did insist on a domestic jurisdiction clause that 
would ensure the UN would have no role in supervising domestic US policy.372   
By the end of the negotiations in San Francisco, the final text of the 1945 UN Charter, which set out the 
aims, purposes and structure of the United Nations373 promised to ‘save succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war’, ‘to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights’ and to ‘promote social progress and 
better standards of life in larger freedom’.  Article 55 (which expands Article 1.3374) called on the 
international organisation ‘[w]ith a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being’, to 
promote: 
a. Higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and 
development; 
b. Solutions of international economic, social, health, and relation problems; and international cultural 
and education cooperation; and 
c. Universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.’375 
 
This significantly expanded the vision of the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks proposals, giving the UN a mandate 
not only to prevent war, but also to maintain peace through economic and social stability, through 
ensuring 'larger freedom', full employment and 'social progress' as well as human rights.  As pointed out 
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by Reidel in Simma et al, ‘[u]nderlying Art 55 is the idea that maintaining international peace and security 
not only requires banning the use of force in international relations, but also requires actively working 
for economic stability within and between States.’376  This was very different from the earlier mandate of 
the League of Nations, which made no link between international peace and economic stability and social 
well-being, and had no machinery for dealing with economic and social matters.  It is also significant that 
the UN Charter placed human rights firmly within the chapter on the economic and social role of the 
new international organisation.   
 
3.1.2 Proposals for an international bill of rights 
Several years before the San Francisco conference, the Roosevelt administration had already started to 
prepare a draft international bill or rights, on the basis that ‘human rights’ should be a necessary aim of 
the new international organization.  After Roosevelt’s ‘four freedoms’ address in 1941, Secretary of State 
Hull had charged the US State Department’s international law specialists with ‘fleshing out the president’s 
ideas’ and ‘to draft a bill of rights that would forever prevent mass human rights violations like those 
committed by the Axis powers.’377 
The State Department’s draft of an international bill of rights was completed by 10 December 1942.  It 
was named a ‘Declaration of Human Rights’ and was annexed to the ‘Draft Constitution’ for a new 
international organization that was sent with American negotiators for the Dumbarton Oaks conference 
of August 1944.  The drafters of what came to be the basis for the 1945 UN Charter believed that this 
‘Declaration’ ‘should be negotiated and ratified along with the Charter to facilitate the universal 
attainment of the Four Freedoms’.378   
However, at the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks conference, strong resistance from the other Allied powers (as 
well as some objections within the US administration) had meant the draft was not considered.  The 1944 
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals annexed no bill of rights, and only included a brief reference to human rights 
as a purpose of the organization under its Chapter IX on economic and social cooperation, which read:  
‘With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and 
friendly relations among nations, the Organization should facilitate solutions of international economic, 
social and other humanitarian problems and promote respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.’379  Much of the literature on the history of human rights suggests that it was this relative lack 
of a strong focus on human rights for the new organization, that ended up mobilizing governments, civil 
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society organizations and other actors to push far harder for a stronger human rights role for the UN at 
the 1945 San Francisco conference.380   
In 1945, many different proposals for an international bill of rights were thus put forward in San 
Francisco.  These proposals and worldwide initiatives have been documented extensively in the 
literature.381  What is significant for our purposes here it that almost all the draft proposals included 
references to economic and social rights.  This was true as true of proposals inspired by the liberal rights 
tradition as it was by those taking a more socialist position.382  Many were still haunted by the experience 
of the Great Depression, as Ellingston (who helped to draft the ALI’s Statement of Essential Rights) 
observed in 1945:   
‘The peoples of the world, shaken by two world wars and a ruinous depression within a short 25 years, had 
discovered that neither peace nor freedom were possible to man in an industrial society without economic 
security. The … extension of economic rights to man without depriving him of his traditional rights of free 
speech, religion, assembly, and fair trial poses the dominating question of the next 100 years. Because it is 
inseparable from the attainment of peace, the question will occupy the center of the national and 
international political stage. To leave social and economic rights out of a modern bill of rights would be to 
stage Hamlet without the Dane.’383 
 
It was the eminent international lawyer, Hersch Lauterpacht, described as one of the most preeminent 
international law scholars of the day, who most clearly explained that a shift had occurred even in liberal 
theories of rights at the time.  This had broadened the understanding of ‘economic liberty’ and established 
the need for a positive, regulatory role of the state including to protect isolated individuals against 
exploitation by powerful economic forces: 
‘…. economic liberty, expressed in the theoretical freedom to give or withhold his services, is utterly 
meaningless because of the overwhelming impact of economic necessity and dependence…. This economic 
freedom of the many, it will be noted, can in many respects be achieved only by putting economic restraints 
upon the few.  In modern society, economic freedom, conceived as the mere absence of restraints imposed 
by the State, results in economy anarchy, in exploitation of the weak and isolated individual by economically 
powerful and organised forces, and in the denial of substantive freedom of contract.’384 
 
Lauterpacht, putting forward his own proposal for an international bill of rights, argued that ‘…the 
International Bill of the Rights of Man must recognise the connection between political freedom and 
economic freedom, between legal equality and economic and social equality of opportunity’,385 defining 
economic freedom in Roosevelt-style terms of larger freedom: ‘Economic freedom in its wider sense 
includes the effective recognition of the right to work under proper conditions of pay and employment, 
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the right to education... and the right to economic security in case of unemployment, old age, sickness, 
disablement, and other cases of undeserved want.’386  
Lauterpacht included two economic and social rights in his proposal for an international bill of rights, 
and deliberately omitted the right to property and freedom of contract.  Leaning on the lessons of the 
legal realists, he argued against the elision between older ideas of ‘natural rights’ with the new ‘human 
rights’ – since they had accorded sanctity only to property rights and freedom of contract: 
‘.. it was especially in the United States that the ideas of the law of nature and of natural rights were resorted 
to in an attempt to curb State interference with the rights of private property and with freedom of 
contract….By reference to the natural rights of man, courts in the United States often declared to be 
unconstitutional, legislation for securing human conditions of work, for protecting the employment of 
women and children, for safeguarding the interests of consumers, and for controlling the powers of trusts 
and corporations.  This explains why natural rights have been regarded in some quarters in the United States 
with suspicion and bitterness and why writers affirming the supremacy of a higher law over the legislature 
have nevertheless spoken with impatience of the damnosa hereditas of natural rights’.387 
 
Thus Lauterpacht excluded the right to property from his draft bill, as it was not a ‘human right’:  
‘...in so far as the right to property is conceived as an absolute and inalienable right of man it finds no place 
in the draft.  Deep social and economic changes have intervened since Locke considered property to be the 
most sacred right of all.......  That character of sanctity and inviolability has now departed from the right of 
property....388   
 
He also excluded the right to free trade: ‘The freedom to buy and to sell conceived as excluding the power 
of the State to regulate international commerce by tariffs, restrictions on imports and exports, and other 
means, has been suggested occasionally as one of the rights to be protected by an International Bill of 
the Rights of Man, but this cannot really be considered as a “natural right” and would be prejudicial to 
the major purposes of Bills of Rights.’389 
The US State Department’s own 1942 draft, drafted as it was by the Roosevelt administration, also 
reflected this shift in liberal ideas of rights.  The 1942 draft was put together first by a State Department 
lawyer, Durward Sandifer (later to become one of Eleanor Roosevelt’s key advisors during the drafting 
of the UDHR), and further developed by a State Department Special Sub-Committee on Legal Problems, 
which included Adolph Berle and Benjamin Cohen - key architects and the intellectual forces behind 
New Deal liberalism.   This Sub-committee was well aware of other contemporaneous efforts to draft an 
international bill of rights, including the efforts of Lauterpacht, and the efforts of the American Law 
Institute and the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (CSOP) that started in the early 
1940s.390  CSOP Chair, James Shotwell also joined the Sub-Committee for some of their deliberations.  
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Durward Sandifer was sent to meetings of the American Law Institute which was simultaneously drafting 
the ALI’s ‘Statement of Essential Human Rights’ (eventually adopted in 1944 and later to have a 
significant impact on the UDHR).391  The drafting also took place contemporaneously with other efforts 
in the administration, including the efforts of the NRPB, explored earlier.392  This aim of the Special Sub-
Committee to draft a ‘forceful statement of general principles’ that would include both ‘traditional rights’ 
and Roosevelt’s ‘new’ rights: 
“The aim was to formulate the basic rights of individuals that should be universally respected, 
even if not formally subscribed to by all states, in a brief and forceful statement of general 
principles.  This should include both traditional rights and certain principles of social and 
economic justice that were beginning to be regarded as basic.  Accordingly, the subcommittee’s 
work related to personal freedoms, property rights, social rights, political rights and procedural 
rights.”393 
 
The Special Sub-Committee thus debated and decided on the inclusion of economic and social rights, 
and after a decision to keep the draft bill short, set out the following as the first three articles in the 1942 
draft: 
US State Department 1942 draft for an international bill of rights (extract, first three articles only) 
Article I: Governments exist of the benefit of the people and the promotion of their common welfare in an 
interdependent world. 
Article II:  All persons who are willing to work, as well as all persons who through no fault of their own are 
unable to work, have the right to enjoy such minimum standards of economic, social and cultural wellbeing 
as the resources of the country, effectively used, are capable of sustaining.  
Article III:  1. All persons shall enjoy equality before the law with respect to life, liberty, property, enterprise 
and employment, subject only to such restrictions as are designed to promote the general welfare.   2.  No 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property except in accordance with humane and civilised processes 
provided by law.394 
 
The way in which these Articles are framed, and the order they are set out appears significant: the first 
Article emphasises common welfare, the second the right to minimum standards of economic, social and 
cultural wellbeing (along with a reference to ‘resources’ that we will explore later) and the third emphasises 
                                                           
391 Brucken 2013, 36–37. 
392 Charles Merriam of the NRPB was also a member of the ALI Committee. Whelan 2010, 18. 
393 Ibid., 41–42. Citing United States Department of State Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation: 1939-1945: 115. 
394 I found a copy of this in the US national archives at College Park, MD.  Draft of the Legal Subcommittee 
dated 3 December 1942, found in the files of the US Subcommittee on the Rights of Women, 3/HRW D-78-47, 
RG 353, Box 110 (see notes in next section on these files). 
84 
non-discrimination (equality before the law) in relation to life, liberty, property, enterprise and 
employment, adding a limitation related to the general welfare (and which I also explore further below).   
Rowland Brucken, in his expansive history dismisses the significance of the 1942 draft’s Article II as a 
‘banal summary’ of the sub-committee’s work on ESCR, and avoids reflecting on why it is included as 
one of the first articles, or why it is clearly affirmed as a ‘right’.  Nor does he reflect on the ‘non-
discrimination’ phrasing or the ‘general welfare’ limitation on the traditionally more absolute rights to 
life, liberty and property.  Whelan in his history by contrast does pick up the significance of the 1942 
draft Article II, although he does not explore Article III.  He notes also the phrasing on the effective use 
of resources, briefly suggesting this appears to foreshadow the ICESCR’s Article 2.1 on ‘maximum 
available resources’395. However, with respect to this phrasing, Whelan makes an immediate assumption, 
anachronistically reading back from our contemporary reading of this phrase, that this phrase was even 
then meant as a ‘qualifier’ or limitation clause for the rights.   Considering that New Dealers such as Berle 
and Cohen were on the drafting committee, and taking account of the discursive context of economic 
Keynesianism and the simultaneous drafting of NRPB’s list of rights, I hypothesize below that an 
alternative (Keynesian) reading of this phrase might be more apt – and thus in the following sections, I 
trace this concept moving forward, including looking in detail at the drafting of Article 2.1 of the 
ICESCR.   
What both scholars show however is that the Legal Subcommittee had already decided that their 1942 
draft of an international bill of rights should be a ‘Declaration of Human Rights’, rather than a legally 
enforceable agreement, presaging later debates over the status of the rights in the UN Charter and the 
UDHR.  As State Department lawyers, their concerns with the legal enforceability of international rights 
revolved around whether an international body (or other governments) should have the power to enforce 
rights in the United States – they were convinced that isolationists in the Senate would reject this outright 
(as they had rejected Roosevelt’s bid to join the ‘World Court’ seven years earlier396) 
The United States did finally agree to support the inclusion of human rights in the 1945 UN Charter, but 
no Declaration of Human Rights was ever attached.  Rather, running out of time at San Francisco, a 
decision was taken to pass that task to a specialized body, the UN Commission on Human Rights.  As I 
show in the next section, the United States was to have a significant role in that drafting process under 
the leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt, who was selected to serve as the US delegate and Chair of the 
Commission on Human Rights.   
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3.2 From the UDHR to the ICESCR – the travaux preparatoires 
3.2.1  US influence on the drafting of  economic and social rights397 
Much of  the literature on the history of  human rights is dominated by a persistent narrative that the 
United States consistently argued against the inclusion of  economic and social rights in the international 
bill of  rights.  As discussed further below, this ‘myth’ of  US opposition to ESCR has been contested 
recently by scholars, notably Whelan and Donnelly as ‘historical revisionism of  the worst kind’ that 
ignores the positive role of  the US in promoting economic and social rights. 398 
In my own research, I found significant new evidence on the US drafting position during the drafting of  
the UDHR that supports the thesis of  Whelan and Donnelly, but goes well beyond it, by drawing on 
previously unexamined archival sources I unearthed in the UN travaux preparatoires and US National 
Archives.  This material sheds important new light on the official US position on economic, social and 
cultural rights during the drafting of  the UDHR over the period between 1947 and 1948, the detail of  
which is mysteriously absent from contemporary histories of  human rights.  These archival materials 
include a July 1947 US proposal unearthed in the travaux preparatoires of  the UDHR, entitled ‘United States 
Suggestions for Articles to be Incorporated in an International Bill of  Rights’,399 which shows that the official 
position of  the United States did support the inclusion of  a full range of  economic, social and cultural 
rights in the Universal Declaration – if  only for a brief  moment in time in mid-1947 and if  only in an 
aspirational Declaration, rather than as legally enforceable rights.  This July 1947 US proposal entitled 
and an earlier June 1947 submission entitled ‘United States Suggestions for Redrafts of  Certain Articles in the 
Draft Outline’400 were submitted as official US contributions to the UN for the work of  the Drafting 
Committee on an International Bill of  Human Rights of  the Commission on Human Rights – but have 
been overlooked by other historians of  human rights, as described further below. 
As I show below, analysing the UN travaux preparatoires alongside detailed US position papers that I found 
in the US Government National Archives in College Park, Maryland, show the strong early support of  
the administration for ESCR.  They also show that the US position was far more nuanced than standard 
narratives suggest, that there were differences amongst the US delegation and its advisers, and that the 
US position in fact shifted quite significantly over the brief  period of  the drafting of  the UDHR between 
1947 and 1948 in response to domestic and international pressures.  Indeed, the mid-1947 US proposal 
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marked a high watermark in official US support for these rights – a support soon eclipsed by 
constitutional concerns, conservative reaction and the rising tensions of  McCarthyism and the Cold War.   
What is most important however about this US July 1947 proposal is not only its significance for the 
drafting of  the UDHR, but more importantly its evident influence on the drafting of  the 1966 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  Substantial parts of  the US 1947 
wording on provisions on economic, social, and cultural rights reappear in the text of  the 1966 ICESCR.  
Key concepts and phrases that were later to become part of  the lexicon of  ESC rights, including the 
concepts of  ‘progressive realization,’ ‘maximum available resources,’ and the specific formulation of  
certain rights such as the ‘right to the highest attainable standard of  health’ clearly have their roots in this 
1947 US proposal. 
Since many scholars who have studied the ICESCR in detail tend to start their analysis from 1949 at the 
point of  drafting the ICESCR, they have missed critical details from the earlier history and the drafting 
of  the UDHR.  My history thus links together the drafting of  the UDHR and the ICESCR, as well as 
linking to the earlier emergence of  the rights and their later elaboration, charting a different story of  the 
roots and evolution of  ESCR.   
The ‘myth and mystery of  US history on ESCR’ 
Many scholars writing on international human rights law have long contended, for very different reasons, 
that economic, social, and cultural rights (ESC rights) were only included in the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of  Human Rights (UDHR) because ‘Third World countries . . . insisted on, and achieved in 
collaboration with socialist countries at the time, recognition of  individual economic and social rights.’401 
Antonio Cassese, too, suggested that ‘it was only in a second stage, given the hostility of  the Socialist 
countries and under strong pressure from the Latin-Americans . . . that the West agreed to incorporate . 
. . a number of  economic and social rights.’402 This dominant narrative posits that the ‘West’ supported 
‘first generation’ civil and political rights, but has always resisted the inclusion of  ‘second generation’ 
economic, social, and cultural rights including during the drafting of  the UDHR.  A further persistent 
narrative also insists that ideas of  economic, social, and cultural rights are, and always have been, alien to 
the liberal individualist, civil and political rights-based tradition of  the United States, in ways that continue 
to draw force from the recent history of  the United States administration’s position on ESC rights.403  
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In an article in the Human Rights Quarterly however, Daniel Whelan and Jack Donnelly challenged this 
narrative, questioning what they call the ‘myth of  Western opposition’ to economic, social, and cultural 
rights, and arguing that this was an erroneous reading of  the history of  human rights; indeed, that it was 
‘ludicrous’ and ‘revisionist history of  the worst kind.’404 Countering this myth, Whelan and Donnelly 
argued that economic and social rights had in fact become central to the thinking of  Western welfare 
states and to the Western vision of  the post-war economic order by 1945—including that of  the United 
States. They point to evidence including Franklin Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter, 
his 1944 ‘Economic Bill of  Rights’ and the positive support of  the United States and other Western states 
for the inclusion of  ESC rights in the Universal Declaration, as well as the instantiation of  these ideals 
in the development of  welfare states in the UK and, less comprehensively, in the US.405  
In response to this article, Alex Kirkup and Tony Evans criticized Whelan and Donnelly’s methodology 
as being too empirical and positivist, suggesting that they take official US support for these rights at face 
value, without looking at the underlying rationale of  the US for promoting human rights (which Kirkup 
and Evans suggest was to legitimize the expansion of  laissez-faire global markets, although they then 
then argue somewhat inconsistently that conservative groups opposed these rights precisely for their 
potential threat to laissez-faire).406 Kirkup and Evans also challenge Whelan and Donnelly for their 
assumptions of  widespread domestic US support for economic and social rights, highlighting the 
powerful conservative reaction against these rights, as evidenced by the influential opposition of  the 
American Bar Association (ABA) and the Bricker amendment controversy of  the early 1950s.407 They 
also point to earlier US opposition to ESC rights (especially the right to work) during the 1944 
Dumbarton Oaks and 1945 San Francisco conferences and the ambivalent position of  the US in the 
drafting of  the human rights instruments408 (although, as Whelan and Donnelly later correctly pointed 
out, there are a number of  inaccuracies in Kirkup and Evans’ use of  archival sources).409 In another 
critique of  Whelan and Donnelly, Susan Kang similarly suggests that, despite rhetorical elite support for 
economic and social rights in the drafting of  the human rights instruments, this was not a settled political 
question in 1945 and that commitments to these rights and to welfare states merely reflected a historic 
compromise that co-opted labour and other social movements into the capitalist system.410 
While these critiques provide important reflections that serve as a corrective to taking rhetorical elite 
support for these rights at face value, it is interesting nonetheless that, despite focusing on the role of  the 
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United States in the drafting of  the international human rights instruments, none of  these scholars look 
in detail at the US official position during the drafting period of  the UDHR over the period 1947–1948. 
Even Whelan’s more recent 2010 book on the history of  the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)411 and its division from the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) (which also contains some of  the material on which Whelan and Donnelly’s article is 
based), looks at important US sources of  inspiration for the UDHR but does not look in depth at the 
US position during the drafting of  the UDHR.412 While Whelan delves in depth into the travaux 
preparatoires [drafting history] of  the Covenants,413 he avoids a detailed investigation of  the travaux 
preparatoires of  the UDHR—largely because he sees Johannes Morsink’s seminal exploration of  the 
UDHR as definitive.414 Yet while Morsink’s history of  the UDHR locates much of  the inspiration for 
economic, social, and cultural rights with the existing constitutions of  Latin American states (among 
others) and various Latin American proposals to the drafting of  the UDHR, Morsink also does not 
explore the official United States written submissions to the UN at that time.415  
Delving into the detail of  the official position of  the United States during the drafting of  the 1948 UDHR 
sheds new light on this debate and has revealed an important part of  the history of  economic, social, and 
cultural rights that appears to have been missed by these scholars. My own research in the United Nations 
archives of  the travaux preparatoires of  the UDHR has yielded a July 1947 proposal entitled ‘United States 
Suggestions for Articles to be Incorporated in an International Bill of  Rights’ (US Suggestions)416 and an 
earlier June 1947 submission on which this is based entitled ‘United States Suggestions for Redrafts of  
Certain Articles in the Draft Outline’ (US Suggestions for Redrafts).417 These texts (among other US 
position papers) were submitted as official US contributions to the UN for the work of  the Drafting 
Committee on an International Bill of  Human Rights set up by the UN Commission on Human Rights.418 
These US Suggestions set out the official US position as of  mid-1947 on the rights in the preliminary 
UN Secretariat draft of  an international bill of  rights and propose wording for new provisions which the 
US believed should be included in the draft international bill of  rights. Surprisingly, the US Suggestions 
set out, in substantial detail, not only a full catalogue of  civil and political rights, but also a full set of  
economic, social, and cultural rights, with curiously detailed text on the correlative duties of  the state, 
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417 U.N.Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/8, June 11, 1947, June US Suggestions 
418 The June 1947 US Suggestions were submitted by the US to the UN Drafting Committee and a slightly revised 
July 1947 US Suggestions were published as Annex C to the report by the Drafting Committee to the 
Commission on Human Rights in July 1947. 
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going significantly beyond the UN Secretariat draft in specifying the duties of  states in relation to these 
rights.  
This June 1947 text (and the slightly revised July 1947 version) of  United States Suggestions thus provides 
a key piece of  strangely overlooked historical evidence which provides proof—at least at the level of  a 
positivist and rhetorical approach to human rights—419 of  official, albeit fleeting, US support for the 
inclusion of  economic, social, and cultural rights, in an aspirational declaration, if  not in a legally-binding 
covenant. Internal US government files available in the US archives also provide further insights into the 
US position during the drafting, particularly the records of  the Interdepartmental Committee on 
International Social Policy and its Subcommittee on Human Rights and Status of  Women, which 
developed the negotiating position of  the United States during the whole period of  the drafting of  the 
UDHR from 1947 to 1948.420  The Interdepartmental Committee on Social Policy (ISP) was established 
in January 1947 to provide a coordinating mechanism between governmental departments for post-war 
international social policy, and responsibility for formulating human rights policy was delegated to its 
Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Status of  Women, chaired by the Department of  State, with 
representatives from the Departments of  Justice, Labor and the Federal Security Agency as well as ad-
hoc representatives from other government agencies.421 The files of  these committees help to reveal in 
more detail the nuances of  the US position and how it shifted quite significantly over the short period 
of  the drafting of  the UDHR between 1947 and 1948.  
Yet there is a certain mystery to this US history, in that this June-1947 US text has been forgotten, and 
features neither in the debate reviewed above, nor in contemporary histories of  human rights, including 
in histories of  the UDHR.422 It is also absent from detailed histories of  US policy on human rights in the 
1940s,423 even recent histories of  the ICESCR, such as that by Whelan cited above. 
                                                           
419 As discussed above, Kirkup and Evans roundly criticized Whelan and Donnelly for their positivistic approach 
in relying on human rights rhetoric and documents to prove western support for ESCR, while ignoring actual 
politics and practice. See Kirkup and Evans 2009.  Much of this section also focuses rather narrowly on the 
rhetoric of the official US position, but this is in the belief that this forgotten history is interesting given the 
significance of the US draft not only for the UDHR but also for the later drafting of the ICESCR. 
420 The records of the United States Inter-Departmental Committee on International Social Policy (ISP) and its 
Subcommittee on Human Rights and Status of Women (S/HRW) for the period 1947-1949 are found in the US 
National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (NARA), Record Group (RG) 353, 
Boxes 98-113 (hereinafter identified with box number, RG353, NARA). The ISP and S/HRW files include many 
brief position papers on each of the rights, setting out the detailed US negotiating positions, which were provided 
to Eleanor Roosevelt as instructions on the US position in her role as US representative in the UN Commission 
and Drafting Committee. 
421 See US Committee on ISP, Draft Terms of Reference for the Committee on Human Rights and the Status of Women, ISP-
D8/47, Box 98, RG353, NARA (3 Jan.1947). 
422 As noted above, there has been a recent explosion of the literature on the history of human rights. See for 
example, Lauren 2003; Hunt 2008; Morsink 1999; Simpson 2001; Moyn 2012; Moyn 2018. 
423 Key works on US human rights policy in the 1940s include Glendon 2001; Borgwardt 2007; Borgwardt 2008; 
Borgwardt 2012; Anderson 2003a; Brucken 2013; Simpson 2001; Vik 2012a; Vik 2012b. 
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The 1947 US Suggestions is significant not only because it belies standard assumptions about the US 
position on ESC rights, but also because substantial parts of  the US wording and provisions on economic, 
social, and cultural rights are closer to the text of  the 1966 ICESCR than to the 1948 UDHR. Several 
concepts and phrases that were later to become part of  the ICESCR, including the concepts of  
‘progressive realization,’ ‘maximum use of  resources,’ and the specific formulation of  rights such as the 
‘right to the highest attainable standard of  health’ appear to have clear roots in this 1947 US text, which 
anticipates the phrasing of  the ICESCR. This then begs a number of  questions: why is it that this US 
text has not appeared or been analyzed in existing histories? And how did this 1947 US text have such an 
impact on the text of  the 1966 ICESCR, a text which was only finalized nineteen years later, after endless 
negotiations between states?  
What is clear from the archives is that this 1947 US proposal demonstrates US commitment to a particular 
conception of  economic, social, and cultural rights early in the drafting process of  the UDHR—one that 
is very similar to the rights eventually incorporated into the ICESCR. It is also clear, however, that this 
mid-1947 text marked a high watermark of  official support for ideas of  economic, social, and cultural 
rights within the US administration, a position which quickly shifted under the pressure of  constitutional 
concerns, deepening conservative opposition as Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal era drew to a close, and 
an increasingly fraught ideological environment at both the domestic and international levels. 
The Drafting of  the International Bill of  Human Rights 
The drafting of  the UDHR began when, in June 1946, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
set out terms of  reference for the new Commission on Human Rights,424 and assigned it the task of  
drawing up an international bill of  rights with the assistance of  the UN Secretariat’s Division of  Human 
Rights.425 The Secretariat, headed by the Canadian, John P. Humphrey, then initiated a comprehensive 
survey of  existing state constitutions and of  proposals for an international bill of  rights that had been 
submitted by states, nongovernmental organizations, and intergovernmental bodies. From this review, 
Humphrey prepared a preliminary ‘Draft Outline of  an International Bill of  rights,’ which contained a 
set of  forty-eight articles on different human rights.426 This first Secretariat draft included civil and 
political rights, and economic, social, and cultural rights, collected and collated from existing state 
constitutions around the world, as well as from the various proposals for draft declarations that had been 
sent in to the Secretariat. For its provisions on economic, social, and cultural rights, Humphrey’s first 
draft drew on many sources, but most prominently from the many existing Latin American constitutional 
                                                           
424 The UN Commission on Human Rights was established in 1946 with eighteen commissioners: representatives 
of the five Great Powers (United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China) plus representatives 
from another thirteen member states of the Commission with revolving three-year terms, with the first consisting 
of Australia, Belgium, Byelorussia, Chile, Egypt, India, Iran, Lebanon, Panama, Philippines, Ukraine, Uruguay, 
and Yugoslavia. 
425 C.H.R. Res. 1946/9, at 520–22, U.N.Doc. E/Res/9(II) (1946). 
426 U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/3, 4 June 1947 (Draft Outline of International Bill of Rights, prepared by the Division of 
Human Rights). 
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provisions on these rights as well as proposals for an international bill of  rights submitted by various 
organizations and some states—including proposals submitted by Panama, Chile, and Cuba.427  
However, although Humphrey’s draft of  the international bill of  rights was very important as the first 
preliminary draft of  what eventually became the UDHR, it was produced by the UN Secretariat and was 
not considered necessarily representative of  the wishes of  the member states of  the UN Commission on 
Human Rights.  Thus the Commission itself, in its first meeting at the beginning of  1947, set up a 
‘Drafting Committee on an International Bill of  Rights’ consisting of  eight state representatives428 and 
led by the Chair, Eleanor Roosevelt (who was also the US representative to the Commission). This 
Drafting Committee was charged with taking the lead in formulating a preliminary draft international bill 
of  rights. Humphrey’s very detailed first draft, along with copies of  other draft proposals and comments 
and suggestions from states,429 were then submitted to this Drafting Committee as the basis for them to 
begin their work. The Drafting Committee met for its first official session between 9 and 25 June 1947 
in Lake Success, New York, and started to negotiate the text for an international bill of  rights, and by the 
end of  the June 1947 session, the Drafting Committee had produced its own draft.430  
At the end of  its June 1947 session, the Drafting Committee reported on its work back to the 
Commission on Human Rights, providing a preliminary draft international bill of  rights that had emerged 
from its work, but also providing the Commission with copies of  the materials on which it had based its 
work. Along with its own draft, the Drafting Committee’s report to the Commission provided annexes 
of  documents that had influenced its work, including Humphrey’s Secretariat draft, a detailed proposal 
from the United Kingdom (proposing a legally binding Covenant limited to civil and political rights) and 
proposals from the United States for revisions of  the draft (which offered redrafts of  articles already set 
out in Humphrey’s initial Secretariat draft, not only on civil and political rights, but also on ESC rights). 
Paragraph 11 of  the Drafting Committee’s July 1947 report reads: 
In addition to the Draft Outline of an International Bill of Human Rights prepared by the 
Secretariat (. . . constituting Annex A), the Drafting Committee had before it the text of a letter 
from Lord Dukeston, the United Kingdom Representative on the Commission on Human Rights, 
transmitting (a) a draft International Bill of Rights and (b) a draft resolution which might be passed 
                                                           
427 U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/3/ADD.1 International Bill of Rights Documented Outline, Part I—Texts. Submitted texts 
included proposals for draft declarations submitted by Chile, Cuba, and Panama, as well as detailed proposals 
made by the US, the UK, and India. Notably Panama submitted the 1946 model bill of rights drawn up by the 
American Law Institute, while Chile submitted the 1945 Draft Declaration of the International Rights and Duties 
of Man drawn up by the Inter-American Juridical Committee. 
428 Initially, the UN drafting committee was composed of only three members of the Commission: the appointed 
Chair, Eleanor Roosevelt of the United States; the Vice-Chairman, P.C Chang of China: and the Rapporteur, 
Charles Malik of Lebanon, but was soon expanded to include another five members with representatives from 
Australia, Chile, France, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. During the second meeting in June 1947, the 
representatives of these members who attended the meetings included Ralph L. Harry (Australia), H. Santa Cruz 
(Chile), Rene Cassin (France), Vladimir M. Koretsky (USSR), and Geoffrey Wilson (UK). 
429 U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/3/ADD.1 International Bill of Rights Documented Outline, Part I—Texts.  This included 
proposals for draft declarations submitted by Chile, Cuba and Panama, and specific detailed proposals made by 
the United States, the UK and India. 
430 Morsink offers a very clear overview of the seven stages of the drafting process in Morsink 1999, 4–12. 
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by the General Assembly . . . constituting Annex B . . . These two documents were considered and 
compared, together with certain United States proposals for the rewording of some items appearing in the 
Secretariat Draft Outline, constituting Annex C.431  
 
The Drafting Committee Report’s Annex C is entitled ‘United States Suggestions for an International 
Bill of  Rights’,432 which is a slightly revised version of  the June 1947 US submission submitted entitled 
‘United States Suggestions for Redrafts of  Certain Articles in the Draft Outline.’433 These US Suggestions 
(both in the June and July versions) set out proposed revisions on text contained in the Secretariat draft 
and wording for new provisions on all rights, including ESC rights. These documents provide a clear 
picture of  the official US position and point to a significant difference between the UK and US positions 
at that time. While the UK was emphasizing the importance of  a legally binding covenant that would 
include only civil and political rights (as set out in Lord Dukeston’s letter in Annex B), the US was 
emphasizing the importance of  a non-legally binding declaration that would be a forceful statement of  
all human rights, including ESC rights.  
It is important here to remember that the Drafting Committee and the Commission on Human Rights 
could not reach agreement on whether to pursue the UK proposal of  a legally binding covenant restricted 
only to civil and political rights, or whether to pursue the US proposal of  a more expansive and 
inspirational, but non-legally binding, declaration of  rights encompassing civil and political rights as well 
as economic, social and cultural rights. The failure to reach agreement led to a decision to pursue the 
drafting of  both a declaration and a covenant simultaneously. By the end of  1948, both texts had been 
through several rounds of  negotiation under UN auspices, but the UN General Assembly only adopted 
the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights, leaving the potentially legally binding covenant on civil and 
political rights until later. 
The 1947 ‘United States Suggestions for Articles to be Incorporated in an International Bill of  
Rights’ 
The mid-1947 US Suggestions were thus conceived within the context of  the US position to produce a 
non-binding declaration, but nonetheless included language on the full range of  human rights. The US 
Suggestions, which amounted to a full draft of  an international bill of  rights, included sixteen provisions 
on civil and political rights,434 but also five expansive provisions on economic, social, and cultural rights 
                                                           
431 U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/21, July US Suggestions, at 41–47 (emphasis added). 
432 Ibid,. 
433 U.N.Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/8, June US Suggestions. Comparing the June and July version shows that the only 
difference is the headings of articles, plus one brief addition to July 1947 which introduces a provision on private 
education into the article on the right to education: ‘The State shall maintain adequate and free facilities for such 
education which, however, ‘shall not be exclusive of private educational facilities or institutions.’ (The changed text 
italicized.) 
434 Articles covered under ‘equal protection before the law’ were: the right to life, the right not to be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest or detention, the right not to be subjected to torture or any ‘unusual punishment,’ the right to a 
fair trial, the right not to be held in slavery or compulsory labor, the right to privacy, the right to freedom of 
93 
including: the right to progress; the right to health; the right to education; the right to economic security 
(including a decent standard of  living, social security, work-related rights, adequate food, housing, and 
community services necessary to wellbeing); and the right to participate in cultural life and share the 
benefits of  scientific progress. The US draft not only enunciated ESC rights, but carefully spelled out a 
correlative duty of  the state in detail for each economic and social right.  In its provisions on ESCR 
rights, the text of  the US Suggestions (taken here from the June 1947 US Suggestions) proposes: 
Article 35  RIGHT TO PROGRESS 
Everyone has the right to a fair and equal opportunity to advance his own physical, economic, and cultural 
well-being and to share in the benefits of civilization.  
It is the duty of the State, in accordance with the maximum use of its resources and with due regard for the 
liberties of individuals, to promote this purpose by legislation or by other appropriate means. Among the 
social rights thus to be achieved progressively by joint effort of the individual and the State are those defined 
in the following articles. 
Article 36  RIGHT TO HEALTH 
Everyone, without distinction of economic or social condition, has a right to the highest attainable standard 
of health.  
The responsibility of the State for the health and safety of its people can be fulfilled only by provision of 
adequate health and social measures. 
Article 37  RIGHT TO EDUCATION 
Everyone has the right to education.  
Each State has the duty to require that each child within territories under its jurisdiction receive a 
fundamental education. The State shall maintain adequate and free facilities for such education. It shall also 
assure development of facilities for further, including higher, education, which are adequate and effectively 
available to all the people within such territories. 
Article 38  RIGHT TO ECONOMIC SECURITY 
Everyone has a right to a decent standard of living; to a fair and equal opportunity to earn a livelihood; to 
wages and hours and conditions of work calculated to insure a just share of the benefits of progress to all; 
and to protection against loss of income on account of disability, unemployment, or old age.  
It is the duty of the State to undertake measures that will promote full employment and good working 
conditions; provide protection for wage-earners and dependents against lack of income for reasons beyond 
their control; and assure adequate food, housing, and community services necessary to the well-being of the 
people. 
Article 39  RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC AND ARTISTIC 
LIFE 
Everyone has the right to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in 
the benefits of science.435 
 
The way in which the rights are set out, with an initial statement of  the right, followed by a correlative 
duty, mirrors the form (though not the content) of  the American Law Institute’s 1946 Statement of  
Essential Human Rights.436 The US proposals on correlative duties set out concrete measures necessary 
                                                           
movement, the right to a legal personality, the right to equal opportunity in employment, the right to property, the 
right to a nationality, the right to freedom of expression and association, and the right to vote. 
435 U.N.Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/8, June US Suggestions, at 6–7. 
436 The 1946 ALI statement was submitted to the UN Secretariat via the delegation of Panama and was used by 
Humphrey in his first draft of the UDHR. The ALI statement also appears to have had a significant effect on the 
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to implement the economic and social rights, including measures for health and education and policies 
for ensuring full employment and social protection for a decent standard of  living. These proposals for 
text on correlative obligations were surprisingly also significantly stronger than the original Secretariat 
text (except in the case of  the right to education, on which Humphrey’s draft had already provided 
similarly worded text on the duty of  the state). 
Although setting out the ESC rights and their correlative obligations in such detail did not necessarily 
suggest that the US administration believed that these rights should be legally enforceable, 437 this text 
suggests that the US at least initially believed that a forceful statement of  these rights should also include 
references to take particular policy measures that would be necessary for states to meet their responsibility 
towards these rights.438 Yet despite this relatively strong language on duties in mid-1947—and despite 
succeeding in getting significant amounts of  these mid-1947 text proposals into the draft Declaration 
(e.g. the US text on the right to health was taken verbatim into the draft of  the Declaration that emerged 
at the end of  the June 1947 Drafting Committee meeting), the US position later shifted and from late 
1947 onwards, the US explicitly tried to downplay or eliminate all this text on correlative duties or state 
obligations in relation to ESC rights, as discussed below.  
The UN archives of  travaux preparatoires of  the UDHR offer key insights into the negotiating positions 
of  the United States, in terms of  the interventions of  Eleanor Roosevelt, as head of  the US delegation, 
during the negotiations.  However, more background on the US position can be found in internal US 
Government files available in the US National Archives in Maryland, particularly the records of  the US 
Interdepartmental Committee on International Social Policy and its Subcommittee on Human Rights and 
Status of  Women.439   The Interdepartmental Committee on Social Policy (ISP) was established in January 
                                                           
official US position, via Eleanor Roosevelt’s adviser, Durward Sandifer of the State Department who had been 
involved in the drafting of the ALI statement since 1942.  Brucken 2013; Vik 2012b. 
437 By pursuing a non-binding declaration on human rights, the US was able to postpone the question of whether 
these rights should be legally enforceable in the domestic US context. In relation to the ALI’s approach, Vik 
details how the ALI drafting committee included economic and social rights drafted as rights with correlative 
duties, but members of the committee could not agree on their precise legal form and remained divided over 
whether these rights should be presented as legally enforceable rights or as policy goals. The final approach agreed 
was that these rights could be framed as a declaration of principles, with the aim to encourage states to enact 
social legislation and formalize constitutional principles, much as the formulation of international principles in the 
International Labour Organization had had some effect on states. This failure to agree on the legal form of these 
rights led to the ALI’s proposal being presented as a ‘Statement of Essential Rights,’ rather than as a ‘draft bill of 
rights,’ and it was ‘circulated,’ rather than submitted for approval by the wider ALI membership. Vik 2012a. 
438 The files of the US Inter-Departmental Committee on International Social Policy and its Subcommittee on 
Human Rights and Status of Women suggests that there were some internal differences between representatives 
of different government agencies on the character of ESC rights, with some suggesting that the US proposals 
should take a declaratory rather than a mandatory form, focusing on the rights of individuals, rather than the 
duties of the state.  See, US Committee on ISP, Supplement to Recommendations with Respect to Specific Articles, 
Declaration on Human Rights: Article 26 (Social Security), position paper submitted by the Federal Security Agency with 
Labor, ISP D-72/48, 7 May 1947, Box 107, RG353, NARA 
439 The records of the United States Inter-Departmental Committee on International Social Policy (ISP) and its 
Subcommittee on Human Rights and Status of Women (S/HRW) for the period 1947-1949 are found in the US 
National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (NARA), Record Group (RG) 353, 
Boxes 98-113 (hereinafter identified with box number, RG353, NARA). The next section refers to these files as 
the ISP and S/HRW files. 
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1947 to provide a coordinating mechanism between governmental departments for post-war 
international social policy, and responsibility for formulating human rights policy was delegated to its 
Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Status of  Women, chaired by the Department of  State, but also 
consisting of  representatives from the Departments of  Justice, Labor and the Federal Security Agency 
as well as ad-hoc representatives from other government agencies.440   
As Vik argues, this sub-committee went to great lengths to establish a coordinated government policy on 
human rights, and engaged in substantive debate on political, philosophical and legal issues, as the 
representatives of the different departments represented on the Sub-Committee had different views on 
the issue of economic and social rights.441  The Department of Labor’s representative, for example, was 
committed to Roosevelt’s New Deal and saw the establishment of an international human rights 
agreement as an opportunity for pushing further domestic reform – and strengthening federal power to 
regulate labour issues at state level.  The State Department lawyers however had a very different position 
given broader constitutional concerns with regard the expansion of federal power as well as the legal 
implications of any international treaties.442  It was these Committees however who agreed on the 
negotiating position of  the United States and provided detailed instructions via the State Department to 
Eleanor Roosevelt for her role in the UN Commission and the Drafting Committee.   
The US Suggestions was produced by the ISP’s Subcommittee on Human Rights and Status of  Women,443 
which had reviewed not only the UN Secretariat’s draft, but had also reviewed at least twenty-three other 
draft bills of  rights in existence at the time.444 The Subcommittee files contain a number of  brief  position 
papers on each right, which were produced by the different department representatives on the 
Subcommittee, and which reveal some significant differences in the understanding of  the character of  
economic and social rights between the different government departments.  445  However, these position 
papers also show that the 1947 US Suggestions intended to strengthen some of  the language of  
Humphrey’s Secretariat draft, particularly in relation to the articles on the rights to health, education and 
social security.  However, it also sought to avoid a direct reference to the right to work (preferring the 
                                                           
440 See US Committee on ISP, Draft Terms of Reference for the Committee on Human Rights and the Status of Women, ISP-
D8/47, Box 98, RG353, NARA (3 Jan.1947). 
441   Vik records the US position at the UN as at January 1947, as this was published in the US archives in a 
Department of State Bulletin dated 16 February 1947, although she also does not review the US documents submitted 
to the UN discussed here.  See Vik 2012a, 906 See her note 17. 
442 Ibid., 894.  
443 See the earlier position paper, US Subcommittee on HRW, Section II: Social Rights, ISP D-89/47, Box 110, 
RG353, NARA(3 June 1947). 
444 The US S/HRW files collect together many of these drafts, which range from the bill drafted by Hersch 
Lauterpacht to that of H.G. Wells, from the American Bar Association to the statement of the American Law 
Institute and many others, showing that these US Committee were well aware of these other efforts. 
445 US Subcommittee on HRW, Draft International Bill of Rights ISP D-95/47, Box 110, RG353, NARA (20 June 
1947) at 8 and at the Annex:  Section II (Social Rights). 
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promotion of  full employment – as explored further below) and introduced the notion of  ‘progressive 
realization’ and emphasised the need for efforts of  the individual as well as the state.446 
Of  the articles proposed by the US, the proposed article on the Right to Progress was new (in that this 
did not exist in the Secretariat draft) and is set out as a chapeau or ‘umbrella’ article for the following 
economic and social rights. It is significant in that its wording is surprisingly close to the eventual wording 
of  Article 2(1) of  the ICESCR, and it appears to provide the first use of  the concepts ‘maximum available 
resources’ and ‘progressive realization’ (or ‘achieving progressively’). The US position papers suggest that 
the US initially drafted this article as a provision to balance the duties of  the state with the duties of  the 
individual, and to limit the immediacy of  the obligation by emphasizing that these rights would be 
‘progressively realized.’447 The UN meeting records show that Eleanor Roosevelt (acting simultaneously 
in her role as Chair of  the meeting but also a member of  the drafting committee representing the United 
States) raised this proposal to the attention of  the Drafting Committee, but did not press forcefully for 
this to be included explicitly as a right to progress during the June meeting in 1947.448  
This language was not then immediately incorporated by the Drafting Committee into its draft, although 
the idea of  an umbrella article for economic and social rights did come back into the drafting process at 
a later point as a French proposal and is partly captured in the final UDHR in Article 22.449 This eventual 
UDHR Article 22 was however interpreted differently by different government representatives to the 
UN, with the French emphasizing the aspect of  international cooperation for securing economic and 
social rights (Cassin, as the French representative, emphasized that international cooperation was essential 
for resolving the issue of  mass unemployment)450 while the US later stressing that this article was intended 
as a limitation on state duties, as Eleanor Roosevelt emphasised in her final speech to the General 
Assembly before the adoption of  the Declaration.451 
The US proposed text on the right to health is also interesting, as it was significantly different and more 
detailed than Humphrey’s preliminary draft.  Humphrey’s draft read, ‘Everyone has the right to medical 
care. The State shall promote public health and safety.’,452 but the US Subcommittee position paper 
                                                           
446 A range of position papers is accessible in Box 110 for this time period. Precise references are given below 
under the separate discussions of each right. 
447 US Subcommittee on HRW, Article 28A: Right to Progress, position paper, S/HRW D-122/47, Box 110 (12 Sept. 
1947) explains that the text aimed to balance the duties of the individual and the need for self-reliance, with the 
duties of the state.   I could not find any position paper clearly explaining the concepts of ‘achieving progressively’ 
and ‘maximum available resources’, although it appears that this combines some text from other position papers 
on social security and the right to work (see further below). 
448 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.14, 23 June 1947, 6. 
449 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, 22, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/217A (1948) states as 
Art 22: 
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national 
efforts and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the 
economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality. 
450 See Morsink 1999, 226–30.  
451 Ibid., 230.  Eleanor Roosevelt, Speech ‘On the Adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (9 Dec 1948). 
452 US Subcommittee on HRW, Draft Outline International Bill of Rights, 12. 
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suggested that this article on the right to health ‘was entirely inadequate’ and called for the use of  stronger 
language, adapted from the Constitution of  the World Health Organization on the right to ‘the highest 
attainable standard of  health’ and on the responsibilities of  governments in the ‘provision of  adequate 
health and social measures.’453 In the June 1947 UN meeting, Eleanor Roosevelt explained that her 
government was in support of  the substance of  the article on health suggested in the Secretariat draft, 
but that the United States had proposed a new wording. She explained that the language proposed by the 
US (which read that, ‘Everyone, without distinction of  economic and social condition, has the right to 
the highest attainable standard of  health’ along with language on the correlative duty of  the state to 
ensure the ‘provision of  health and social measures’ was an adaptation of  text from the Constitution of  
the World Health Organization.454  
The US proposal on this right did make its way almost verbatim into the draft after her intervention. 
However, the text on the right to health was later merged and collapsed into a broader article covering a 
range of  rights and in the final UDHR, the right to health is subsumed into Article 25 as ‘Everyone has 
the right to a standard of  living adequate for the health and well-being of  himself  and of  his family, 
including food, clothing, housing and medical care.’455 Interestingly, however, this phrasing of  ‘the highest 
attainable standard of  health’ was to later come back in the text of  the ICESCR. It is intriguing, then, 
that it was the US that first proposed this language—a phrase which, like the phrases of  ‘progressive 
realization’ and the ‘use of  maximum available resources,’ has since entered the lexicon of  economic, 
social, and cultural rights.  
On the proposal for the right to education, the US proposal cleaved more closely to Humphrey’s text 
(which already followed a similar format setting out the duty of  the state),456 although US Subcommittee 
position paper had even proposed stronger language than the language that ended up in the US draft, 
including phrasing on the need for the development of  facilities to ‘the highest attainable level’ for further 
education.457 
The United States also proposed an article on the ‘Right to Economic Security’, to include the right to a 
decent standard of  living, work-related rights, and social security.  This appears to have been a revision 
and extension of  the article of  Humphrey’s draft article on social security, along with folding in some of  
his other proposed economic and social articles into this one provision. The US Sub-committee position 
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paper on social security criticised the Secretariat draft article on social security as being ‘too narrow in 
concept’ and suggested it should incorporate the broader understanding adopted in the 1944 Philadelphia 
Conference of  the International Labour Organization, which went beyond the provision of  social 
insurance to include other types of  social measures including public assistance, the provision of  medical 
care, as well as measures for encouraging employment.458 Eleanor Roosevelt raised this proposal for an 
article on the ‘Right to Economic Security’ in the June 1947 meeting, and although the United States text 
was not taken wholesale into the new draft, many elements of  it were eventually incorporated in the 
UHDR as Article 25 on the right to an adequate standard of  living.459 
The Subcommittee’s position papers therefore generally proposed strengthening the ESCR articles in the 
Secretariat draft, particularly in relation to the duties of  the state in implementing them – even whilst 
introducing the idea that these should be duties to be progressively realized.  It was only the article 
proposed on the ‘right to work’ that appears to have raised significant problems for the Subcommittee.   
The US Subcommittee’s position paper on the right to work takes a markedly different tone, far less 
positive on the right than the other position papers (and it appears to have been written by a different 
agency than the other papers, although it was not possible to establish conclusively from the archives 
which government body drafted the paper).  Responding to the US domestic context, and recent debates 
over the an enforceable right to work in the draft 1945 Full Employment Bill, this position paper 
questions the legal enforceability of  the right to work (and social rights more broadly) and pushes for the 
UN language of  the right to work to be replaced by US language accepted during the UN Charter 
negotiations on the ‘promotion of  full employment.’460   The fear of  an explicit reference to the right to 
work is clearly linked to the administration’s keen awareness that any guarantee of  the right to work had 
already been rejected outright by Congress during the fierce debates in 1945 and 1946 that followed the 
introduction of  the Full Employment Bill of  1945.  As discussed above, that bill was eventually passed, 
but only as a much watered down 1946 Employment Act, with a commitment to pursue ‘maximum 
employment’ but no guarantee of  the right to work.461  The position paper of  the Sub-Committee 
expresses these concerns explicitly: 
In Congressional debates preceding the enactment of our own Employment Act of 1946, the concept of a 
‘right to work’ met with strong opposition. Neither this phrase nor ‘full employment’ appears in the law as 
enacted, which instead declares it to be the policy and responsibility of the Federal Government, subject to 
certain provisos, to use all its resources to create and maintain ‘conditions under which there will be afforded 
useful employment opportunities, including self-employment, for those able, willing, and seeking to work, 
and to promote maximum employment, production and purchasing power.462  
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The same position paper also points out that, during the drafting of  the UN Charter’s Article 55, the 
United States had also opposed text on the duty to guarantee full employment, although it had eventually 
accepted language to ‘promote full employment.’ For these reasons, the US Suggestions therefore 
subsumes the article on the right to work under the ‘Right to Economic Security’, replacing language on 
the ‘right to work’ with text on the duty of  the state to promote full employment and good working 
conditions in the context of  a ‘right to a decent standard of  living’.  
In the drafting process, the US was not successful in eliminating a reference to the right to work in the 
final UDHR, which includes the right to work in its Article 23.  During the drafting of  the UDHR, there 
was also a lengthy dispute with the Soviet delegates on the meaning of  the right to work, as the Cold War 
rhetoric on both sides escalated during the meetings of  the Commission on Human Rights.463 This US 
suggested that the USSR conception of  the right to work meant that people were forced to work, without 
a choice in their occupation, which explains why the UDHR’s article on the right to work in Article 23 is 
also balanced with US language on the ‘free choice of  employment.’  And while the UDHR did not 
include language on ‘full employment,’ it is again interesting to note that this wording was recovered later 
in the ICESCR which calls in its Article 6(2) on the right to work for policies to promote, inter alia, ‘full 
and productive employment.’  
Although both the UDHR and the ICESCR were clearly the result of  negotiations and the difference 
voices and ideas of  many different country representatives, the language and concepts raised in its 1947 
US Suggestions do therefore appear nonetheless to have had an important impact on the drafting of  the 
UDHR.  Oddly however, the 1947 US Suggestions appear to have had a greater significant impact on the 
later drafting of  the ICESCR. Indeed, the wording of  the provisions of  US Suggestions is surprisingly 
close in form and content to the 1966 text of  the ICESCR. The table below shows the similarity between 
the two texts by highlighting in italics the similar wording in relation to economic, social, and cultural 
rights, using the full text of  the 1947 US Suggestions, and comparing this with extracts of  text of  articles 
of  the ICESCR (with references in italics where there are similarities in the text). Note, for example, the 
provisions on ‘maximum available resources’ and ‘progressive realization,’ as well as the references to ‘full 
employment’ and the ‘right to the highest attainable standard of  health’: 
US July 1947 US Suggestions ICESCR 1966 
‘Everyone has the right to a fair and equal opportunity 
to advance his own physical, economic, spiritual and 
cultural well-being and to share in the benefits of 
civilization.’ 
It is the duty of the State, in accordance with the 
maximum use of its resources and with due regard for the 
liberties of individuals, to promote this purpose by 
‘Each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum 
of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant by all 
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legislation or by other appropriate means. Among the 
social rights thus to be achieved progressively by joint effort 
of the individual and the State are those defined in the 
following Articles.’  
appropriate means, including particularly the 
adoption of legislative measures.’ 
 
‘Everyone, without distinction as to economic or social 
condition, has a right to the highest attainable standard of 
health.  
The responsibility of the State for the health and safety 
of its people can be fulfilled only by provision of 
adequate health and social measures.’  
‘The States Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health.’ 
‘Everyone has the right to education. Each State has the duty 
to require that each child within territories under its 
jurisdiction receive a fundamental education.  
The State shall maintain adequate and free facilities for such 
education which, however, shall not be exclusive of 
private educational facilities or institutions. It shall also 
assure development of facilities for further, including 
higher education, which are adequate and effectively 
available to all the people within such territories.’  
‘The States Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize the right of everyone to education. They agree 
that education shall be directed to the full 
development of the human personality and the 
sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
‘The States Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize that, with a view to achieving the full 
realization of this right:  
‘(a) Primary education shall be compulsory and 
available free to all’  
Everyone has a right to a decent standard of living, to a fair 
and equal opportunity to earn a livelihood; to wages and 
hours and conditions of work calculated to insure a just share of 
the benefits of progress to all; and to protection against 
loss of income on account of disability, unemployment 
or old age.  
‘It is the duty of the State to undertake measures that 
will promote full employment and good working conditions; 
provide protection for wage-earners and dependents 
against lack of income for reasons beyond their 
control; and assure adequate food, housing, and community 
services necessary to the well-being of the people. 
The States Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family, 
including adequate food, clothing and housing, and 
to the continuous improvement of living 
conditions.  
The States Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment 
of just and favourable conditions of work. 
The States Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize the right to work, which includes the right 
of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work 
which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take 
appropriate steps to safeguard this right. 
The steps to be taken by a State Party to the present 
Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right 
shall include . . . to achieve . . . full and productive 
employment under conditions safeguarding 
fundamental political and economic freedoms to 
the individual. 
‘Everyone has the right to participate in the cultural life of 
the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in the 
benefits of science.’464 
 
‘The States Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize the right of everyone:  
a) To take part in cultural life;  
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its 
applications’  
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The provisions proposed in the mid-1947 US Suggestions are, in fact, closer in wording to the 1966 
ICESCR than to the wording of  the 1948 UDHR, which is significant to the extent that the US 
suggestions appear to have remained influential even after 1948, and after the US position had shifted 
substantially in its own position against commitments to ESC rights.  
The archives show that, despite the evidence of  official US support for the inclusion of  ESC rights in 
the declaration in June and July 1947, there was a significant shift in the US position by the end of  1947 
to eliminate references to the correlative obligations of  states and to emphasize the non-legally binding 
nature of  the declaration.  Albeit in a non-binding form, the US did however support the inclusion of  
ESC rights in the UDHR right up until its adoption in 1948, and it was only after turning towards the 
drafting of  the legally binding Covenant(s) in 1949 that the US position turned more decisively against 
these rights. 
The Evolution of  the US Position on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights during the drafting 
of  the UDHR, 1947-1948 
The US position on the international human rights agenda was already clear by 1942 –its 1942 draft 
‘Declaration of Human Rights’ was a ‘forceful statement of general principles’ that would include new 
rights related to social and economic justice. 
The first US submission to the Commission on Human Rights in 1947 dated 28 January 1947 and entitled 
“United States Proposals Regarding an International Bill of Rights” 465 echoed that position, by suggesting 
the inclusion of social rights:  
 “Among the categories of rights which the United States suggests should be considered are the following:  
a) personal rights, such as freedom of speech, information, religion and rights of property, 
b)  procedural rights, such as safeguards for persons accused of crime; 
c) social rights such as the right to employment and social security and the right to enjoy minimum standards 
of economic, social and cultural well-being; 
d) political rights such as the right to citizenship and the right of citizens to participate in their 
government.”466 
This brief January 1947 US submission was then substantially expanded in the June and July 1947 US 
Suggestions discussed above, after the review of Humphrey’s first draft.  By this time, the official US 
position was being prepared by an Interdepartmental Committee on Social Policy which reviewed the 
draft international bill of rights and set out the official US response and proposals, and submitted via her 
advisers to Eleanor Roosevelt who led the US delegation to the Commission on Human Rights, as well 
as chairing the UN Drafting Committee.467  
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Glendon suggests that Roosevelt, “although she cooperated closely with her State Department aides, was 
able to influence US policy at several key junctures, especially by keeping the spirit of the New Deal alive 
where economic and social rights were concerned”468 although Simpson argues that it is difficult to assess 
the extent of her impact.469  But the archives suggest that she had more autonomy early in the smaller, 
more informal drafting process of the initial Drafting Committee meetings, but after that she became 
more constrained in her role as US representative in the wider Commission on Human Rights and 
General Assembly she was required to stick more closely to an increasingly less positive State Department 
script.470 
Like Franklin Roosevelt himself, for Eleanor Roosevelt the language of rights was powerful, even if the 
rights were not to be initially inscribed as legally enforceable ‘rights’ or legally binding provisions.  She 
did not push back against her instruction, when at the beginning of  the drafting period of  the UDHR, 
when in February 1947, the US called for the drafting of  a nonbinding declaration to be followed by (a) 
legally binding convention(s) at a second stage: 
With regard to the legal form of an international bill of rights, the United States suggests that the 
Commission should first prepare it in the form of a Declaration on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms to be adopted as a General Assembly resolution. This Declaration should be . . . framed with a 
view to speedy adoption by the General Assembly. The resolution containing this Declaration should make 
provision for the subsequent preparation by the Commission on Human Rights of one or more conventions 
on human rights and fundamental freedoms. This course, it is thought, would permit prompt adoption of a 
broad statement of human rights and allow time for the working out of detailed treaty provisions on specific 
matters.471 
 
Eleanor Roosevelt was keen that the declaration should not be full of  legalese but should rather be 
phrased in short, rousing text in ordinary language ‘readily understood by all peoples.’472 Marjorie 
Whiteman, Eleanor Roosevelt’s legal adviser from the State Department at the time, wrote:  
In her view, the world was waiting, as she said, ‘for the Commission on Human Rights to do something’ 
and that to start by the drafting of a treaty with its technical language and then to await its being brought 
into force by ratification, would halt progress in the field of human rights.473  
 
While it is easy to take a cynical reading of  the US decision to pursue a non-binding instrument on human 
rights, it is also interesting to examine whether, for Eleanor Roosevelt and her advisers, pushing first for 
a morally binding declaration (and only later for a legally binding convention) was also a strategic choice 
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from the perspective of  the US domestic context. Pursuing a declaration first would mean that difficult 
constitutional questions over the implications of  a binding international treaty could be postponed and, 
importantly, a non-legally binding statement of  principles would not require congressional approval. 
Avoiding the need for congressional approval was particularly important for Eleanor Roosevelt and her 
advisers in the historical context of  isolationists in Congress becoming increasingly hostile to the United 
Nations and the drafting of  international treaties that might impact on national sovereignty.474 It was also 
important if  economic and social rights were to be included in a declaration—as the Subcommittee on 
Human Rights was deeply aware of  the Congressional rejection of  the right to work in the wake of  the 
controversy over the 1945 proposal for a ‘Full Employment Bill’ (as reflected in their position discussed 
above). But bypassing the need for congressional approval was not only important only for human rights 
as such, and for ESC rights in particular—it was also for civil and political rights, particularly in relation 
to provisions related to non-discrimination and right to vote in the context of  tensions over racial 
desegregation and southern opposition to change.475  
On 3 July 1947, Eleanor Roosevelt requested advice from the head of  the US delegation to the UN, 
Senator Warren Austin, on his views regarding the likelihood of  securing approval for a legally binding 
convention from the Senate (even one only referring to civil and political rights as the UK had proposed). 
Senator Austin ‘agreed with Mrs. Roosevelt that there would be certain elements among the Southern 
contingent and the reactionaries from other parts of  the country where very strong opposition to a 
convention would be met.’476 Eleanor Roosevelt concurred: 
We should be perfectly willing to enter into a convention as well as a declaration, but we must be reasonably 
certain that the country will back us up. We should not try for too much. It would be most unfortunate if 
we were to take the lead in forcing a convention through the General Assembly and then be turned down 
by the Senate.477 
 
By the end of  that meeting in July 1947, Austin had agreed with Eleanor Roosevelt that priority should 
be given to drafting the declaration, followed by the preparation of  one or more legally binding 
conventions. She also asked Austin if  he could put some pressure for support of  this position on Robert 
Lovett, who had just become Under-Secretary of  State, responsible for UN affairs, but was opposed to 
both the declaration and the covenant. Lovett became opposed to any legally binding covenant, as he was 
convinced that the Senate, dominated by powerful southern Democrats, would oppose any agreement 
on human rights that might outlaw segregation and other forms of  racial discrimination.478 He was also 
opposed to a declaration as he did not see how it would serve the interests of  the United States. He 
further believed that economic and social rights had no place in the draft, but focused his efforts firstly 
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on preventing the drafting of  the covenant, and secondly on insisting that the declaration would not 
impose any contractual duties on the state.479  A.W. Brian Simpson details how Eleanor Roosevelt ‘locked 
horns’ with Lovett in November 1947, but went over his head to the White House and Dean Acheson 
to insist on US involvement in the drafting of  the declaration and also to have the freedom to participate 
in the drafting of  a convention, if  this became the priority at the UN.480 Lovett’s instructions to the US 
delegation of  26 November 1947 were self-contradictory and revealed these tensions in the US position: 
The United States position . . . is that priority should be given to the declaration. The draft declaration should 
not be so phrased as to give the impression to individual citizens or governments that there is a contractual 
obligation on the part of government or on the part of the USA to guarantee the rights set forth in the 
declaration . . . the proposal for a convention at this time should not be pressed. It may be that the original 
US position, that conventions should be worked out carefully over a period of years, may be the best 
approach. The US does not wish to see members of the U.N. enter into a convention unless they intend to 
observe it in good faith. . .. You are, however, authorized at your discretion to participate in the drafting of a convention 
and to accept it for submission to your government.481 
 
While Lovett’s views were not reflected in the June and July US Suggestions, with its emphasis on 
correlative obligations, by the December 1947 second session of  the Commission on Human Rights, 
Eleanor Roosevelt’s interventions, as recorded in the UN meeting records reflect Lovett’s view and a shift 
in the US position: 
[T]here had been a slight evolution in the United States’ position with regard to the form which a Declaration 
on Human Rights should take. Her delegation thought that priority should be given to the draft Declaration, 
and that the latter should not be drawn up in such a way as to give the impression that Governments would 
have a contractual obligation to guarantee human rights. As regards the draft Convention or Conventions, 
the United States considered that the Commission should not proceed to draw them up until it was sure 
that such Conventions could be accepted and applied in all good faith by the participating States.482 
 
The US position had evolved to the extent that it now wished to avoid any suggestion of  correlative 
duties or contractual obligations of  states and would avoid any legally binding instrument. At this point 
the US also argued that the declaration should be shorter and less detailed. On 26 November 1947, the 
United States submitted a new draft text for a short form Declaration with only 10 Articles, with an 
emphasis on the brief  declaration of  rights, with no reference to mandatory language or correlative 
obligations.483  Only one of  the articles (Article 9) referred to economic and social rights—which 
collapsed the earlier proposed rights together, cutting much text and eliminating any reference to 
correlative duties. The text of  Article 9 on ESC rights thus now read ‘Everyone has the right to a decent 
living; to work and advance his well-being; to health, education and social security. There shall be equal 
                                                           
479 Letter of Eleanor Roosevelt to Robert Lovett, Black 2007, 711. 
480 Simpson 2001, 429.  
481 Ibid., 429–30.  See also US Committee on ISP, Commission on Human Rights, Changes Made by the Under Secretary of 
State in the US Draft Declaration of Human Rights and in the US Draft Convention on Human Rights, ISP D-182/47 (21 
Nov. 1947) and US Committee on International Social Policy, Instructions to US Representative, ISP D-188/47, (11 
Dec 1947) in Box 111. 
482 U.N.Doc E/CN.4/SR.25, December 2, 1947. 
483 U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/36, November 26, 1947 Proposal for a Declaration of Human Rights, submitted by the Representative 
of the United States. 
105 
opportunity for all to participate in the economic and cultural life of  the community.’484 (To the dismay 
of  Lovett, the US delegation did however also put forward a more legalistic text for a convention, 
although this did not include ESC rights.)485  
Despite the clash with Lovett, at the time of  the third session of  the Commission between May and June 
1948, Eleanor Roosevelt was still emphasizing the importance of  economic and social rights and echoing 
the words of  Franklin Roosevelt’s ‘Economic Bill of  Rights,’ but she also again emphasized that the US 
position was now against setting out the correlative duties of  states or how states should implement those 
rights, as that would have to be accomplished in different ways by different countries. Referring explicitly 
to the right to work and the commitment to full employment, she stated that: 
The United States delegation favoured the inclusion of economic and social rights in the Declaration, for 
no personal liberty could exist without economic security and independence. Men in need were not free 
men. The United States delegation considered that the Declaration should enunciate rights, not try to define 
the methods by which Governments were to ensure the realization of those rights. Those methods would 
necessarily vary from one country to another and such variations should be considered not only inevitable 
but salutary.486 
 
In other words, the US position had shifted distinctly to suggest that Declaration should enunciate only 
the rights, but not the correlative duties of states for implementing those rights – a significant shift from 
the June 1947 US Suggestions which clearly enunciated correlative duties, even if these were perceived at 
the time as an encouragement for to undertake such policy measures, rather than as legally-binding duties.   
By the end of  its third session in mid-1948, the Commission on Human Rights had a final draft of  the 
Declaration. This was sent to the UN General Assembly’s Third Committee, which again debated every 
article of  the draft Declaration against the increasingly tense backdrop of  growing rivalry and tensions 
between the US and the Soviet Union and rising Cold War rhetoric. But on 23 September 1948, Secretary 
of  State George Marshall gave a resounding call to the General Assembly: ‘Let this third regular session 
of  the General Assembly approve by an overwhelming majority the Declaration of  Human Rights as a 
standard of  conduct for all,’487 emphasizing also that ‘[o]ur aspirations must take into account men’s 
practical needs—improved living and working conditions, better health, economic and social 
advancement for all, and the social responsibilities which these entail.’488  
However, minutes of  meetings of  the US delegation to the third session of  the General Assembly dated 
24 and 25 September 1948 record the continuing sense of  growing domestic pressures in relation to the 
nature of  the Declaration and the anti-communist pressures at home. The minutes record how John 
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Foster Dulles, who had joined the US delegation (and who later became Secretary of  State), asked for 
assurances that the Declaration would not impose any new legal obligations on the United States and 
State Department advisers reassured him that the Declaration would not be legally binding.489 But Dulles 
was concerned by one particular provision in the Declaration: 
Mr. Dulles read the provision of the Declaration which states ‘everyone has the right of access to public 
employment’ and recalled that he had had to sign a declaration that he was not a Communist at the time of 
his appointment to the Delegation. . .. He pointed out that unexplained United States support of the 
Declaration, however, might lead to misunderstanding, if it were not made clear that the Declaration is a 
general statement of principle and aspiration and not a legal document. . .. He emphasized that it was 
important to make this very clear to avoid any unfortunate inferences. He referred again to the statement 
regarding the right of any person to public employment. . .. He referred to the possibility of the Republican 
Party picking up an isolated clause such as that on public employment and interpreting it as a commitment 
by the United States Delegation agreeing to employment of Communists in such agencies as the Atomic 
Energy Commission.490   
 
This provision on the right of  access to public employment was about non-discrimination in access to 
public employment. It had been in the original Humphrey draft and had also been supported by the US 
and included in the 1947 US Suggestions. But Dulles was referring to the 1947 Federal Employee Loyalty 
Program introduced to address fears of  communist spies in the federal government, especially in agencies 
such as the Atomic Energy Commission.491 Dulles’ concern, and other domestic objections to ideas of  
economic and social rights, explains Eleanor Roosevelt’s statement when she presented the UDHR to 
the Third Committee of  the General Assembly that: ‘The United States Government did not feel that it 
was infringing any basic human right by excluding individuals with subversive ideas from its civil 
service.’492 This was related to what has been called an anti-communist ‘witch-hunt’ which was purging 
progressives from the administration and bringing an end of New Deal reforms.493 
The Truman administration was also under attack by the American Bar Association and others, which 
(as I detail further below) was putting constraints on the US position in the General Assembly and on 
Roosevelt herself - though as Roosevelt stated in a radio broadcast in November 1948, she was ‘quite 
sure that she wasn’t a communist’.494  After her September 1948 speech, at the University of Sorbonne 
in Paris on ‘The Struggle for the Rights of Man’, John Humphrey recorded in his diary: 
 “The crowd had come to hear the Chairman of the Human Rights Commission and the widow of a very 
great man.  It heard a speech which had obviously been written by the State Department and ninety per cent 
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of which was devoted to an attack against the USSR.  I do not blame the Americans for talking back; but I 
regret that they are using Mrs. Roosevelt as their spokesman in these polemics.”495   
 
In her final speech to the General Assembly on 9 December 1948, before the adoption of  the UDHR 
on 10 December 1948, Eleanor Roosevelt made sure to reiterate that the Declaration was not legally 
binding and that the commitments to economic, social, and cultural rights did not imply any legal 
obligations for the state to take direct action.  
[M]y government has made it clear in the course of the development of the Declaration that it does not 
consider that the economic and social and cultural rights stated in the Declaration imply an obligation on 
governments to assure the enjoyment of these rights by direct governmental action. This was made quite 
clear in the Human Rights Commission text of article 23 [22] which served as a so-called ‘umbrella’ article 
to the articles on economic and social rights. We consider that the principle has not been affected by the 
fact that this article no longer contains a reference to the articles which follow it. This in no way affects our 
whole-hearted support for the basic principles of economic, social, and cultural rights set forth in these 
articles.496 
 
But she was not only emphasised this in relation to economic and social rights, but in relation to the 
Universal Declaration as a whole: 
‘In giving our approval to the declaration today, it is of primary importance that we keep clearly in mind the 
basic character of the document.  It is not a treaty, it is not an international agreement.  It is not and does 
not purport to be a statement of law or of legal obligation.  It is a declaration of basic principles of human 
rights and freedoms, to be stamped with the approval of the General Assembly by formal vote of its member, 
and to serve as a common standard of achievement for all peoples of all nations.’497  
 
The Chilean representative, Hernán Santa Cruz, who had accompanied her on the journey to produce 
the UDHR since their roles together in the Drafting Committee, wrote that her ‘intervention 
disappointed me a little. I did not hear the spontaneous expression of  her personal fight for human rights 
that was present on previous occasions. On the other hand, one sensed the caution of  someone who was 
speaking on behalf  of  a State that does not forget the political implications of  the practical application 
of  human rights instruments.498  However, Eleanor Roosevelt, too, was troubled: she recorded that night: 
 ‘I wondered whether a mere statement of rights, without legal obligation, would inspire governments to see 
that these rights were observed.’499 
 
Contextualising this shift in the US position 
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The US position had thus shifted significantly over the brief  period between 1947 to 1948 between the 
mid-1947 US Suggestions and the final US position.  This close analysis of the UN and US archives 
shows a far more nuanced picture on the US position on ESC rights than is reflected in most histories 
of human rights, including even histories of the ICESCR.   
This shift should be understood within a broader historical arc of the domestic and international context 
between 1945 and 1953. The international context of the Cold War is a familiar story, as the drafting of 
the UDHR took place against the dramatic backdrop of the end of the wartime alliance with the USSR, 
the announcement of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan for Europe in June 1947, and the 
Berlin blockade that began in June 1948.   But the domestic US context is also important.  
The drafting took place against the background of a domestic crusade against “Communists in 
government” or the “Second Red Scare” in the US, as well as the formalization of the Federal Employee 
Loyalty Program in the US in March 1947500 and its chilling effect on administration staff.501  It was a 
time of rising conservative fears of an overextension of federal and executive power in racial 
desegregation and progressive New Deal reforms and growing isolationist opposition to US involvement 
in international treaty making 502  There was a major shift in power from the internationalists who drove 
overwhelming US congressional approval of the UN Charter in 1945, towards the isolationists 
culminating with the Bricker amendment controversy, and the eventual announcement in 1953 under 
Republican President Dwight Eisenhower that the US administration would not become party to any 
human rights treaty.  
Many of the legalistic arguments around constitutional concerns and the balance of responsibilities 
between the federal and state governments were related to conservative fears of federal and executive 
overreach. 503  And this in turn was related to fears that human rights agreements would strengthen 
federal power to outlaw racially discriminatory practices (such as segregation and lynching) in southern 
states and to interfere in the economy by imposing labour laws and social rights.504  Conservative 
opposition to ESC rights particularly through the forceful lobbying of the American Bar Association to 
any international human rights convention, particularly one that included economic and social rights, 
began around the beginning of 1948 during the drafting of the UDHR and escalated during the drafting 
of the Covenants.505  Along with the end of the New Deal era (and its support to economic and social 
rights as expressed in Franklin Roosevelt’s ‘Second Bill of Rights’ speech one year before his sudden 
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death in 1945), it was this growing domestic opposition led to the shift in the US official position, from 
the comparatively strong language in the mid-1947 document to a much weaker position by the end of 
1948. 
However, it was only in 1949 that the tide turned decisively against economic and social rights in the US 
position, once the negotiations moved on to drafting the legally binding Covenants. With the election of 
Eisenhower to the Presidency in 1953, the tide then turned even further against human rights, with the 
new administration announcing to the world that it would not accept “foreign interference” in its 
domestic affairs and would not become a party to any human rights treaty approved by the United 
Nations.506  This is explored further below in Section 3.3.1 which traces the impacts of the opposition 
of the American Bar Association, the Bricker Amendment on this 1953 change.   
What remains important here is how the mid-1947 US Suggestions are significant for the history of 
ESCR. This analysis of the UN archives, alongside the US archives, has shown that the US position was 
far more nuanced than standard narratives suggest, that there were differences amongst the US delegation 
and its advisers, and that the US position in fact shifted quite significantly over the short period of the 
drafting of the UDHR between 1947 and 1948 in response to domestic and international pressures. Any 
history of the ICESCR must thus take this earlier history into account, not only because it questions 
standard assumptions about the US position on ESC rights, but because substantial parts of the US 
wording and provisions on economic, social, and cultural rights reappear in the text of the 1966 ICESCR.  
Several key concepts and phrases that were later to become part of the lexicon of ESC rights, including 
the concepts of “progressive realization” and “maximum use of resources,” have clear roots in this 1947 
US proposal.  In the next section, I explore this further, looking in more detail at how the July 1947 US 
Suggestions on the ‘right to progress’ with its concepts of  ‘progressive realisation’ and ‘maximum 
available resources’ came eventually to influence the drafting of  the ICESCR and its Article 2.1. 
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3.2.2 Tracing the drafting of  ICESCR Article 2.1 - Keynesianism lost in translation? 
ICESCR Article 2.1 is of  particular importance because it sets out the nature and scope of  economic, 
social and cultural rights in a way that is markedly different from the equivalent Article 2.1 of  the ICCPR.  
While the ICCPR Article 2.1 sets out immediate obligations to ‘respect and ensure’ the rights of  that 
Covenant, ICESCR Article 2.1 sets out progressive obligations to take steps towards achieving the rights, 
‘to the maximum of  its available resources’.  Article 2.1 reads:   
‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international 
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, 
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant 
by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.’   
 
Most analyses of  this Article locate its roots in the travaux preparatoires of  the ICESCR and a proposal for 
an ‘umbrella’ article for ESC rights discussed in the 1951 meeting of  the Commission on Human 
Rights.507  However, as we have seen above, it appears the roots of  Article 2.1 lie further back in history 
in the US proposals dated June and July 1947,508 which were submitted to the June 1947 first session of  
the Commission on Human Rights’509 which includes phrasing that is surprisingly similar to the eventual 
phrasing of  the ICESCR Article 2.1.  The similarity between the texts is striking: 
June-1947 US proposal on ‘right to progress’ 1966 ICESCR Article 2.1 
It is the duty of the State, in accordance with the 
maximum use of its resources and with due regard 
for the liberties of individuals, to promote this 
purpose by legislation or by other appropriate 
means. Among the social rights thus to be 
achieved progressively by joint effort of the 
individual and the State are those defined in the 
following articles. 
Each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to take steps, … to the maximum 
of its available resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant 
by all appropriate means, including 
particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures 
 
The US language above referring to the rights ‘defined in the following articles’ suggests that the US 
always saw their proposal for a ‘right to progress’ as an ‘umbrella’ or chapeau clause that would define 
the nature and scope of  the ESCR obligations. And as I show in more depth below, these phrases were 
to eventually come into the ICESCR via the drafting of  the UDHR’s Article 22, which was also originally 
conceived of  as an ‘umbrella’ article for the ESCR during the drafting of  the UDHR (although some of  
the changes in phrasing later obfuscated this history).   The June 1947 US proposal thus substantially 
prefigured Article 2.1 of  the ICESCR. 
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Yet even the detailed overview of  Morsink’s examination of  the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
does not give a clear indication of  the role of  the US in drafting this provision.510  Most of  the academic 
literature that analyses the ICESCR and its Article 2.1 in depth, such as Alston, Whelan and Craven start 
their analysis by concentrating on the drafting history of  the ICESCR from 1949 onwards,  511 without 
exploring its roots in the drafting of  the UDHR between 1947 and 1948. These scholars have thus largely 
missed that Article 2.1 had its roots in UDHR Article 22 and in these 1947 US Suggestions on a ‘right to 
progress’.  These scholars have also missed the possible Keynesian connotations of  ‘maximum available 
resources’ – at least in the US proposal – which offers another small, but significant, part of  the history 
of  the nature and scope of  economic, social and cultural rights. 
Much of  the contemporary literature interprets Article 2.1, with its provisions of  ‘progressive realisation’ 
and ‘maximum available resources’, as a limitations clause suggesting that the achievement of  ESCR will 
necessarily be limited by the (lack of) availability of  resources.  Many have suggested that the phrasing of  
Article 2.1 also lacks clarity and introduces a certain ‘vagueness’ into obligations on ESC.  Vierdag even 
argued that the ‘vague commitment’ of Article 2.1 rendered economic and social rights ‘of such a nature 
as to be legally negligible.512 Craven further suggested that its ‘convoluted phraseology and numerous 
qualifying sub-clauses’ seem to ‘defy any sense of obligation’,513 and Robinson has problematised that the 
formulation of ‘maximum of its available resources’ as ‘a difficult phrase – two warring adjectives fighting 
over an undefined noun’.514 
In tracing its roots back through the earlier US history however, including back to Franklin Roosevelt’s 
rights and his National Resources Planning Board’s elaboration of  these rights, I show that the phrasing 
(at least in its very initial elaboration in the US 1947 Suggestions) may have earlier had a very different – 
and indeed much clearer - meaning.  Building on the history traced earlier of  Roosevelt’s New Deal, I 
show that the roots of  both ‘progressive realisation’ and ‘maximum available resources’ appear to lie in 
this earlier conceptualization of  the rights.  The concept of  ‘progressive realisation’ for example appears 
to have earlier been understood more positively in the US in the 1940s, emerging as it did out of  the legal 
realist distrust of  the courts, and their commitment to keeping ESCR out of  the hands of  the (often 
conservative) judges, and in the arena of  changeable policy rather than immutable law.515 
The concept of  ‘maximum available resources’ also has roots in Roosevelt’s National Resources Planning 
Board’s vision of  economic and social rights as grounded in Keynesian economic thinking.  As I will 
show below, the phrasing of  the US proposal in terms of  ‘maximum use of its resources and with due 
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regard for the liberties of individuals’ points to a Keynesian interpretation of full employment – including 
recognising the freedom of the individual to choose employment (a freedom that was emphasised to 
contrast Keynesian-style ‘full employment’, with the lack of choice, or even forced labour, of the Soviet 
notion of full employment).  This is significant since it challenges the conception of  resources as ‘limited’ 
as, within the historical and linguistic context of  the Keynesian era in which these documents emerged, 
the idea of  the ‘maximum use of  available resources’ was not aimed as a limiting clause (as it is commonly 
understood today) but was rather an exhortation for governments to spend more, to ensure the 
‘maximum use’ or ‘full employment’ of  all available unemployed resources.  It was, in other words, an 
exhortation to adopt Keynesian economic policies, challenging classical economic prescriptions for 
balanced budgets, limited spending and austerity -  especially in times of  economic crisis.  
I first trace how the June-1947 US Suggestions with its proposal for a ‘right to progress’ including the 
‘use of  maximum available resources’ had its roots in this economic understanding of  this clause.  I then 
trace how how it was through this circuitous route of  the Keynesian impact on the United States’ later 
New Deal policies and on planning for the post-war economic order, as well as early US interventions in 
the drafting of  the UDHR, that this phrase entered the lexicon of  economic, social and cultural rights.  
Yet this economic understanding of  the phrase - and even an awareness of  this debate - was quickly ‘lost in 
translation’ and obscured in the international negotiations over the UDHR and the ICESR once lawyers 
and diplomats took over from economists in the drafting process.  However, I suggest that, even though 
this economic understanding was quickly lost, reading the phrase ‘maximum available resources’ with a 
Keynesian eye still unsettles our contemporary interpretation of  Article 2.1 - and offers insights worth 
recovering today for our own Great Recession and contemporary trends towards the 
‘constitutionalisation of  austerity’ (as highlighted later in section 4.3.1).  
The US proposal for a the ‘Right to Progress’ - a exhortation for Keynesian spending? 
As I argued have already argued above, Keynes’ argument, which drew from the lessons of  mass 
unemployment during the Great Depression of  the 1930s, was that the government could and should 
intervene in the economy to ensure ‘full employment’ or, in other words, to ensure the maximum use of  
available resources.  As Bailey wrote at the time: 
‘Keynes’ General Theory, was an attack upon the ‘classical’ and ‘neoclassical’ economic thought that the free 
market capitalistic economy was a self-adjusting mechanism which tended to produce a condition of full 
employment and maximum utilisation of resources… [given that] a vast amount of involuntary 
unemployment existed and the economic system showed few signs of moving automatically toward the full 
utilization of resources.’516 
 
As I have also shown above, US conceptions of  ‘economic and social rights’ in New Deal liberalism and 
in post-war planning were clearly articulated in the work of  the National Resources Planning Board 
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(NRPB).  The NRPB’s National Resources Development Report 1943 set out a vision for Roosevelt’s Four 
Freedoms and a ‘new bill of  rights’, conceptualising these rights as being implemented through a set of  
economic and social policies grounded in Keynesian economic policy.  The NRPB’s 1943 report 
emphasized the need to ensure ‘the ‘full use of  our national resources, to full employment and 
increasingly higher standards of  living’,517 challenging classical economic assumptions of  automatic 
equilibrium of  free markets - ‘there are no automatic devices in our system that will insure the fair 
distribution of  income between various kinds of  goods and services or guarantee the full use of  
resources’.    
The Board emphasised the necessary role of  the state in the economy, emphasising that ‘[o]ne of  the 
most important economic facts we have learned in the past decade is that fiscal and monetary policy can 
and should be used to foster an expanding economy.’518   It also insisted that the key to ‘winning the war’ 
and ‘winning the peace’ was full employment – ‘[t]he economic and social stability of  the United States, 
as of  other countries, depends in great measure on our capacity to prevent mass unemployment’.519  The 
NRPB’s Chair, Charles E. Merriam had also declared that: ‘We propose to plan our national activities so 
that they will ensure the maximum utilization of  our most important resource of  all – manpower.’520   
Many of  the NRPB’s publications, including pamphlets written by the ‘American Keynes’, Alvin Hansen, 
throughout the early 1940s, regularly listed five key objectives essential to ‘defend our freedoms and our 
rights, our way of  life’521.  These priority objectives forcefully linked the role of  the state to ensure full 
employment (to make full use of  all available resources of  ‘men and machines’ if  the market and the 
private sector failed to do so) with the ‘progressive realisation’ of  basic rights and freedoms:  
1.   We must plan for full employment, for maintaining the national income at 100 billion dollars a year, at 
least, rather than to let it slip back to 80, or 70, or 60 billion dollars again. In other words, we shall plan to 
balance our national production-consumption budget at a high level with full employment, not at a low level 
with mass unemployment.  
… 
4.   We must plan to enable every human being within our boundaries to realize progressively the promise 
of American life in food, shelter, clothing, medical care, education, work, rest, home life, opportunity to 
advance, adventure, and the basic freedoms.522 
 
Post-war planning was focused on how to prevent another ‘great depression’ after the end of  the war and 
how to prevent another global war, by securing full employment not only at the national level, but also at 
the global level.  Keynesianism was thus part of  the discursive context of  the drafting of  the UN Charter 
and the international bill of  rights (and the Bretton Woods institutions), and for Roosevelt’s 1944 ‘Second 
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Bill of  Rights’. This also appears to set the historical and linguistic context for the drafting of  the US 
State Department 1942 draft for an international bill of  rights, which as we saw above, included in its 
Article II an article linking employment, ESCR and the ‘resources of  the country, effectively used, are 
capable of  sustaining’ - which echoes the NRPB and Alvin Hansen’s call for the state to ensure the full 
employment of  all available resources, up to the maximum limit that could be quantified (sustaining 
national income at 100 billion dollars, rather than leaving it to languish at lower levels). 
This phrasing is even more closely reflected in the June-1947 US Suggestions and its ‘Right to Progress’, 
that was prepared for the drafting of  the UDHR.  Evidence in the US archives and position papers which 
set out the US position on each of  the rights to be included in the international bill of  rights suggest this 
US position was framed in the discursive context of  Keynesianism.   
As we saw the section on the US influence on the drafting of  ESCR, more background on the positions 
of  the US during the drafting of  the UDHR can be found in internal US government files, particularly 
the records of  the US Interdepartmental Committee on International Social Policy and its Subcommittee 
on Human Rights and Status of  Women.523 In my research in these US national archives in Maryland, I 
found evidence that the 1947 US position papers prepared for the drafting of  the UDHR contributed to 
the development of  the concept of  ‘maximum available resources’, grounded in advice from economists 
and specialists in these different ministries.  The files include a number of  position papers, one on each 
human right, setting out the US’s own position on each right, and proposing redrafts of  the Secretariat 
articles.  I did not find in the archives a position paper relating specifically to the US proposal on the 
‘right to progress’ but I did find relevant position papers on the right to social security and the right to 
work, drafted by the specialist departments of  government that were part of  the International Committee 
on Social Policy, including among others, the Department of  Labour and the Federal Security Agency.524  
For example, a position paper dated 20 May 1947 on the Right to Social Security proposed a redrafting 
of  the UN Secretariat draft article on the right to social security, suggesting this be combined with a few 
other articles and reworded as follows: 
‘Everyone has the right to security of income and access to services necessary to support a healthful standard 
of living for himself and his family.  The State shall undertake measures designed to bring about full use of 
productive resources and effective opportunity for gainful employment at fair and reasonable wages; to 
assure income for the family when the worker is sick or disabled, unable to find a job, too old to continue 
working for pay, or has died prematurely or when means of subsistence are lacking or insufficient for any 
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other reason; to assure the availability of adequate food, housing and community and personal health service 
for all, and to provide social services necessary to the health and wellbeing of the people.’525 
 
Another position paper, dealing directly with the Right to Work dated 23 May 1947, proposes a rewording 
of  a number of  articles, including suggesting a provision on work: 
‘Measures to assure full employment through maximum use of productive resources and equitable 
distribution of purchasing power among its people’526 
 
This frames to the language on the ‘maximum use of  productive resources’ in a slightly different 
terminology, but even more closely related to the eventual wording of  Article 2.1, as well as to Keynesian 
prescriptions of  full employment to compensate for the lack of  aggregate demand or ‘purchasing power’ 
amongst the population.   
As I have noted above, this position paper on the Right to Work is significantly less enthusiastic than the 
other position papers on social rights, it also considers the legal interpretations on whether all social rights 
will be immediately enforceable if  resources are limited), and refers explicitly to the domestic US policy 
debates over Keynesian-style full employment during the fierce discussions over 1945 and 1946 that 
followed the introduction of  the draft 1945 Full Employment Bill and resulted in the 1946 Employment 
Act (as discussed in Section 2.3.3).  The position paper argues that, given the domestic conflicts that arose 
during this time, the US position in the drafting of  the UDHR would need to be careful with respect to 
making explicit references to the ‘right to work’ and to the concept of  ‘full employment’:  
‘In Congressional debates preceding the enactment of our own Employment Act of 1946, the concept of a 
‘right to work’ met with strong opposition. Neither this phrase nor ‘full employment’ appears in the law as 
enacted, which instead declares it to be the policy and responsibility of the Federal Government, subject to 
certain provisos, to use all its resources to create and maintain ‘conditions under which there will be afforded 
useful employment opportunities, including self-employment, for those able, willing, and seeking to work, 
and to promote maximum employment, production and purchasing power.’527    
 
This position paper noted how the US rejected, but ultimately agreed to the commitment in the UN 
charter to ‘promote’ ‘full employment’, and warns against adopting a more conservative approach that 
would imply a retreat from Articles 55 and 56 of  the UN Charter.  It nonetheless  warned of  the risk that 
‘the right to work’ could be interpreted as implying a guarantee by the State of  a job for all which ‘may 
be, or may be thought to be, incompatible with economic institutions in certain countries e.g. with the 
principles of  a private enterprise economy’.528  This, along with the US concern to distinguish their 
approach to full employment from what they saw as the ‘forced employment’ approach of  the USSR 
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appears to explain the additional phrasing the duty of  the state to ensure ‘maximum use of  resources, 
with due regard for the liberties of  individuals’ in its ‘right to progress’.   
The position papers also show that the US government position was however not monolithic, that that 
there were different ministries pushing for distinct aspects of  the rights, and that the roots of  this 
Keynesian phrasing of  the economists was not always clearly understood, and became ‘lost in translation’ 
as lawyers and diplomats took over from the economists in defining the US position on economic and 
social rights during the drafting of  the UDHR. 
The drafting of  Article 22 as a ‘chapeau’ clause for ESCR in the UDHR 
It was during the one of  the first meetings of  the Drafting Committee on the international bill of  rights 
in June 1947 that Eleanor Roosevelt, in her role as the US delegate, raised the US proposal on the ‘Right 
to Progress’.  However, the proposal, and its clauses relating to the ‘duty of  the state’, the ‘maximum use 
of  resources’ and ‘to be achieved progressively’, did not make it into the draft international bill of  rights 
at that meeting. 
However, it came back into the drafting process when the United States brought this up again in the 
context of  discussing Article 22 of  the UDHR during the June 1948 meeting of  the Commission.  
Although Article 22 of  the UDHR appears to be an article focused on the right to social security, the UN 
archives show that Article 22 was originally developed as a chapeau clause for the ESC rights, as part of  
an effort to develop ‘a special article concerning the measures to be taken in order to ensure enjoyment 
of  economic and social rights’.529  It was not intended as a stand-alone article on ‘social security’ but 
rather as a covering clause for all the ESC rights that came below it in the draft UDHR.  Indeed, the 
phrase ‘right to social security’ was only added to Article 22 significantly later, on the insistence of  French 
delegate Cassin, after strained disagreements over the definition of  social security led to its deletion from 
Article 25 on the right to an adequate standard of  living.530 Cassin insisted that no modern bill of  rights 
could exclude social security and it was integrated given a lack of  objection, despite not adding much 
clarity to Article 22.   
A close reading of  the final text of  Article 22 shows that it contains key elements of  a chapeau article 
including the listing at the end of  ‘of  the economic, social and cultural rights’, the clause on ‘national 
efforts and international cooperation’ and ‘in accordance with the organization and resources of  each 
State’ (which were later to become the roots of  ICESCR Article 2.1):   
‘Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through 
national efforts and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of 
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each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development 
of his personality.’531 
 
The US proposal on the ‘right to progress’ had included wording on ‘the economic, social and cultural 
rights, as set out below’ signalling it as a chapeau clause - but ‘as set out below’ was also eventually deleted, 
much to the ire of  the US delegation, who came to see this article as part of  the increasingly urgent 
strategy to limit the legal effect of  the UDHR (as described in the previous section) and to avoid spelling 
out a precise role for the state on ESCR.  This explains Roosevelt’s later insistence in her final address on 
9 December 1948 to the General Assembly, referring directly to the chapeau article: ‘We consider that 
the principle has not been affected by the fact that this article no longer contains a reference to the articles 
that follow it’, although this ‘in no way affects our whole-hearted support for the basic principles of  
economic, social and cultural rights set forth in these articles.’532  
During the drafting process, the most detailed discussion on the ‘umbrella article’ occurred in June 1948, 
emerging in the context of  the right to work and full employment, and the role of  the state in securing 
that right.   The US explained that its position the right to work meant ‘the right of  the individual to 
benefit from conditions under which those who were able and willing to work would have the possibility 
of  doing useful work, including independent work, as well as the right to full employment and to further 
the development of  production and purchasing power.’533 But the US was insistent by this point, that the 
duty of  the state should not be spelled out - the UDHR should ‘not try to define the methods by which 
Governments were to ensure the realization of  those rights’ salutary.’534  The representative of  France, 
Rene Cassin countered however that it was important to explain what the duties of  the state were in 
relation to ESCR -  ‘Recently acquired rights, such as the right to work, should be stated more explicitly 
than the rights recognized for centuries, such as the right to life.’  He also emphasized that there may be 
a need to spell out responsibilities not only at the national level (since unemployment was ‘not purely a 
national question’) but also the international level.535   
A consensus began to emerge that, instead of  spelling out the duties for each ESC right under each right, 
a general article specifying that measures should be taken might be useful.536  There were two different 
proposals at this point - the Lebanese delegate, Malik, argued that ESC rights would also require 
favourable social conditions,537 and proposed a text ‘Everyone has the right to a good social and 
                                                           
531 UDHR, Article 22. 
532 US Government, ‘General Assembly Adopts Declaration of Human Rights: Statement by Mrs Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, US Representative to the General Assembly, December 19, 1948, Department of State Bulletin Oct-Dec 
1948, 751.  
533 E/CN.4/SR.64, 6. 
534 E/CN.4/SR.64, 5. 
535 E/CN.4/SR.64, 12. 
536 E/CN.4/114. 
537 E/CN.4/SR.65. 
118 
international order in which the rights and freedoms set out in the Declaration can be fully realized.’538.  
Cassin however proposed a general article emphasising both national and international responsibilities 
that ‘Everyone, as a member of  society, has the economic, social and cultural rights enumerated below, 
whose fulfilment should be made possible in every State separately or by international collaboration.’539   
The US called for adding the phrase ‘in accordance with the social and economic system and political 
organization’540 into Cassin’s wording, to emphasise that states had very different economic institutions 
and models of  organization (the US was still keen to differentiate its market system from the Soviet 
communist system in relation to the right to work, since they perceived the Soviet system as not giving 
anyone free choice of  their work).  It is not exactly clear where this phrase came from, but Eleanor 
Roosevelt’s legal adviser, James Hendrick, explaining the US position in the US State Department Bulletin 
in his August 1948 Progress Report suggested the US modelled this clause on a provision of  the draft 
International Trade Organization Charter541, explaining that: 
‘Certain members felt that there was no reason to say anything more about social and economic rights than 
was said about civil rights; to do so would indicate the former were more important than the latter, an 
impression which they definitely did not wish to convey. Others felt that this new type of right should be 
given special attention; people throughout the world were ‘used to’ civil rights, but they did not know about 
social and economic rights.   
The compromise was to retain the chapeau clause but to include it in a phrase, loosely modelled after a 
provision of the International Trade Organization Charter, which would recognize the necessary differences 
among various states in the manner and extent of the granting of these rights, which would depend upon 
‘the organization and resources of each state’.’542 
 
Hendrick does not specify exactly which provision of  the ITO was used as a model.  One possibility 
could be the draft ITO Article 3.1 which read that each member state should secure full employment 
through measures appropriate to its particular form of  organization: ‘Each Member shall take action 
designed to achieve and maintain full and productive employment and large and steadily growing demand 
within its own territory through measures appropriate to its political, economic and social institutions’.543  
This ITO text did not emphasise resource limitations, but rather full employment, while nonetheless 
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making clear that the US (Keynesian) approach to full employment would be different from the USSR 
(socialist) approach. 
The US proposal was adopted, but revised to include a reference to resources: ‘in accordance with the 
organization and resources of  each State’ (text that eventually coalesced into the final Article 22), and 
states began to discuss resources as a limitation at this point.  The UK, for example, linked the issue of  
resources to different levels of  development in different states ‘in view of  existing differences in the state 
of  economic and social progress throughout the world.’544  The UK was clear by this point that resources 
should be a limitation - although for the UK, this appears to have been aimed at avoiding Cassin’s 
‘international’ responsibilities in terms of  potentially onerous obligations towards people living in 
Britain’s colonial territories. 
The US position at this stage was less focused however on limited resources, but more focused on 
establishing a ‘chapeau’ or covering clause for ESCR.  In December 1947, Roosevelt had already argued 
that ‘there are widely different theories and practices in different parts of  the world as to the manner in 
which the Government can best facilitate’ ESCR, and that the UDHR should ‘proclaim rights, but should 
not attempt to define the role of  government in their ultimate attainment.’545   By the meeting in 
November 1948, she suggested the essential elements of  Article 22 were its two provisions on ‘through 
national effort and international cooperation’ (as suggested by Cassin) and ‘in accordance with the 
organization and resources of  each State’ (as suggested by the US with others), explaining also that this 
article was ‘intended as something of  an introduction to the subsequent articles’.  She emphasised that 
this was ‘a compromise between the views of  certain Governments, which were anxious that the State 
should give special attention to the economic, social and cultural rights of  the individual, and views of  
Governments, such as the United States Government, which considered that the obligations of  the State 
should not specified.’546  
Hendrik, in his public explanation of  the US position in the State Department Bulletin revealed that the 
strategy of  the State Department lawyers was to ensure that the UDHR was not conceived as creating 
any new legal obligations, but that it would ‘be considered to impose a moral, but not a legal, obligation to 
strive progressively to secure universal and effective recognition and observance of  the rights and freedoms 
therein set forth’ - although for the Americans, ‘progressive realisation’ by this time applied not only to 
ESCR but to the whole UDHR:  
[This] finds expression in the preamble to the declaration…. proclaiming the declaration as a ‘common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of 
society ...  shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by 
progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and 
observance’.  It finds expression also in the introduction to the articles dealing with social and economic 
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rights: ‘Everyone as a member of society... is entitled to the realization, through national efforts and 
international cooperation, and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the 
economic, social and cultural rights set out below.’547 
 
Against the backdrop of  emerging domestic opposition against the US role in drafting an international 
bill of  rights including in Congress, as well as rising international pressure within the negotiations (see 
below section 3.3.1), this umbrella text became an increasingly urgent US strategy aimed at avoiding 
taking on any immediate legal treaty obligations, but the notion of  progressive realization was not only 
linked to ESCR rights, but to the whole Declaration, including CPR rights.   With the adoption of  the 
Article 22 language on ‘in accordance with the organization and resources of  each State’, the precise US 
phrases on ‘maximum available resources’ and ‘progressive realization’ were lost in the drafting of  the 
UDHR, although it is clear from the archives that these stood behind the US reasoning on this provision.  
Oddly however, these phrases were to later return during the drafting of  the Covenant.   
The drafting of  Article 2.1 - a ‘chapeau’ clause for ESCR in the legally-binding Covenant 
The US 1947 proposal for a ‘right to progress’ and its clauses on ‘maximum available resources’ and 
‘progressive realisation’ made its comeback in May 1951, during the meetings of  the 1951 Seventh Session 
of  the Commission on Human Rights.  At that point in 1951, the Commission was still drafting a joint 
Covenant that was to include both civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights, 
and the US proposals re-emerged as part of  discussions over preambular ‘chapeau’ for the ESC rights to 
be included in the Covenant.   
In the May 1951 session, negotiations started over the ESCR to be included in the joint Covenant, and a 
joint French/US proposal was submitted on 8 May 1951, proposing adding the phrase ‘achieving 
progressively the full realisation’ into a text that was grounded on the previous preambular text of  UDHR 
Article 22: 
‘4. Undertake, in accordance with their organization and resources, to take steps, individually and through 
international cooperation, by legislative or other methods with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in this part of the Covenant.’548 
The next day another revision in a French proposal on 9 May 1951 replaced the text ‘in accordance with 
their organization and resources’ (the agreed text of  UDHR Article 22) with phrasing of  ‘the maximum 
available resources’, proposing:   
‘4. Undertake to take steps, individually and through international cooperation, to the maximum of the 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in this 
part of the Covenant.’549 
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It was in this way, that the June-1947 American proposal made its way back, through a French proposal, 
into the text of  the Covenant, substantially prefiguring what was to become ICESCR Article 2.1.  And, 
once the General Assembly changed its position on the Covenant and called for the drafting of  two 
separate Covenants, it was this preambular text that then became part of  the preamble of  the ICESCR, 
eventually becoming its Article 2.1.  Tracing this story in more depth shows how the French delegate 
(Cassin) worked closely with the Americans to get their wording back into the text.    
Tracing the drafting process in more detail - French-American collaboration 
After the adoption of  the UDHR in 1948, states decided to move ahead with the drafting of  legally-
binding instruments in 1949, and took up the existing draft of  the Covenant that had been put aside in 
early 1948.  The existing text of  the Covenant (based on the original UK proposal) only included a narrow 
set of  civil and political rights.  But, in taking this text up again in 1949, there was a long debate over 
whether ESC rights should be added into the existing text.  The US argued against, on the grounds that 
adding more provisions would slow down its finalisation, so it would be better to finalise this one and 
then develop a further Covenant for ESCR.  Other delegations were adamant that ESCR must be 
included.  This led to long debates over whether or not the Covenant should be divided into two 
Covenants on the different categories of  rights or whether it should be one Covenant including both 
CPR and ESCR.   In 1950 the GA instructed the Commission to integrate ESCR into the existing 
Covenant, and it was only in 1952 that the GA decided to develop two separate Covenants.550  
Most of  the drafting on the articles of  ESCR took place in meetings over 1951, when it was envisaged 
that ESCR would make up a distinct Part III of  one Covenant.  Discussions emerged on a preambular 
article for Part III as part of  an agenda item on a ‘general clause concerning economic, social and cultural 
rights’551 over the period 8 to 11 May 1951.  At this point, states were still arguing over whether or not 
there would be one or two covenants – and to some it seemed that this general clause was a precursor 
for separating the two Covenants. John Humphrey, agreeing with the USSR delegate that some states 
appeared to be trying to ‘write a covenant within a covenant’ complained that while he ‘realized that the 
Covenant would have to be in two parts with a separate system of  implementation in each… the 
Americans and the French have carried this logic too far and they are now encumbering the economic 
and social part of  the Covenant with umbrella clauses, general limitations clause, anti-discrimination 
clauses etc.’552   
Many states submitted proposals for a general clause, but it was the French and US proposals that were 
discussed in most detail.  The French proposal provided a long preambular-style text to introduce Part 
III of  the Covenant, including an operative paragraph building on Article 22 of  the UDHR, but adding 
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(the American) proposal on progressive implementation, such that States parties ‘pledge themselves to 
take steps, both individually and through international cooperation, in accordance with their organization 
and resources, to ensure the progressive implementation of  all these rights…’.553   Meanwhile, the US 
proposal offered three covering articles for Part III of  the covenant – a non-discrimination article, a 
general article on state obligations, and a limitations clause.554  The US proposal in a sleight of  hand 
attempting to weaken explicit language on ESCR, offered a general, chapeau article that included the 
notion of  ‘economic, social and cultural progress’ instead of  ‘rights’:  ‘Each State party to the Covenant 
undertakes, within the framework of  its organization and compatible with its resources, to promote by 
legislative or other methods conditions of  economic, social and cultural progress and development for 
securing the rights recognized in this Part of  the Covenant.’555  The USSR delegate (Mr Morosov) 
pointedly compared the US proposal on the general article for ESCR, with the general article for the CPR 
part of  the covenant, arguing that it was ‘conceived in much weaker and less precise terms’ and  would 
effectively enable governments to ‘circumvent their obligations to ensure an adequate standard of  living 
for their peoples.’556   
Other states became concerned that the reference to ‘resources’ might give the impression that this could 
be construed as a loop-hole, or an ‘escape clause’ – although Chairman Malik pointed out that Article 22 
of  the UDHR employed almost identical language.557  Developing states tried to clarify that this should 
be replaced with language making clear this was about the difficulties of  developing countries, proposing 
alternative text: ‘in accordance with the level of  their economic development..’ to avoid putting onerous 
responsibilities on developing countries558.  Eleanor Roosevelt, speaking as the US delegate, also insisted 
that ‘organization and resources’ was not ‘tantamount to an escape clause’, but recognised the de facto 
situation that countries were differently organized (had different economic systems), and then suggested, 
making the link to resource limitations, that the obligations of  governments should be ‘necessarily be 
linked to their respective national systems and available physical resources.’.559   Greece (Mr Eustathides) 
pointedly suggested this would in fact strengthen the obligations of  states with substantial economic 
resources.560 
France (Mr. Cassin) emphasised that the term ‘progressively’ was needed to qualify implementation, 
otherwise some states would not be able to ratify the Covenant.  While the Lebanese delegate Malik 
assumed this referred to resources (and countered that some of  the ESCR could be implemented 
                                                           
553 E/CN.4/612, 5 May 1951. 
554 For the US proposals, see E/CN.4/610 and Add.1 and Add.2.  The US proposals were eventually largely 
adopted.  The provision on discrimination appears as Art 2.2, the limitations clause was largely adopted as Article 
4, and the general article contributed to Art 2.1, as discussed further here. 
555 E/CN.4/610/Add.1, 5 May 1951, 1. 
556‘E/CN.4/SR.233, 9 May 1951, 9. 
557 E/CN.4/SR.232, 8 May 1951, 7. 
558 E/CN.4/SR.233, 9 May 1951, 5. 
559 Ibid., 7. 
560 Ibid., 11. 
123 
immediately, such as equal pay for equal work and trade union rights.561), it seems that Cassin was more 
concerned that the Americans would not ratify the Covenant unless ‘progressive realisation’ appeared in 
the preambular text.  This would explain why Cassin was working with the Americans on re-introducing 
this language.  Thus, the joint French/US proposal submitted on 8 May 1951, proposed adding the phrase 
‘achieving progressively the full realisation’ into the preambular text. 
The next day, (Cassin) then dropped text on the ‘organization and resources of  states’ from a combined 
US-French proposal,562 preparing a further French proposal which replaced this text with the phrase that 
states would undertake to ‘take steps to the maximum of  their available resources.’563  The new operative 
paragraph in a revised French proposal read that States parties:  ‘undertake to take steps, individually and 
through international cooperation to the maximum of  the available resources with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of  the rights recognized in this part of  the Covenant.’564  It is this French 
proposal, dated 9 May 1951, that then substantially captures the American proposal with its key phrases 
regarding ‘progressive realization’ and ‘maximum available resources’, largely prefiguring what was to 
become ICESCR Article 2.1 
All the states continued to discuss this draft preambular article, debating their different understandings 
of  its provisions for the next three days.  Questions were raised over whether resources referred to 
national resources or also those available from international assistance, and the extent to which some 
elements of  ESC rights had to be implemented immediately, while others would need to be implemented 
progressively – although Uruguay (Mr Ciasullo) suggesting that this limitation might ‘represent a 
regression by comparison with Article 56 of  the Charter’ which did not contain such limiting clauses.565  
Despite a number of  questions the French proposal was adopted, and thus the US managed to get their 
June-1947 text into the preambular provision for ESCR. 
Despite its success, the US delegation, increasingly under pressure from deepening domestic opposition 
to US involvement in the drafting of  the Covenants (see Section 3.3.1 below), later tried to weaken even 
their own proposed text.  In 1952 at the Commission’s eighth session, the US made proposal to change 
‘to the maximum of  available resources’ to ‘with due regard to its available resources’.566  This was not 
accepted, so the US then proposed a revision to read ‘to the maximum of  its available resources available 
for this purpose’, and in an increasingly conservative approach further away from public action of  the 
state, introduced also an amendment for realization by ‘legislative or other means such as private 
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action’.567  Many states resisted these US changes and further questioned ‘progressive realisation’ over the 
next few meetings568 and in the end the US agreed to revert to the earlier phrasing.569  By 1952, the US 
delegation was publicly setting out its case that it did mean this as a limiting clause:   
 ‘Although the term ‘rights’ is used in both the civil and political articles and the economic, social and cultural 
articles, it is used in two different senses.  The civil and political rights are looked upon as ‘rights’ to be given 
effect promptly.  The economic, social and cultural ‘rights’ are looked upon as goals toward which countries 
ratifying the covenant would undertake to strive, achieving these objectives ‘progressively’ over a much 
longer period of time. 
3) The manner in which the two groups of rights will be achieved is different.  In the case of the civil and 
political rights, these are to be effectuated by the adoption of such legislative or other measures as may be 
necessary.  In the case of the economic, social and cultural rights, these are to be achieved by many means 
and methods, private as well as public…. Many economic, social and cultural rights cannot be effectuated 
immediately because their effectuation is so dependent on available resources and in some countries available 
resources are not now sufficient for the immediate realization of these rights.’ 
4) [The] Complaint procedure... is expected to be applicable to the civil and political rights but not to 
economic, social and cultural rights because of the obligations with respect to these rights cannot be as 
precisely defined as in the case of civil and political rights.’570 
 
Few changes were made after that and by 1954 the Commission on Human Rights had finalised the 
drafting of  both the ICESCR and the ICCPR passed these to ECOSOC and then the General Assembly 
for their finalisation.   Sixteen years later, after the eventual adoption of  both Covenants in 1966, the final 
text of  Article 2.1 remained much the same as it had been in the Commission’s 1954 draft – and indeed, 
much the same as the very initial US draft of  1947.  However, any Keynesian connotations of  the phrase 
on ‘maximum use of  available resources’ had long been lost.  During debates between 1954 and 1966, in 
the shift towards discussions over issues of  colonialism and the addition of  a right to self-determination 
in the Covenants, attention shifted even more towards an understanding of  the resource constraints of  
the developing states, and a concomitant duty of  international assistance and cooperation.  In the final 
detailed discussion before the adoption of  Article 2.1, the meeting record reported that all the delegates 
speaking:   
 ‘recognised that in view of the inadequacy of resources in many countries and the time needed to develop 
them, it was important to impose on States’ Parties only the obligation of achieving ‘progressively’ the 
realisation of economic and social rights.  The considerable difficulties which would be experienced by the 
developing countries desirous of applying the Covenant were mentioned. It was also agreed that the 
development of resources in each country depended on the continuation and intensification of assistance 
and international cooperation.’ 
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In the end then, the final draft of  ICESCR Article 2.1 includes language strikingly similar to the original 
US proposal in 1947, pointing to the strong influence of  the US in framing the nature and scope of  the 
obligations envisaged for ESC rights.  However, the meaning changed significantly as it also became an 
increasingly urgent strategy of  the US to limit the legal effect of  the Covenant in asserting ESCR as 
rights.  The US State Department lawyers came to push hard for Article 2.1 as a safeguard clause against 
ESCR as immediately enforceable legal rights (just as they pushed hard for a federal state clause as a 
strategy in the context of  racial discrimination).  As the international lawyers took over from the 
economists in the shaping of  economic and social rights, the earlier conceptions of  the New Deal 
economists working at the time of  the Great Depression and its NRPB roots in the Keynesian 
implications of  ‘maximum available resources’ were therefore quickly ‘lost in translation’, as were the 
potential implications as an exhortation for Keynesian fiscal policy.   
The final text of  ICESCR Article 2.1 came to be understood as a limitations clause subjecting ESCR to 
the limited availability of  resources and progressive realization, and seen by many scholars as undermining 
the nature and scope of  ESCR obligations.  Nonetheless, as I note above, reading the phrase ‘maximum 
available resources’ with a Keynesian eye unsettles and casts new light on how this clause could be 
interpreted, particularly in the context of  economic crises, and our own Great Recession.  I turn to that 
in Section 4 on the evolution of  the ESCR, including looking at how the UN Committee later interpreted 
this clause.   
Before that however, I explore another part of  the history of  the nature and scope of  ESCR, which lies 
in the curious case of  right to property and the question over why it was included in the UDHR, but was 
never to be included in either of  the legally binding Covenants.   
 
3.2.3 The curious case of  the right to property – the missing right? 
As Franklin Roosevelt had shown, influenced by legal realists and institutional economists, establishing 
‘new’ economic and social rights on an equivalent basis to ‘old’ classical rights, was critical to challenging 
the underpinnings of  laissez faire economic liberalism.  This in turn required questioning the 
‘absoluteness’ and primacy accorded to the right to property in classical liberal theories of  rights, and 
their taken-for-granted nature in orthodox economic theory.  For this reason, Roosevelt’s ‘human rights’ 
emerged to counter the primacy of  ‘property rights’ in his 1936 constitutional moment – a shift that was 
also reflected more broadly at the international level. 
By 1945, these shifts within ‘western’ liberalism and towards ‘embedded liberalism’ were clearly reflected 
in the proposals for an international bill of  rights, including in an explicit questioning of  the sanctity and 
absolute character of  the liberal right to property.  For example, the then eminent legal scholar, 
Lauterpacht, in his proposal for an international bill of  rights, produced in advance of  the 1945 UN 
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Charter negotiations, explicitly excluded the right to property from his draft, explaining that while 
property was an important right, it should not be included within a list of rights described as ‘human 
rights’:  
‘...in so far as the right to property is conceived as an absolute and inalienable right of man it finds no place 
in the draft.  Deep social and economic changes have intervened since Locke considered property to be the 
most sacred right of all.......  That character of sanctity and inviolability has now departed from the right of 
property....571   
 
Many contemporary critiques of  human rights tend to elide human rights and property rights, as if  they 
are one and the same thing, or as if  human rights are merely a cover for the expansion of  a ‘neoliberal’ 
capitalism.  This is particularly true of  critics employing the theoretical lens of  Marxism, but it also true 
for many other scholars (and lawyers) who tend to take the relationship between human rights and 
property rights very much for granted.  Many of  these critics appear not to have noticed that, while the 
Universal Declaration of  Human Rights does include a right to property, there is no right to property 
included in either of  the legally binding Covenants, neither the ICCPR or the ICESCR.  Indeed, as Shabas 
points out, the right to property has the ‘distinction of  being the only article in the Universal Declaration 
of  Human Rights with no counterpart in the multilateral treaties which were intended to give it binding 
effect.’572   
This section therefore explores the drafting history of  the right to property, as part of  understanding the 
shifts within ‘western’ liberalism that had occurred, and as part of  questioning the simplistic narrative 
that ‘western’ states supported only civil and political rights, while socialist states promoted economic 
and social rights.  In looking at why the right to property was left out of  the Covenants, I show how, in 
the context of  the time, the ‘absoluteness’ of  the right to property had come to be questioned, not only 
by communist and socialist states, but also by more liberal Western states, as Lauterpacht’s bill had 
illustrated.  The drafting process of  the UDHR and the ICESCR included intensely philosophical debates 
and disagreements over whether there was a particular element of  property rights that could strictly fall 
into the category of  ‘human rights’.   
This drafting history also shows that, while the United States was in fact the most insistent supporter of  
the inclusion of  a right to property,  even the US position on the right to property shifted markedly from 
a position at the start of  the UDHR negotiations that reflected this questioning of  the absoluteness of  
property, towards a far more conservative position by the end of  the ICESCR negotiations (under intense 
domestic scrutiny in the context of  the ABA opposition and the Bricker amendment, as I detail further 
in Section 3.3.1).   
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Morsink records how the discussions during the UDHR ‘were some of  the most openly philosophical 
ones in which the drafters engaged.’573  In his review of  the travaux preparatoires of  the Covenants, Shabas 
also notes that ‘Scholars have been tempted to explain the absence of  a ‘right to property’ provision in 
the Covenants as the result of  ideological differences between the Western powers and the Soviet 
Union…’.574  However, he points out that  
‘Careful review of the travail preparatoires (sic) demonstrates that there were frequent hesitations about the 
need to recognise the right in the Covenants and even, for that matter, in the Universal Declaration.  It is 
also clear that there was unanimity on the importance of limitations on the right to property.  Once the 
formulation ‘alone or in association with others’ was generally accepted in the Universal Declaration, it is 
hard to distinguish any real ideological agenda at work.  If anything, the debates were sharpest between the 
United States and the United Kingdom, on such issues as the use of the word ‘arbitrarily’….’ The real 
conclusion to be drawn from the travail preparatoires is that the right to property was left out because it 
simply was not (considered) important or fundamental enough!’575  
 
Morsink and Shabas explore some of  the wide-ranging disagreements over different definitions in 
differing national legal systems, the definition of  ‘arbitrary’ in relation to expropriation, as well as whether 
it was an individual or collective right, and whether the right to property was a ‘positive’ or a ‘negative’ 
right.  However, neither scholar fully explores the animated discussions over whether property rights 
could be considered fundamental human rights, or how the ‘absolute’ character of  property should be 
subject to limitations necessary for promoting social welfare.  It is these aspects that this section briefly 
explores in more detail, delving back into the travaux preparatoires of  the UDHR and the ICESCR, as well 
as looking at the position of  the US showing that, like its position on ESCR more broadly, the US’s own 
interpretation of  the right to property also shifted over time, including as a response to domestic and 
international pressures during the drafting period.    
Drafting the right to property – from the UN Charter to the UDHR 
Many of  the draft international bills of  rights prepared for the 1945 San Francisco conference (and later 
submitted for the drafting of  the Universal Declaration on Human Rights) included some form of  right 
to property, although not as an absolute right.    
In 1945, the proposal of  Panama at the San Francisco conference (which had been drafted by the 
American Law Institute) presented a fairly standard formulation that ‘Everyone had a right to own 
property under general law.  The state shall not deprive any one of  his property except of  public purpose 
and with just compensation’ though it noted some limitations in that ‘the right to private property is 
subject to the right to the state to expropriate property in pursuance of  public policy, just compensation 
being made to the owner.’ 576   By contrast, the proposal of  Chile at San Francisco (which was the initial 
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draft of  the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of  Man, prepared by the Inter-American 
Juridical Committee), took a much more ambitious, socialistic approach, suggesting that the right to 
property meant the state had a duty to ensure everyone a minimum level of  property necessary for a 
decent life:   
‘Every person has the right to own property.  The state has the duty to cooperate in assisting the individual 
to attain a minimum standard of private ownership of property based upon the essential material needs of a 
decent life looking to the maintenance and dignity of the human person and the sanctity of home life.  The 
state may determine by general laws the limitations which may be placed upon the ownership of property, 
looking to the maintenance of social justice and to the promotion of the common interest of the 
community.’577 
 
The US position in 1945 was based on its 1942 draft ‘Declaration of  Human Rights’.  In that draft, the 
US had included an article not on the right to property per se -  rather the right was framed in terms of  
non-discrimination with respect to the rights to life, liberty and property.  Significantly the draft suggested 
that any deprivation of  the right to property should be subject, not simply to ‘due process’ (as prescribed 
in Article VI of  the existing US bill of  rights) - but rather should be subject to a broader standard of  the 
‘humane and civilized processes’ of  the law: 
Article III:  1. All persons shall enjoy equality before the law with respect to life, liberty, property, enterprise 
and employment, subject only to such restrictions as are designed to promote the general welfare.   2.  No 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property except in accordance with humane and civilised processes 
provided by law.578 
 
By 1947, at the start of  the UDHR negotiations, this same article was still the official US position and 
was included in mid-1947 ‘US Suggestions’ we explored above.  A US position paper on the right to 
property in the archives of  the US International Social Policy Subcommittee on human rights, dated May 
5, 1947 noted that the right to property would ‘undoubtedly arouse controversy in the drafting of  an 
international bill of  rights’ noting that other states were tending away from a private enterprise system 
and would likely call for ‘greater social control over the means of  production and distribution or use of  
various types of  property’.579  It did support including the right, suggesting that property rights were a 
part of  ‘larger freedom’ - ‘property enables a person to live his life in larger freedom’, but noted that 
‘attitudes towards property are in a state of  flux in many countries’580 and that many of  the draft proposals 
for international bills of  rights rather focused on its ‘negative aspects’ in terms of  non-discrimination 
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protections (through equality before the law) and the prohibition of  deprivation of  property.  At the start 
of  the UDHR negotiations, the US position thus first also followed this non-discrimination approach 
(with its article focused on equality before the law), although later the US position became far more 
conservative (partly in relation to the ‘one-man crusade’ of  Frank Holman and the broader conservative 
reaction to the US position in the drafting of  the UDHR and the Covenants.581)    
John Humphrey, as he prepared the first draft of  the international bill of  rights, was aware of  all of  these 
previous proposals, and he included a right to property in his first 1947 draft of  the international bill of  
rights.  This was then slightly revised in Cassin’s next draft, formulated not as an absolute right, but as a 
limited ‘right to own personal property’, and allowing for state regulation of  property.582  Significantly, 
the right to property was never included in the draft of  the binding Covenant (that was discussed in 
parallel with the draft Declaration) as the draft Covenant was based the UK draft that focused narrowly 
on civil rights.583  
The first discussions over this article on the right to property came up in June 1947, when it was agreed 
that, as the representative of  France (Cassin) noted the discussions would be difficult given ‘enormously 
different conceptions regarding the right to property’. 584  One significant element of  the debate was over 
limitations on the right to property for public interest and public welfare.  This was linked to debates over 
‘personal property’ versus ‘real property’ and ‘private property’ versus the ‘social functions of  property’.  
It was also linked to a debate over which elements of  property rights could properly be included as part 
of  a fundamental human right to property.585 The representative of  Chile, (Santa Cruz) suggested that it 
might be possible to arrive at an agreement along the lines that, ‘everyone has the right to personal 
property in certain cases, and that general property is subject to the interest of  the community.’ 586  
Lebanon also suggested that ‘the unlimited character of  the ownership of  private property could not be 
considered a fundamental right’ but it was ‘self-evident that men (sic) cannot live without personal 
property; that this…was as essential and fundamental as almost any other right’ and that ‘even the most 
socialistic constitutions refer to the fact that a man must have something which is his own’.587 
The ‘western’ states also agreed on the need for some limitations.  For example, the US (Roosevelt as the 
Chair) suggested that ‘the need for the limitation of  property rights, or the consideration that the rights 
of  other people ought to be considered’ could be covered by a general article on limitations that ‘in the 
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exercise of  his rights, everyone is limited by the rights of  others’.  Roosevelt continued ‘property rights 
of  an individual…  would be implicitly limited by the rights of  others.’588  The UK also suggested that 
‘little remained of  the absolute right to property’ since it was ‘subject to a mass of  control in every 
country’ and suggested it should be omitted altogether, or included in a very limited form such as ‘stating 
that everyone has a right to own such property as is necessary in order to enable him to live a decent 
life.’589 
In the second and third session of  the Commission on Human Rights in May 1948, the draft article was 
refined further, but a key debate remained over the extent of  state regulation of  the right and over 
whether it was possible to establish that ‘at least part of  the property held should be held as of  essential 
right’ given that ‘the purpose of  the declaration, which was to establish essential rights’.590Many other 
issues  were also raised, including regarding whether the right should be made subject to different national 
legal and property systems (the USSR pleaded for wording ‘in accordance with the laws of  the country  
where the property is located’ and that property could be enjoyed individually and ‘in association with 
others’).  Another heated issue was the meaning of  ‘arbitrary’ in relation to the deprivation of  property, 
which was also linked to concerns over whether the ‘nationalisation’ of  resources by states would be 
subject to international supervision.   
After much debate, a decision was made to confine the discussion on the right to property to a 
subcommittee which included only the US, the UK, France and the USSR.591  The final proposal that 
emerged from that subcommittee in the May 1948 session read, with far simpler wording that previous 
drafts: ‘1.  Everyone has the right to own property, alone as well as in association with others.  2.  No one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of  his property.’   
This made no reference to the earlier heated debates over ‘personal property’ necessary for a life in dignity.   
Nor did it include a clear limitation on the right to property in the public interest, although there was a  
general agreement that Article 17 should be read with Article 29 which set out limitations on all rights.  
This text was eventually adopted, and included in the UDHR as Article 17 - but these same debates were 
later to forcefully re-emerge in the drafting of  the Covenant. 
Negotiations of  the right to property for the ICESCR 
When it came to the drafting of  the legally binding Covenants, much of  the discussion over the right to 
property during occurred in 1951 - during the discussions on ESCR, at a time when it was still planned 
that ESCR were to be included in one Covenant (in its part III).   
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During the 1951 seventh session of  the Commission, on 7 May 1951, it was the US which proposed 
adding the right to property into the list of  social rights, offering simple wording based on the UDHR 
article, with an amendment from Uruguay that ‘Private property shall not be taken for public use without 
just compensation.’  However, the Chilean representative (Santa Cruz) pushed back on including the right 
to property as a social right, suggesting that this would mean going over the same arguments as during 
the drafting of  the UDHR  - ‘the Commission would be wasting its time if  it tried to define the concept 
of  the right to own property, since it would find itself  beset by the same difficulties as had led the General 
Assembly to limit itself  in the Universal Declaration to an exceedingly simple wording.’592  He argued 
that, during the UDHR negotiations, there had been a ‘majority view that the deprivation of  property 
other than basic property (that was home, personal and household articles) was not a violation of  a 
fundamental right of  the individual.’593  He later added that he could not accept a ‘monstrous’ Uruguayan 
amendment which seemed to give protection to all types of  property and seems to suggest that any State 
action to limit the right would constitute a violation of  a fundamental human right: 
‘the Commission would be making a serious mistake if it set up the right to own property as a fundamental 
human right, without any limitation.  The fundamental human rights were those inherent in the human 
personality, those that gave man worth and dignity.  It would be monstrous to accept the right to own 
property as a fundamental right without specifying what property was meant.’594 
 
Uruguay (Ciasullo) was upset with his amendment being described as ‘monstrous’ - he argued that he had 
not been defending an absolute right to property – rather it was important to protect the individual right 
to property and at the same time the right of  society to regulate it.  The US representative (Roosevelt) 
also clarified that her delegation ‘did not maintain that the right to own property was an absolute right’, 
but thought that its limitation should be covered by a general clause applicable to all the economic, social 
and cultural rights in the Covenant.595  
As the debate became more heated, Denmark (Sorensen) expressed frustration and suggested deleting 
the article, since the right to property was not a fundamental right - ‘Human beings could develop their 
personalities to the full without protection of  property rights’.596  France (Cassin) proposed a solution by 
adding a limitation clause that read: ‘No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of  his property.  Expropriation 
shall occur only in cases of  public necessity or utility established by law and provided equitable 
compensation is made account being taken where necessary of  the origin of  property and the nature of  
the possessions expropriated.’  But the USSR (Morosov) disagreed given the risk that specifying 
limitations posed to national sovereignty.  Frustrated after further fruitless debate, a vote was called on 
the Danish proposal to delete the right to property: ‘The Commission on Human Rights decides not to 
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include at present in the International Covenant on Human Rights an article on the right to property’.  
This was carried 10 votes to 6 with 2 abstentions.597 
The issue came back however at the Commission’s 1952 eighth session, but was again adjourned without 
resolution.  There was heated debate over several issues, including over a new Lebanese and French 
proposal that the language on property should be revised to ‘States should undertake to respect’ so that 
it would not be subjected the ESCR-related clause on ‘progressive realization’.  But Chile threatened to 
vote against the Covenant if  the draft article was approved: 
‘It seemed out of place for a covenant that was designed to protect the rights of the individual and to 
promote his wellbeing and personal development, to protect property rights including the rights of 
monopolistic or foreign enterprises which controlled the natural resources of a country and thereby impeded 
the attainment of the objectives of the covenant.  The Chilean delegation was prepared to accept a provision 
limiting the right of the individual to own property to the property needed for a livelihood and for 
development of the individual in society.  No further extension of the right to property could be regarded 
as a fundamental right of the individual.’598 
 
The French delegate insisted that a provision had been included on due process with regards to 
expropriation, precisely in order to reflect the social aspects of  the right to property (noting that in France 
at that time, the nationalization of  key industries had been written into the law, and compensation 
granted).599  He also clarified that the right to property would not extend to referring to taxes, to which 
everyone was necessarily subject.600 There was no any clear agreement however, and against the wish of  
the US, the debate was adjourned once again. 
It was not discussed again until two years later in 1954 at the Commission’s tenth session, when the US 
again urged for its inclusion.  By that point the US delegation had changed - Eleanor Roosevelt had been 
summarily sacked by the new Eisenhower administration, with her place taken over by Mrs Lord.  By that 
point, the new US administration had also announced a new US position that it would never ratify the 
Covenants (this is discussed below at Section 3.3.1).   
The 1954 meeting of  the Commission discussed the right to property over 3 days.601  In the meeting on 
25 February 1954, the then head of  the US delegation, Mrs Lord, re-introduced a US proposal with 
                                                           
597 Ibid,. 17. Shabas, and Banning following him, appear to erroneously suggest that this Denmark resolution was 
about the ICCPR, but in fact it related to the joint Covenant which at that point was still to include both CPR and 
ESCR rights.  It is important to recall that the GA instructed the Commission to include ESCR in the draft 
Covenant in December 1950, only reversing its decision in 1952 to agree with two separate Covenants. 
598 E/CN.4/SR.303, 3-4. 
599 Ibid, 6. 
600 Ibid, 5. This debate raised another big issue at stake related to ‘expropriation’, given the economic context of  
the time, both related to a marked move towards a nationalization of  industries in the ‘western’ states (that had 
included requisitioning property held by large monopolies and by non-nationals protected by provisions in 
international private law,), as well as the nationalization of  resources in developing states and the ‘fair treatment 
of  foreign capital and existing contractual relations – see E/CN.4/SR.415. 
601 Detailed debates were held over four days between Thursday 25 February 1954 and Tuesday 2 March 1954.  
See EC/CN.4/SR.413-SR.418. 
133 
identical language to Art 17 of  the UDHR be included in the Covenant.602  She reiterated that the US 
had made its position clear and would not be signing the Covenants, she urged the Commission not to 
‘weaken’ the text of  the Covenants by leaving out the right to property and reversing progress made in 
the UDHR.  She insisted that under the law of  many countries, including the United States, it was a 
‘fundamental principle that the Government could not interfere with or seize private property except for 
public purposes and in return for just compensation.’  Several countries objected to the proposal or called 
for further amendments, including the Philippines, Egypt, Lebanon, USSR, Pakistan, Greece and Chile.  
Australia (Whitlam) brought attention back to the economic context, reiterating that the ‘sacredness’ of  
the right to property was now gone, and noting that limitations for the purposes of  public purposes, 
taxes and general welfare were essential:   
‘...it was unrealistic to imagine that any idea of inviolability or sacredness was attached to the concept of 
ownership in the modern world, where far-reaching economic and social changes had directly affected that 
concept.  If the right was to be expressed in the covenants, it was essential to bear in mind the economic 
and social conditions to which the ownership and enjoyment of property were subject…. Thus, with regard 
to expropriation, it would be necessary to find an expression covering the concepts of ‘public necessity’, 
‘utility’ and ‘public purposes... It was also essential to include reference to other limitations on the right to 
property, such as taxes, death duties and general public welfare regulations.’603 
 
The UK representative (Hoare) shared Australia’s view:  ‘The difficulties in drafting an article on the right 
of  property arose from the fact that the entire conception of  property and the rights attaching thereto 
and of  the relationship of  the owner to society and the State was still fluid.’604  Others expressed a range 
of  other concerns, including also ‘expressing the importance of  recognising the interests of  the 
community and of  limiting the right to property in relation to the public interest, safety and morals, the 
general welfare, public order and social progress.605   
Many states proposed further changes and amendments and eventually the US added in those proposed 
by India, Lebanon and Egypt, agreeing on a clause making the right to property subject to ‘such 
reasonable restrictions as may be imposed by general law in the public interest’.606  The representatives 
of  Chile and Uruguay however insisted on revising this to include ‘social progress’, with an amendment 
reading: ‘as the public interest and social progress required.’607  Another subcommittee was formed to 
merge the amendments, producing a combined article, with clear limitations on the right to property, that 
read: 
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‘1.  The states parties to this Covenant undertake to respect the right of everyone to own property alone as 
well as in association with others.  This right shall be subject to such limitations and restrictions as are 
imposed by law in the public interest and in the interest of social progress in the country concerned.   
2. No one shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.  Expropriation may take place only 
for consideration of public necessity or utility as defined by law and subject to such compensation as may 
be prescribed.’608  
 
At this point however, this was too much for the US delegate, Mrs Lord, who refused to accept this 
limitation on the right to property to pursue ‘social progress’.   
The draft was therefore put to the vote.  Oddly there were separate votes for the first and second clauses 
– which were both separately adopted.  But then there was another vote on the article as a whole, and in 
what Shabas describes an ‘astonishing’ final result, delegates rejected it (by a vote of  seven votes to six, 
with five abstentions).  Unable to agree on how to overcome this ‘deadlock’, the frustrated delegate of  
Uruguay then moved to an adjournment sin die.609  At that point, the sin die motion was overwhelmingly 
adopted (by 12 votes to two with 4 abstentions)610 leaving the Covenants forever without a formal, legally 
binding right to property.   
By the end of  that session, its tenth session in 1954, the Commission had completed its work on the 
ICESCR as well as the ICCPR (which also never included a right to property), and the texts of  Covenants 
were left to lengthy, further deliberations in ECOSOC and the General Assembly.611 
Shabas suggests that, reading between the lines, that in the end the exclusion of  the right to property 
from the Covenant can be laid at the foot of  the US.  By that time, not only had the US position hardened 
in terms of  the limitations that would be put on the right to property, but the US had also shocked the 
Commission with its 1953 no-treaty policy.  As Shabas points out:   
‘the decisive stage in the rejection of the Sub-Committee draft [came] during the Tenth Session came in 
conjunction with the defeat of a US amendment, and this after the United States had declared that it would 
not sign the Covenants.612   
 
This story shows then, how the drafting of  the right to property was strongly influenced by 
contemporaneous questioning of  the ‘absoluteness’ or ‘primacy’ of  the right to property – and the need 
for certain limitations on this right, including to secure economic and social rights.  As Australia had put 
it, there was no longer ‘any idea of  inviolability or sacredness attached to the concept’ of  the right to  
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property and it was critical to include limitations to cover ‘public purposes’, taxes, and general public 
welfare regulations.613   
This was a debate not linked only to socialism, but also to debates within liberalism over classical liberal 
rights to life, liberty and property (and the questioning of  the classical rights by the legal realists and 
economic institutionalists explored above).  This story also shows how the US had a profound influence 
on the drafting of  the right – not only on its inclusion in the UDHR, but also on its eventual exclusion 
from the legally-binding Covenants.  At the same time, it is important to understand the context in which 
these debates were being waged, and how this changed over time, not only internationally but also 
domestically in the US, to which we now turn.  
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3.3 From ICESCR to the Cold War and back to legal and economic orthodoxy 
‘My purpose in offering this resolution is to bury the so-called covenant on human rights so deep that no one holding 
high public office will ever dare to attempt its resurrection.’ 
Senator John Bricker, Congressional Record, 1951 
 
Moyn has dramatically declared that the 1948 proclamation of  the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights was ‘less than the annunciation of  a new age than a funeral wreath laid on the grave of  wartime 
hopes’,614 and that human rights ‘died in the process of  being born’615 - but he has not explored why, 
preferring rather to examine their (re)emergence in the 1970s.616   
This section briefly explores (one strand of) how ‘human rights’ – and specifically discussions of  
‘economic and social rights’ - were closed down in the US context.  This shows how, despite its early 
support of  economic and social rights, the US administration shifted to strong opposition not only to 
ESCR, but to the international human rights treaties more generally.  Against the backdrop of  domestic 
resistance from anti-communists, segregationists and isolationists, the US position became more 
conservative during the brief  period of  drafting of  the UDHR between 1947 and 1948 (as described 
above), but shifted more dramatically after 1949 (including with respect to the right to property).  The 
US position shifted decisively against ESCR once the drafting moved on to the legally-binding Covenants, 
and once the domestic opposition heated up, notably in a campaign led by the American Bar Association 
and the ‘Bricker amendment’ which explicitly sought to ‘bury’ the Covenants.  Then in 1953, under the 
new Republican administration of  President Eisenhower, the US dramatically announced that it would 
refuse to become party to any international human rights treaty - firmly laying the funeral wreath on US 
engagement with human rights. 
This shift has often been set against the international backdrop of  the Cold War, but it should also be set 
against fervent opposition to New Deal liberalism within the US domestic context, as well as broader 
efforts to reassert the classical liberal rights and economic orthodoxy.  This section first looks at the 
impact of  the ABA campaign and the Bricker amendment on the 1953 shift in the US position, before 
exploring broader attacks on ESCR (including Friedrich Hayek’s) and the eventual return of  neoclassical 
economic orthodoxy, culminating in Reagan’s 1987 economic bill of  rights and his four freedoms, 
designed precisely to reverse Roosevelt’s. 
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3.3.1 The United States - From proposition to opposition to 1953 withdrawal  
While New Deal liberalism culminated in Roosevelt’s four freedoms and his 1944 economic bill of  rights, 
these rights were never constitutionalised in the United States.  As I have shown above however, they 
were, partly through US influence, constitutionalised in the UN Charter and the international bill of  
rights.   
Opposition within the United States to the ‘constitutionalisation’ of  these rights at domestic, and then at 
the international level, was however fierce for many reasons – particularly after the rapid return to 
isolationism as the internationalism of  the immediate post-war moment receded, and anxieties over 
international supervision of  domestic policy (including on racial discrimination), as well as fears of  the 
threat of  communism.  This section however, focuses just on one small element of  that domestic 
opposition – Frank Holman’s ‘one-man crusade’ – and the profound impact it had on the US involvement 
in the drafting of  the international bill of  rights (including on their increasingly conservative position on 
ESCR and the right to property).   
I show how, while Holman was arguing against Communism as the Cold War began to heat up, he was 
also engaging in directly challenging the ‘alien’ and ‘un-American’ nature of  New Deal constitutionalism, 
reasserting the primacy of  the traditional rights to life, liberty and property and trying to avoid the 
formalisation or ‘freezing’ of  Roosevelt’s ‘new’ rights into the UDHR and the Covenants.  With the 
powerful platform of  the American Bar Association and its influence over Congress, he along with many 
others, sought to erase the recent history of  New Deal liberalism and equate ESCR as rights imposed on 
the US by the USSR – engaging in historical revisionism already at that time, and contributing to a 
persistent narrative that continues to influence the perception of  ESCR today.  617 
Holman’s crusade against the human rights treaties as ‘a blank cheque for a new Constitution’ 
Frank Holman, who was later to become President of  the American Bar Association in 1947, had 
launched his crusade in 1945 at the time of  the drafting of  the UN Charter.  The conservative, anti-New 
Deal lawyer ridiculed the basic premise that economic issues should even be addressed in the Charter to 
preserve the peace at national and international levels:  ‘The fallacy that both World Wars were caused by 
economic distress or inequalities has so permeated the American mind that many think world peace is 
attainable only be a levelling out of  the world’s economic inequalities and that the surest way to do this 
is to have a ‘world government’ which can enforce a planned economy everywhere.’618  He also directly 
attacked ideas for an international bill of  rights as trying to impose a new economic philosophy:   
‘I do not believe that either of the world wars were caused by the absence of an International Bill of Rights 
or, primarily by subnormal or abnormal social and economic conditions in any country…. Therefore, in my 
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opinion, we are not dealing with a so-called International Bill of Rights that will assuredly contribute to 
world peace.  We are dealing chiefly with a missionary spirit on the part of social and economic reformers 
to establish throughout the world their social and economic ideas….’619 
 
Attacking the Roosevelt administration’s legal realist critique of  the Supreme Court, Holman’s view was 
that judges had a duty state the law as it is, unchanging in all contexts, rather than adapting it to changing 
social and economic circumstances or democratic opinion, criticising Roosevelt’s efforts at shifting the 
philosophy of  the Court in his ‘court-packing’ plan: 
‘Another tendency which reached the peak of its advance in the days of the court-packing plan….  supports 
the specious doctrine that any action by the courts in holding act of Congress or state legislatures 
unconstitutional is usurpation of power on the part of the courts…..[but]… the judicial function was never 
intended to register the changing opinions of social or economic pressure groups or even to register the 
opinion of a majority of the people as to what the Constitution and the law ought to be – but to interpret 
dispassionately and declare the Constitution and the law as they exist – whether such interpretation satisfies 
a majority of the people or the President and his advisers or the members of his party or no one at all.’620 
 
A dedicated McCarthyite, he also argued that ‘A nation-wide housecleaning is urgently need to rout out 
the Reds in Government who are burrowing through our structures of  government like prairie dogs.  
Too many Communists today hide behind the star-spangled cloak of  Americanism.’621 
Writing in the American Bar Association’s journal in November 1948, just before the signing of  the 
UDHR in December 1948, Holman warned that the international bill of  rights would have ‘dangerous 
implications’ for the US and that the US public seemed to be unaware of  the extent to which the UDHR 
was ‘at variance with our fundamental concept of  individual rights and freedoms’.622  Holman was 
outraged that ‘One of  the most fundamental rights protected by our American form of  government, that 
of  private ownership of  property’ had been left out of  the draft Covenant (not mentioning that it was 
included in the draft UDHR) and directly attacked the US State Department for this ‘failure’.623  He 
lobbied hard against the State Department, writing to the Secretary of  State on the dangers of  US 
participation and criticizing the lack of  protection of  the right to property, receiving an assurance that 
the UDHR would be ‘merely declaratory in character’ and would have no legal effect.624 
Writing on the ‘so-called human rights’ in 1949, Holman questioned the re-definition of  ‘human rights’: 
‘the sponsors of  the international human rights program would have this phrase include not only basic 
rights affecting life, liberty and property, as heretofore known to lawyers, but also a whole category of  
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social and economic benefits.’625   Seeking to reassert the primacy of  the traditional rights, he challenged 
the State Department’s involvement in the Covenant negotiations, arguing that: 
‘‘Our government seems to have lost sight of the basic principles of human liberty and freedom as set forth 
in our Constitution and Bill of Rights….and is attempting to sell a new concept of basic human rights to the 
American people.’626 
 
For Holman, the ESCR provisions constituted ‘an agreement to adopt the New Deal on an international 
scale’, requiring a ‘welfare type of  government’, with rights that were not the usual rights that imposed 
‘limits’ on government, ‘but on the contrary impose so-called economic and social duties upon 
government, the fulfilment of  which will require a planned economy and a control of  government of  
individual action.’627  He criticised Eleanor Roosevelt as not ‘trained in legal draftsmanship; she is 
primarily a social reformer’628 and suggested that it was ‘the immediate and important duty of  lawyers to 
study and analyse before it is too late.’629 
He insisted that any international human rights treaty would amount to a ‘blank check for a new 
Constitution’, and campaigned hard against the UDHR, but even harder against the legally binding 
treaties, concerned that they would amount to a rewriting of  American law – and would allow the federal 
government to invalidate the states’ racial discrimination laws as well as transforming the US into a 
‘socialistic state’.630  Holman insisted that any international human rights treaty (including the Genocide 
Convention) would threaten US national sovereignty, interfere with the states’ prerogatives over racial 
segregation, and ‘promote state socialism, if  not communism, throughout the world’, destroying the 
‘American way of  life’.631  
He criticised the civil and political rights for their ‘loose language’, but was more apocalyptic on ESCR.632  
For example, on the comparatively soft language of  the (then draft) Covenant’s provision of  right to 
education, he insisted that this would mean that ‘education in the future shall be an instrumentality for 
propagandizing the citizens of  America and of  the world toward the promotion of  a collectivist society 
set for in the Declaration’.’633  And he threatened that the US would be forced, ‘in accordance with our 
greater resources we are to provide, or in a large part provide, social security for all the rest of  the 
world.’634 
                                                           
625 Holman 1949, 479. 
626 Ibid., 482. 
627 Holman 1948, 1081. 
628 Holman 1949, 479. 
629 Holman 1948. 
630 Holman 1950. 
631 Ibid. 
632 Holman 1950. 
633 Ibid., 788. 
634 Ibid., 789. 
140 
By 1950, Holman was declaring that American Bar Association must ‘explain this great legal and 
constitutional issue’ so the people can decide ‘whether they wish to follow further the Pied Pipers of  
Internationalism who are leading them to a complete change in their form of  government’635. Ignoring 
the fact that it was less than 15 years previously that Franklin Roosevelt had taken this choice to the 
people in his 1936 ‘constitutional moment’, Holman engaged in revisionist history in his own time.  With 
his unsubtle conflation of  New Deal liberalism with Soviet communism, Holman also challenged the 
‘alien’ and ‘un-American’ nature of  New Deal constitutionalism, and reasserted the traditional rights to 
life, liberty and property, against the formalisation of  Roosevelt’s ‘new’ rights in the UDHR and the 
Covenants.  Holman was not alone - other conservative academics, including William Fleming, were also 
writing in the American Bar Association’s journal, that ESCR were a ‘danger to America’ and bore ‘the 
heavy imprint of  Soviet philosophy’.636 With the powerful platform of  the American Bar Association and 
its influence over Congress, these commentators thus worked to equate ESCR as rights imposed by the 
USSR (ignoring that other ‘Western’ states also supported the inclusion of  ESCR in the Covenant.637)   
These attacks on the constitutional implications of  the human rights treaties, fell in fertile ground in the 
environment of  McCarthyism where there was pressure on everyone to demonstrate publicly that they 
were not ‘Reds’ or communist spies.  As Kaufman further details, the Cold War rhetoric of  the Truman 
administration had itself  contributed to conservative fears, legitimizing them in the public mind.638   She 
points to historians such as Richard Freeland who have argued that the Truman administration launched 
a propaganda effort against the USSR, as a way to get approval for the Marshall Plan, although this 
produced repercussions that the Truman White House could not control:   
‘The campaign implanted the idea in the public mind that the United States was imminently threatened by a 
massive, ideologically based assault upon everything Americans valued.  This exaggerated representation of 
the dangers of international and domestic communism created the emotional and conceptual context within 
which America reacted to the Soviet explosion of the atomic bomb, the fall of China, the outbreak of the 
Korean War, and convictions of Alger Hiss.’ 
 
Holman’s other central fear was that international treaties would take precedence over the United States 
Constitution, threatening American’s Bill of  Rights.  As the UDHR was being drafted, two Supreme 
Court cases on racial discrimination sought to invoke the human rights provisions of  the UN Charter to 
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condemn discriminatory policies, giving him fodder for his argument.639  In the spring of  1949, a 
California Court of  Appeal decision in Sei Fujii v. The State of  California also held that California’s 1920 
Alien Tort Land Law (that prevented non-citizens, including Japanese residents, from ever owning land) 
was invalid in the light of  the UN Charter.  Although that case was made on questionable grounds, and 
was overturned the following year by the California Supreme Court, the decision became a lightning rod 
in the domestic debate, galvanising the emerging opposition to the UN and to the US role in drafting the 
international human rights treaties and eventually leading to the Bricker Amendment controversy.   
In 1951, Republic Senator John W. Bricker of  Ohio had introduced a proposal for a constitutional 
amendment that would severely limit the ‘treaty-making power’ of  the US executive and its impact.  
Bricker labelled the human rights Covenant, the ‘Covenant on Human Slavery or subservience to 
government’, and declared that: ‘My purpose in offering this resolution is to bury the so-called covenant 
on human rights so deep that no one holding high public office will ever dare to attempt its 
resurrection.’640  Bricker’s resolution insisted that ‘The President of  the United States should instruct 
United States representatives at the United Nations to withdraw from further negotiations with respect 
to the covenant on human rights, and all other covenants, treaties, and conventions which seek to 
prescribe restrictions on individual liberty.’641  By 1953, Bricker had proposed another amendment that 
came very close to being approved by the Senate, and although it was not adopted, it precipitated a final 
turn in the US position on the drafting of  the treaties under the new Eisenhower administration, which 
announced in 1953 its decision that it would refrain from signing or ratifying any of  the human rights 
treaties.   
The shifting the US position during the drafting of  the Covenants 
The US position during the drafting of  the UDHR as well as the Covenants was profoundly influenced 
by this domestic campaign, as well as broader opposition from conservative forces, including the 
democratic Dixiecrats, and the isolationists in Congress.   
At the adoption of  the UDHR in December 1948, in her final statement to the UN General Assembly, 
Eleanor Roosevelt had already stated clearly that the UDHR was ‘not a treaty’, and would have no binding 
legal effect.  Once drafting the process to translate the UDHR into a legally-binding Covenant started to 
move forward in 1949, the US delegation then first pushed for two separate covenants (an ICCPR and a 
separate ICESCR) and then adopted a strategy to pushed harder for Article 2.1 as a safeguard clause 
against ESCR as immediately enforceable legal rights, as well as for a federal-state clause that would 
protect ‘state’s rights’ with respect to racial discrimination issues.  These pre-emptive strategies aimed to 
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disarm the domestic opposition, including opposition of  ABA and the Dixiecrats on racial legislation, 
and reflected a shift in public opinion away from the UN and international treaties, not only the human 
rights treaties but also the Genocide Convention, which the Senate refused to ratify in 1949. 
In 1951, with the Bricker Amendment coming before the Senate, and after the decision of  the General 
Assembly to include ESCR and CPR in one binding Covenant, the US delegation moved to further water 
down the language on ESCR.  The Department of  State instructed the US delegation to limit provisions 
on ESCR ‘to general language along lines proposing the promotion of  economic, social and cultural 
progress and development’.642   This legal sleight of  hand was to emphasise ‘economic, social and cultural 
progress’, rather than ‘rights’.643   Reporting back to the President and the Department of  State after the 
1951 session of  the Commission on Human Rights, Roosevelt recounted that for many developing states, 
economic and social rights had become an aspirational symbol and standard by which they hope to prod 
their own governments towards efforts for social improvement, and they now resented the ‘unwillingness 
of  the United States to state them in terms of  rights.’644  She warned that the Soviet Union would use 
this for propaganda against the US.  Thus, the US delegation was caught between pressure at the 
international level, and strong domestic opposition as she saw that ‘unless very carefully safeguarded, 
their inclusion in the Covenant would mean the rejection of  the whole Covenant by the Senate.’645  
The opposition to including ESCR as legally-binding rights, reflected the cautionary approach of  the 
State Department lawyers who had always cautioned against including them in a legally binding Covenant, 
but the delegation was thus increasingly worried about the rejection of  the Covenant by the Senate.  In 
the minutes of  a meeting of  the US delegation to the General Assembly in Paris November 1951, 
Roosevelt described how US NGOs present were not happy with the US position on the Covenant, but 
did not ‘seem to realize the practical difficulties involved, especially in connection with ratification by 
Congress’.  From the advice of  her State Department lawyers, she recognised the ‘tremendous legal 
difficulties encountered by the US’, though she was concerned by the ‘ danger that the US might seem 
to be opposed to the cause of  human rights.’646   Asked by the Senators who had joined the US delegation 
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to the GA why US was supporting two covenants, Roosevelt emphasised that it was very important that 
the US ratify the civil and political rights covenant, ‘even if  it were necessary to have a big debate in 
Congress on the anti-discrimination clause’, but expressed the fear that the US would ‘never ratify 
economic and social rights in a treaty’.647  
By 1952, ABA’s domestic campaign attacking the human rights treaties was generating even greater 
domestic opposition, raising the issue not only in the Senate, but also in the public mind.   Eleanor 
Roosevelt declared that: ‘there is a great need for the State Department to undertake a general public 
relations program to meet the attack on US participation in the United Nations which is now 
concentrated on the work in the human rights field…. It is time to meet the attacks being made on the 
United Nations which take the line that it is a highly dangerous organization’648  To avoid this becoming 
an issue in the 1952 election campaign, she insisted on the need ‘for the State Department to realize, 
meet and inform public opinion’.649 However, Truman lost the Presidency and, after the election of  a 
new Republican President (Eisenhower), Eleanor Roosevelt was summarily sacked in 1953 by the 
Eisenhower administration and replaced by Mary Lord as the US lead delegate at the Commission on 
Human Rights.  The new administration ordered a ‘complete review of  our policy respecting the 
promotion of  human rights through the United Nations’.650  The internal memo in the archives explicitly 
recorded the criticism of  ABA and the subsequent Bricker amendment: 
 ‘In recent years vocal criticism has developed in the United States concerning United States participation in 
the drafting of these Covenants, with the expression of fear by many that such international treaties would 
supersede the Constitution and impose obligations upon the United States destructive of some of the basic 
concepts of the United States Constitution.  Such criticism, initially formulated by a Committee of the 
American Bar Association is reflected in the proposed ‘Bricker Amendment’’.651  
 
It further records that ABA had called for the US to cease participating in the drafting of  this Covenant 
(while recognising that this was opposed by other groups, such as the New York City Bar Association).  
However, it also warned that ‘Should the United States abandon the Covenants, it is certain that before 
their completion, the texts would substantially deteriorate and articles would be included utterly 
unacceptable to the United States.’652  The archives contain detailed memos setting out the pros and cons 
of  various positions, including discussing withdrawing completely from the drafting of  both Covenants 
to dampen support for the Bricker amendment.   
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The decision was then made and the US suddenly announced to the world that it would not accept 
‘foreign interference’ in its domestic affairs and would not become a party to any human rights treaty 
approved by the United Nations.  On April 8, 1953 at the 1953 session of  the Commission, Ms Lord, the 
new US representative, announced this change in the US position, suggesting that ‘...the United States is 
proposing a new and urgent approach to the promotion of  human rights….my Government has 
concluded that in the present stage of  international relations, it would not ratify the covenants.’653  Despite 
a strategy of  telegraphing this change in advance to US allies in the negotiations, the reaction in the room 
was emotional and very negative. Writing urgently in a telegram back to capital, Lord noted that some 
representatives ‘would have preferred less frankness now’ on the US position, with some implying that 
the ‘statement was timed to sabotage work on the covenants.’ Even allies were not supportive:   
‘Our new action program did not get very strong support from our Western allies—Australia, Belgium, 
France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  As a matter of fact, I had made an informal agreement with the 
representatives of these countries that they would not attack our program. I was disappointed that they not 
only referred to the importance of the Covenants and our not signing them but also went fairly far in pointing 
out the difficulties of such a program.654 
 
The telegram also called for damage control:  
In light reactions and speeches after our statement urgently advise international-minded reporters be given 
background story by Secretary explaining that forthright statement in commission was needed at this time 
re covenants to meet arguments proponents Bricker Amendment…. Also urge consideration further 
explanation for domestic and international opinion that without forthright statement at this time serious risk 
restriction on treaty-making which might have crippled American participation in UN in areas of collective 
security in which treaties essential while in human rights area objective can be attained without treaties.655 
 
The new Republican administration of  President Eisenhower thus laid the funeral wreath on US 
engagement with human rights, in a decision that continues to redound today.  For her part, Eleanor 
Roosevelt could not hide her disgust in her blistering public attack on this US position, noting (as 
described above): ‘We have sold out to the Brickers and McCarthys. It is a sorry day for the honor and 
good faith of the present Administration in relation to our interest in the human rights and freedoms of 
people throughout the world 656 and that ‘the Eisenhower Administration does not want to fight a section 
of the American Bar Association, or the isolationists or those who might vote for the Bricker 
amendment.... The Administration . . . should feel . . . embarrassed.657 
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3.3.2 From Roosevelt’s 1944 Second bill of rights to Reagan’s 1987 ‘Economic bill of  rights’  
Beyond the attack of  ABA lawyers, there were broader attacks by economists on human rights and 
‘reform liberalism’, which aimed at reasserting classical legal and economic orthodoxy.  These efforts 
were eventually to result in the return of  neoclassical economic orthodoxy of  the Reagan/Thatcher era, 
culminating in Reagan’s 1987 economic bill of  rights and his four freedoms, designed precisely to reverse 
Roosevelt’s. 
In 1944, at the same time as Roosevelt’s 1944 Second bill of  rights, and after the 1943 list of  rights and 
freedoms of  the National Resources Planning Board that preceded it, Friedrich Hayek’s 1944 ‘Road to 
Serfdom’ (which was aimed at a UK audience) proved a sudden hit in the US, given its attack on the 
instinct for ‘planning’ and a greater role of  the state to ensure ‘economic security’ for the ordinary man 
(sic) ( although it had little immediate impact on economic policy).658 By 1976, at the time of  the entry 
into force of  the two human rights Covenants, Hayek was ridiculing economic and social rights in his 
1976 Mirage of  Social Justice and also equating New Deal liberalism with Soviet communism. Hayek wrote:  
this ‘new trend was given its chief  impetus through the proclamation of  President Franklin Roosevelt of  
his ‘Four Freedoms’’ which found its ‘definite embodiment’ in the UDHR. But in an inconsistent sleight 
of  hand, he then attacked the UDHR as an incoherent attempt ‘to fuse the rights of  the Western liberal 
tradition with the altogether different conception deriving from the Marxist Russian Revolution’.659  
Hayek argued that the new ‘economic and social rights’ were in fact incompatible with the classical 
western liberal rights and would destroy capitalism – since they could not be guaranteed by the 
‘spontaneous order of  the market’ but would require ‘planning’ in terms of  a role of  the state in the 
economy.  Hayek saw no inconsistency however in using the force of  government to ensure the classical 
rights to property and freedom of  contract in this ‘spontaneous’ order (ignoring the lessons of  the 
institutional economists who long before had pointed out the ‘laissez-faire’ was a myth as government 
power was still being used to enforce the rights of  some over others.) 
For Hayek, economic and social rights not only debased the word ‘right’, but were a slippery slope to 
totalitarianism.  Echoing his earlier 1944 polemic ‘The Road to Serfdom’ which had directly attacked any 
government intervention in markets for social justice or ‘economic security’, and argued directly against 
Keynesian ‘full employment’ for leading to ‘totalitarianism’660, Hayek also condemned the idea of  ‘full 
employment’ on which these ideas of  these rights were based:  
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‘It is evident that all these ‘rights’ are based on the interpretation of society as a deliberately made 
organization by which everybody is employed…. And so require that the whole of society be converted into 
a single organization, that is, made totalitarian in the fullest sense of the word.’661 
 
Despite Hayek’s polemic and fear-mongering in the 1940s and his suggestions that Keynesianism would 
produce totalitarianism, Keynesian policies were in fact largely followed over the post-war years from the 
1940s to the 1970s, along with elements of  the US ‘residual’ welfare state.  Those years were characterized 
by solid economic growth, fewer economic crises and a ‘dramatic downward distribution of  income and 
wealth’, as the changes in the rules, institutions and role of  the state in the economy had shifted the 
distributional impacts under the regulated markets of  ‘embedded liberalism’.662  
However, in the 1970s, this Keynesian consensus started to unravel following the oil crises of  the 1970s 
that produced spiralling inflation at the same time as rising unemployment.  This called into question the 
Keynesian economic model (or at least the version of  it that Joan Robinson had called ‘Bastard 
Keynesianism’) and precipitated a swing back towards the classical economic liberalism and neoclassical 
economics,663 led by Hayek along with other economists such as Milton Friedman (both won Nobel 
prizes for economics in the 1970s)664, who reasserted the classical liberal rights of  property and freedom 
of  contract, and (against Keynes) re-affirmed that ‘free’ markets would be inherently stable, efficient and 
self-correcting if  only governments would refrain from intervention (reversing the lessons of  the Great 
Depression).   
Rolling back the lessons of  the institutional economists as well as the Keynesian economists, this saw the 
re-emergence of  the mathematical models of  neoclassical economics, which in its modern form insisted 
that that ‘an unregulated general equilibrium maximizes social welfare’, and that ‘Left to its own devices, 
without any government involvement, the perfectly competitive market will gravitate to that level of  
output and prices that is socially optimal.’665 There was a return to a faith in market relations as voluntary 
and non-coercive, and a belief  in the justice of  market outcomes and the impossibility of  the existence 
of  powerful economic actors.666  Against the lessons of  the ‘heterodox’ economic theories of  the 
institutionalists and Keynesians (discussed in the first part), there was a return to a faith in the formalist, 
deductive logic of  the neoclassical economic model - which is timeless, context-less, and universally 
applicable in the sense that it can be applied at all times in all places –one-size fits all.667  This signalled a 
move back towards neoclassical economic models based on equilibrium and assumptions of  a self-
regulating economy that buttressed economic (neo)liberalism and its ‘free market fundamentalism’ (while 
                                                           
661 Hayek 1999, 104. 
662 Krugman 2007, 39.  
663 Mogdigliani, 1997 cited in Tabb 2002. 
664 Hayek 1944; Friedman and Friedman 2002. 
665 DeMartino 2002, 58. 
666 See generally on neoclassical economics versus the heterodox economists, Waligorski 1997. 
667 For a substantive discussion of this point, see Tabb 2002. This is relevant for example in the case of structural 
adjustment which is imposed in much same model in all contexts. 
147 
taking-for-granted state enforcement of  a legal framework protecting the right to property and freedom 
of  contract, as the earlier institutional economists who challenged the ‘myth of  laissez-faire’ had pointed 
out).   
Alongside the ending of  the ‘Cold War’, a modern version of  economic liberalism (later named by its 
critics as ‘neoliberalism’) came to underpin the governments of  Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, 
and animated the ‘structural adjustment’ policies that the IMF and the World Bank promoted across the 
developing world.  This version of  economic (neo)liberalism encouraged rolling back the (social role of  
the) state in the regulation of  the economy, through liberalization, privatisation, deregulation and 
decentralization (including financial liberalisation) despite the earlier lessons learned during the Great 
Crash and the Great Depression.  It also set the stage for the dramatic reversal of  the redistributive rules 
and regulations that had reduced inequality in the post-war period, and inequality started to rise from the 
1970s onwards.  As Hobsbawm detailed:   
‘Those of us who lived through the years of the Great Slump still find it almost impossible to understand 
how the orthodoxies of the pure free market, then so obviously discredited, once again came to preside over 
a global period of depression in the late 1980s and 1990s, which once, again, they were equal unable to 
understand or to deal with.  Still, this strange phenomenon should remind us of the major characteristic of 
history which is exemplifies: the incredible shortness of memory of both the theorists and practitioners of 
economics.’668 
 
By 1987, this ‘revolution’ culminated in Reagan announcing his own 1987 ‘Economic Bill of  Rights’, 
effectively reversing Roosevelt’s 1944 ‘Economic Bill of  Rights’.  In this rarely cited initiative, Reagan 
countered Roosevelt’s ‘four freedoms’ with his own four freedoms:  
‘Over the past 40 years, …. the growth of government has left our citizens with less control over their 
economic lives. What America needs now is an Economic Bill of Rights that guarantees four fundamental 
freedoms: 
- The freedom to work. 
- The freedom to enjoy the fruits of one's labor. 
- The freedom to own and control one's property. 
- The freedom to participate in a free market.’669 
 
As Reagan’s manifesto further explained, his ‘freedom to work’ was to be secured by reducing 
government regulation and unnecessary restrictions on the individual’s pursuit of  their livelihoods (in 
other words, they would be ‘free’ from having to join a union), as well as by the privatisation and 
contracting out of  government services (on the assumption the private sector would create more jobs) -  
reversing the lessons of  the institutional economists on strengthening the bargaining power of  workers, 
and the Keynesian insistence that the private sector was not always able to create sufficient jobs to ensure 
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full employment.  In Reagan’s manifesto, the ‘freedom to enjoy the fruits of  one’s labor’ meant reducing 
taxes and restoring balanced budgets by making every new government program ‘deficit-neutral’, again 
challenging Keynesian policy prescriptions to adjust government deficits to the economic circumstances 
of  the time (and to avoid austerity in times of  crisis).  On the freedom to own property, Reagan’s bill 
promised to ‘restore your constitutional rights’ and to strengthen intellectual property protection.  His 
‘freedom to participate in free markets’ promised to strengthen freedom of  contract (‘the right to contract 
freely for goods and services and to achieve your full potential without government limits on opportunity, 
economic independence and growth’) and to reform the welfare system, as well as promoting free trade 
for American enterprise.670   
Reagan’s 1987 economic bill of  rights thus reasserted the primacy of  property rights and freedom of  
contract, and reinforced the rolling back of  the positive role of  the state of  the state in the economy, 
reversing the New Deal’s ‘reform’ liberalism and Roosevelt’s ‘human rights’ and marking the height of  
the return to liberal legal and economic orthodoxy. 
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4. EVOLUTION:  JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UN COMMITTEE ON ESCR 
As I have shown above, the emergence of  economic and social rights occurred in the United States in 
the context of  the Great Depression and the (liberal) challenge to economic liberalism, which in turn 
shaped their inclusion in the international bill of  human rights in the UDHR and the ICESCR.  After the 
adoption of  the Covenants in 1966 however, there was little further formal elaboration of  the rights until 
after the establishment of  the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1987. 
This section explores how economic and social rights were elaborated in the 1980s and 1990s onwards 
in the 'jurisprudence' of  this UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  I show how 
economic and social rights were defined in this period, arguing that they were elaborated again in the 
context of  economic crisis and again in the context of  a challenge to the resurgence of  a modern form 
of  laissez-faire liberalism (later labelled ‘neoliberalism’ or 'market fundamentalism' by its critics671) that 
characterised the Reagan (and Thatcher) administrations and was epitomized in the 'Washington 
Consensus' of  the international financial institutions.  I show how the Committee began to elaborate the 
nature and content of  economic and social rights against the backdrop of  the severe human costs of  the 
shock therapy of  'structural adjustment' imposed across the developing world and the transition to market 
economies across Eastern Europe and the former USSR.  Much of  the Committee's work can be seen 
as a call to 'humanise' economic policy and to put limits on the suffering of  people from the negative 
impacts of  the 'rolling back of  the state' and of  'aggressive market forces', drawing on critiques of  
structural adjustment, including those by UNICEF and UNDP and influenced by the economist Amartya 
Sen.  However, I also argue that many of  the earlier insights from the Keynesian and institutional 
economists that shaped ESCR at their emergence have been lost in the modern elaboration of  these 
rights from the 1980s onwards.  
I show how the Committee interpreted Article 2.1 of the Covenant, by building on the understanding 
from the travaux preparatoires of the concept of 'maximum available resources' as a limitation clause on 
ESCR, but attempting to set a ‘minimum core’ or a floor below which expenditures and the realisation 
of the rights should never fall even in times of crisis.  Although this interpretation sought to challenge 
the imposition of structural adjustment and austerity, this was a very different approach to the earlier 
exhortation for Keynesian fiscal policy to spend more, not less, in times of economic crisis.   
I also show how with the development of  its tripartite 'respect, protect, fulfil' framework of  obligations, 
the Committee sought to challenge the classical liberal dichotomy of  'negative' versus 'positive' rights.  
This broke down the dichotomy by emphasising that both CPR and ESCR involved cost-free, negative 
obligations to refrain from intervention, as well as costly positive obligations to take action.  It also 
reiterated the regulatory role of  the state, challenging the model of  the 'minimal state'.  Although this 
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challenged the priority accorded to traditional civil and political rights as rights, over economic and social 
rights as merely expensive ‘aspirational goals’, this did not touch on the issues that had animated the 
earlier institutionalists on the role of  the state in the economy (including markets are structured by the 
state enforcing particular kinds of  rights and obligations, including the rights of  property and freedom 
from contract) and did not explicitly challenge the shifting in the 'working rules’ of  the economic game, 
even as liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation worked to 'disembed' the market from the ‘web’ of  
constraints institutionalised during the post-war era of  ‘embedded liberalism’.   
I argue then that although these rights re-emerged in the context of  a challenge to the re-emergence of  
a modern form of  ‘laissez faire’ liberalism, the elaboration of  economic and social rights in this era were 
attenuated and circumscribed by the much more constraining environment of  economic thought in the 
1980s in the discursive context of  ‘neoliberalism’.  With the loss of  confidence in Keynesianism, the shift 
away from 'embedded liberalism' and the insistence on TINA ('there is no alternative'), along with the 
lack of  a strong alternative economic paradigm, the Committee had little powerful economic theory to 
draw from in shaping its interpretation and elaboration of  the rights.  There is evidence of  some influence 
of  one of  the dominant heterodox economists of  the time, Amartya Sen, who critiqued the assumptions 
of  neoclassical economic theory, promoting a positive conception of  freedom and ‘capabilities’ and 
replacing the focus on economic growth with a focus on human development.  However, Sen's work was 
less 'progressive' than the institutional economists of  the first 'law and economics movement' and less 
prescriptive than the Keynesians, offering fewer intellectual resources for challenging economic 
(neo)liberalism.  Many of  the earlier theoretical insights of  the 1930s that shaped ESCR during the Great 
Depression have thus been lost in ways that have circumscribed the definition of  these rights in the 
normative elaboration by the Committee on ESCR.   
Moving on to examine the context of  our more recent 2008 economic crisis, I suggest that the immediate 
aftermath of  deepest crisis since the Great Depression generated a massive, globally coordinated 
Keynesian fiscal response at the policy level amongst governments, and a questioning of  the neoclassical 
economic model amongst economists.  However questioning rapidly receded and was replaced by a 
deepening entrenchment of  economic neoliberalism and attempts among a number of  states to 'freeze' 
orthodox economic policy prescriptions into law.  Indeed, the contemporary trend towards what has been 
called the ‘constitutionalisation of  austerity’ marks the culmination of  a full reversal from earlier (New 
Deal) efforts to constitutionalise the anti-austerity policies of  economic Keynesianism (as in the draft 
1945 Full Employment Bill).    
While the Committee has responded by reiterating its position on the importance of  protecting ESCR in 
times of  crisis against economic prescriptions of  austerity, and has set out new tests for retrogression 
and for policy changes, as well as proposing a ‘human rights impact assessment’ in advance of  loans from 
the international financial institutions (such as the IMF and the World Bank), its interpretive framework 
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has had little analytical purchase in confronting the crisis and in counterbalancing the deepening 
retrogression in ESCR.  I therefore suggest that recovering the insights of  the era of  the Great 
Depression – and drawing on their more modern equivalents – may be useful, otherwise human rights 
risk being, as Moyn has posited, a 'powerless companion'672 to the further entrenchment of  modern 
neoliberal form of  ‘laissez faire constitutionalism’. This section then ends by signalling a further future 
risk that, without a deeper engagement with economics and macroeconomic policy, the Committee, like 
the human rights world more generally, also risks missing the need to develop concepts to address the 
new shift towards the extra-ordinary monetary policy of  'quantitative easing', and its distributional effects, 
which have accelerated already extreme levels of  inequality since the Great Recession.   
 
4.1 Establishing the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Although at the time of  adoption of  the Covenants in 1966, the UN General Assembly insisted that the 
rights of  the ICESCR and the ICCPR were interdependent and indivisible, the two Covenants included 
significantly different provisions on their monitoring mechanisms,673 and the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was not established until 11 years later in 1987.   
While the ICCPR mandated a body for monitoring the treaty, the Human Rights Committee (to be made 
up of  independent experts and charged with examining state reports and complaints) the ICESCR 
instead required States to submit reports to the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) ‘on the 
measures they have adopted and the progress made in achieving the observance of  the rights’ and 
indicating ‘factors and difficulties affecting the degree of  fulfillment of  obligations’. 674  The reason 
posited for these two approaches was the perceived differences in the nature and scope of  ESCR in 
contrast to CPR675 which emerged in disagreements over the ‘means of  implementation’ for the different 
sets of  rights during the drafting process. While there had been proposals for a Committee for the 
ICESCR (e.g. Lebanese representative made a detailed proposal for a ‘Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights’ in 1951(to be comprised of  fifteen members with ‘recognized experience’ in the field 
and nominated States Parties) this was rejected.676  Much later, at the very end of  the drafting process in 
1966, the representative of  Italy also made a proposal for an ‘ad hoc Committee of  Experts’ and the US 
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even presented a proposal for an independent Committee, but no agreement was reached except for the 
compromise text included in the Covenant.677 
The debate over the nature of  the rights and the perceived need for different supervision mechanisms 
also animated the (largely US-led) push for dividing the Covenants into two separate Covenants, and the 
drafting of  the ICESCR’s Article 2.1 (an article that became an increasingly urgent strategy of  the US to 
avoid legally-binding obligations, as I have argued above).  In 1952, James Simsarian, then the legal adviser 
to the US delegation, suggested that: 
4) [The] Complaint procedure…. is expected to be applicable to the civil and political rights but not to 
economic, social and cultural rights because of  the obligations with respect to these rights cannot be as 
precisely defined as in the case of  civil and political rights.’678 
 
This American view prevailed, and with a change of  heart in the General Assembly, the Covenant was 
split into two different Covenants, solidifying the different ‘nature’ of  the rights and their differing 
monitoring provisions.  This then left the ICESCR without a dedicated ‘treaty body’ to monitor its 
implementation.   
Several attempts were made to establish an independent committee between 1954 and 1985, but all were 
unsuccessful.679 Once the ICESCR entered into force, progress in meeting its provisions was therefore 
monitored by ECOSOC under a series of  sessional working groups.  However, this process turned out 
to be so ‘patently inadequate’, that in 1985, ECOSOC itself  decided to establish a new monitoring body 
- a Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) to be composed of  18 experts, 
paralleling the ICCPR Human Rights Committee.680 Thus, unlike the other human rights ‘treaty bodies’ 
established by their treaties (or additional protocols), the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights was created post facto by ECOSOC resolution.681  Nonetheless, most commentators agree ‘that the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights now operates in practice (and is treated by States) 
in much the same way as the other bodies that supervise compliance with the global human rights 
treaties’682 and this has been confirmed by the GA resolution on the strengthening of  the treaty body 
system.683  Although there remain complaints about the ESCR Committee’s perceived weaknesses 
(especially from governments),684 it has now become the authoritative monitoring body of  State reports 
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under the ICESCR (and more recently also receiving individual complaints under the 2008 Optional 
Protocol), and has played a critical role in the elaboration, interpretation and formalization of  the 
meaning and content of  ESCR rights.    
The Committee’s jurisprudence has been developed through its ‘Concluding Observations’ on States 
parties reports,685 but more analytically through its ‘General Comments’ which, following the example of  
the Human Rights Committee, have served as ‘a means of  laying down some solid foundations for the 
future development of  its jurisprudence.’686  It issued a number of  General Comments from 1989 
onwards on procedural and substantive aspects of  the Covenant, to define the normative content of  
many of  the specific rights.  Since 1991, the Committee has also published public Statements and Open 
letters on issues of  particular concern or as contributions to international conferences that have further 
served to interpret the rights.  In addition, it explored a number of  issues in depth through holding a Day 
of  General Discussion on a specific topic during each of  its sessions687.  Before looking below at the 
interpretations of  the Committee and the evolution of  economic and social rights, I set these 
developments in the economic context of  the time, for the light that this throws on the Committee’s 
work, showing how 1987 became a watershed year for ESCR. 
 
4.2 Economic crisis and structural adjustment - challenging (neo)liberal orthodoxy? 
The new Committee – which held its first meeting in 1987 – was established against the backdrop of  the 
height of  the eras of  the Reagan and Thatcher governments, the end of  the Cold War, as well as the rise 
of  the ‘Washington consensus’ and a resurgence of  economic belief  in the superiority of  free markets 
over government intervention in the economy in neoclassical economics and what came to be called 
‘neoliberalism’688. 
In 1987 US President Ronald Reagan had announced his own ‘economic bill of  rights’ (as detailed above) 
and UK prime minister, Margaret Thatcher announced ‘there was no such thing as society, only 
individuals’.689  Under the slogan that ‘There Is No Alternative’ (TINA) and ‘government is the problem, 
not the solution’, new economic policies highlighted the need for liberalization, deregulation and 
privatization in favour of  a ‘minimal state’ that refrained from intervention in the economy (or at least 
the kind of  intervention that protected people against the vicissitudes of  the market).  Social policies 
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came increasingly under pressure and Keynesian full employment fiscal policies were abandoned in favour 
of  a monetary policy designed to quell inflation, regardless of  the consequences for employment.  This 
political and economic project, which as Harvey colourfully describes, constituted the rise of  
‘neoliberalism’, was a project that effectively aimed to disembed markets from the ‘web of  social and 
political [institutional] constraints’ that it had been made subject to in the era of  ‘embedded liberalism’, 
a web that served to restrain the ‘economic power of  the upper classes’ to accord labour ‘a much larger 
share of  the pie’.690 Although as Harvey also notes, this theory’s ‘distrust of  state power sits oddly with 
the need for a strong and coercive state necessary to defend the rights of  private property, individual 
liberties and entrepreneurial freedoms.’691 
In a different form, but with similar substance, these policies were also promoted through the IMF and 
the World Bank under structural adjustment programme in a package labelled as the ‘Washington 
Consensus’.692 Williamson’s distillation of  the ten main policy prescriptions of  this new economic 
consensus put a high priority on ‘fiscal policy discipline’ as well as the liberalisation and deregulation, 
while concomitantly strengthening the legal framework for private property rights:  
‘1. Fiscal policy discipline, with avoidance of  large fiscal deficits relative to GDP; 
2. Redirection of  public spending from subsidies (‘especially indiscriminate subsidies’) toward broad-
based provision of  key pro-growth, pro-poor services like primary education, primary health care 
and infrastructure investment; [earlier versions focused more on the reduction of  public expenditure 
in toto] 
3. Tax reform, broadening the tax base and adopting moderate marginal tax rates; 
4. Interest rates that are market determined and positive (but moderate) in real terms; 
5. Competitive exchange rates; 
6. Trade liberalization: liberalization of  imports, with particular emphasis on elimination of  quantitative 
restrictions (licensing, etc.); any trade protection to be provided by low and relatively uniform tariffs;  
7. Liberalization of  inward foreign direct investment; 
8. Privatization of  state enterprises; 
9. Deregulation: abolition of  regulations that impede market entry or restrict competition, except for 
those justified on safety, environmental and consumer protection grounds, and prudential oversight 
of  financial institutions; 
10. Legal security for property rights.’693 
 
Through the imposition of  loan conditionality by the international financial institutions, in the aftermath 
of  the ‘Third World debt crisis’ of  the 1980s, these contractionary, ‘structural adjustment’ policies were 
implemented aggressively and often rapidly through ‘shock therapy’, first in Latin America and then in 
Sub-Saharan Africa - and, following the collapse of  the Soviet Bloc, also in Eastern Europe.  The debt 
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crisis impelled the insistence that government expenditure was excessive – and that it was ‘crowding out’ 
the private sector.  As Ellis suggests ‘Bank economists assumed that in the void left by collapsed state-
run economies, free market economies would flourish.  This erroneous thinking resulted in inconsistent 
successes and often tragic failures.’694  He suggests:  
‘The World Bank’s neoliberal agenda manifested itself  in the 1980s in ‘shock therapy’-style structural 
adjustment policies (SAPs).  By the early 1990s, these had become ‘cornerstones’ of  the Washington 
Consensus.  Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) – given on condition that borrowing countries liberalise 
their economies – became a key way to encourage reform.  Shock therapy, in essence the immediate and 
simultaneous implementation of  a large number of  reforms, entailed a rapid ‘shift of  economic decision 
making to the private sector’, while government intervention in the national economy was severely 
curtailed.’695 
 
Yet critics - including economists – were growing wary of  the negative impacts, he continues: 
‘..many economists contend[ed] that such policies have only increased poverty in poorer countries through 
‘depressed employment and real incomes as well as severe cuts in social expenditures.’  While Bank SAPs 
may increase world income as a whole, they simultaneously perpetuate income disparities, driving the poor 
deeper into poverty.’696 
 
The evidence of  harsh effects of  ‘shock-therapy’-style structural adjustment policies generated louder 
and louder critiques throughout the 1980s and 1990s, particularly with respect to the impacts on the 
poorest and most marginalized communities.   
It was in 1987 (the same year as the first Committee meeting), that UNICEF (the UN’s agency for 
children) issued its influential study in two volumes called for ‘Adjustment with a Human Face: Protecting the 
Vulnerable and Promoting Growth’, roundly criticizing the IMF and World Bank structural adjustment 
programmes for their neglect of  the social and human dimension of  development and for placing a 
disproportionate burden on the poorest.697  According to Danilo Turk, this suggested that:  
‘the call for a more people-sensitive approach to adjustment is more than a matter of  economic good sense 
or political expediency. Ultimately it rests on the ethic of  human solidarity, of  concern for others, of  human 
response to human suffering’.698   
 
Although later criticized as being too ‘modest’ in its ambition and potentially foreclosing more radical 
critiques,699 the UNICEF report was considered important in its time for its direct and explicit criticism 
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of  the dogma of  structural adjustment being promoted by the international financial institutions, with 
human rights scholar and Special Rapporteur, Danilo Turk, describing the report as ‘monumental’ and 
‘impressive’.700  It certainly had catalytic effects in shifting (at least rhetorically) the position of  the World 
Bank.   
By 1990, the World Bank responded with its World Development Report 1990 which chose poverty as its 
theme, and for the first time, acknowledged the need for structural economic reforms to be accompanied 
by social policies.  The report stated unembarrassedly that little attention had been paid to the impacts 
on the poor of  structural adjustment, but it promised it had changed: 
‘... when structural adjustment issues came to the fore, little attention was paid to the effects on the poor. 
Macroeconomic issues seemed more pressing, and many expected that there would be a rapid transition to 
new growth paths. As the decade [1980s] continued, it became clear that macroeconomic recovery and 
structural change were slow in coming. Evidence of  declines in incomes and cutbacks in social services 
began to mount. Many observers called attention to the situation, but it was UNICEF that first brought the 
issue into the centre of  the debate on the design and effects of  adjustment. By the end of  the decade the 
issue had become important for all agencies, and it is now reviewed in all adjustment programmes financed 
by the World Bank’.701 
 
UNICEF was not convinced that the World Bank had changed however, reverting in 1992 with a report 
that stated that the Bank was still focused on reducing the role of  the state in protecting people from the 
negative impacts of  free markets: 
‘Maximum investment in people and minimum intervention in markets is [now] the nub of  the Bank's 
current advice... [but] the Bank is not even-handed in its scrutiny of  these two aspects of  development 
policy. Its implication continues to be that markets can do little wrong and that all economic growth is 
necessarily to the good... Government intervention in the economy, on the other hand, is always regarded 
as guilty until proven innocent.’702  
 
Meanwhile, in 1990 UNDP had also published its first Human Development Report, promoting the idea of  
‘human development’ to replace economic growth as the primary concept and goal of  development.  
Drawing on the work of  Amartya Sen amongst others, the concept of  ‘human development’ challenged 
the focus on economic growth as an end in itself.703  It sought to ‘humanize’ development, bringing the 
focus back to people and expanding people’s ‘capabilities’ as the end of  development, drawing on Sen’s 
‘capability’ approach (discussed further below).704  Through the development of  its ‘Human 
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Development Index’, UNDP further challenged the narrow measure of  poverty as income poverty with 
a new measure of  the multidimensional forms of  poverty.705 
These critiques denounced the singular focus of  economic policy on aggregate economic growth and 
called for a broader conception of  social and economic progress grounded in the concept of  ‘human 
development’, with more attention to the impacts of  SAPs on the poorest and most marginalized.  Hulme 
suggested that this gave scholars and activists ‘a relatively coherent framework from which to argue for 
policy change’ although he presciently noted that ‘it gave them limited guidance for challenging 
macroeconomic policy orthodoxy.’706  In other words, the concept of  ‘human development’ provided a 
vision of  the outcomes to be achieved, broadening the narrow vision of  economic growth, but it did not 
provide a blueprint or prescriptive policies for how to get there.  Sen’s economic theory provided a vision 
for what outcomes should be achieved, but was not very clear on its prescriptions for policy - it did not 
in the end provide a paradigm shift to supplant the dominance of  the neoclassical approach (as discussed 
further below). 
The Committee and ESCR as a ‘last ditch defence for the most vulnerable’  
The Committee thus emerged in 1987 at the height of  controversy over what Turk called the ‘‘deadly 
shift of  the 1980s towards structural adjustment’707 with the increasingly loud calls for the need to 
‘humanise adjustment’.708   As the Committee started its work to elaborate in more detail the nature and 
content of  these rights, it focused on the need to ‘humanise’ economic policy and to put limits on the 
suffering of  people from the negative impacts of  ‘aggressive market forces’ – particularly in times of  
adjustment, austerity and economic crisis.  Indeed, as one of  the Committee members, Bruno Simma 
vividly articulated early on:    
‘The Covenant had sometimes been described as a ‘good weather instrument’ …[but] That attitude was 
based on false reasoning: just as conditions of  political unrest constituted the decisive test for the relevance 
of  the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, so, in times of  economic crisis, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights should assume its most important function – that of  a 
last-ditch defence for the most vulnerable.’709 
 
It was in this context that the Committee started to define and elaborate the provisions of  the ICESCR.  
The Committee’s work built on the 1987 Limburg Principles (a set of  principles and definitions for the 
Committee agreed previously by a group of  academics and activists, many of  whom were later to have 
an influential impact on the Committee) as well as Asbjorn Eide’s 1987 influential report on the right to 
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food, which both set the groundwork for much of  the later conceptual underpinning and evolution of  
the rights.   
The Committee’s concern with the harsh impacts of  the impact of  structural adjustment as well as the 
transition to free markets in many socialist economies can be traced throughout its early work – and this 
is one of  the most dominant themes evident in its elaboration and interpretation in its General 
Comments, as well as in the recommendations of  its Statements and its Concluding Observations, and 
the records of  its debates in its ‘Days of  General Discussions’.710  As Turk recorded at the time: ‘The 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has become increasingly concerned 
about the role of  structural adjustment in many of  the [then] 97 States parties to the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and consequently the ability of  States parties to fulfil their 
obligations under the Covenant.’711   
The Committee focused particular attention on the role of  international organizations, and the urgent 
need to protect basic rights in contexts of  structural adjustment and austerity.  In its second General 
Comment adopted in 1990, the Committee highlighted its concern about ‘the adverse impact of  the debt 
burden and of  the relevant adjustment measures’ on ESCR in many countries, recognising that 
adjustment programmes might have to involve some austerity, but calling for an alternative approach, 
such as ‘adjustment with a human face’, and insisting that ‘protecting the rights of  the poor and the 
vulnerable’ must be a ‘basic objective of  economic adjustment’712  Its third General Comment, also 
adopted in 1990, the Committee again directly refers to ‘adjustment with a human face’ and reiterates the 
need to protect the most vulnerable even in times of  economic crisis (although it seems to propose a 
shift away from universal social protection towards a narrower policy of  targeting the poorest): 
‘12.  Similarly, the Committee underlines the fact that even in times of  severe resources constraints whether 
caused by a process of  adjustment, of  economic recession, or by other factors the vulnerable members of  
society can and indeed must be protected by the adoption of  relatively low‑cost targeted programmes.  In 
support of  this approach the Committee takes note of  the analysis prepared by UNICEF entitled 
‘Adjustment with a human face: protecting the vulnerable and promoting growth, the analysis by UNDP in 
its Human Development Report 1990 and the analysis by the World Bank in the World Development Report 1990.’ 
 
The Committee was not concerned only with structural adjustment in developing countries, but with the 
shift to market economies in the developed world as well.  As Turk had pointed out, ‘the economic 
policies of  many industrialized States, while perhaps rarely called ‘adjustment’, in fact resemble standard 
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policies of  adjustment advocated by the IMF and World Bank.  Cuts in public expenditure for most social 
services were common features of  the economic landscape of  the 1980s in developed States as well.’713   
Wary of  the recent Cold War divisions, the Committee sought to present its work as neutral with respect 
to the economic system in place – and as relevant to both market and non-market economies alike.  As 
one member of  the Committee suggested that ‘questions of  a general nature on the wider aspects of  the 
political or economic system of  a country were not their concern except in so far as they affected the 
enjoyment of  the rights embodied in the Covenant’714  The Committee was careful to make the case that 
the realization of  rights does not necessarily require any specific kind of  economic system: 
‘….in terms of  political and economic systems the Covenant is neutral and its principles cannot accurately 
be described as being predicated exclusively upon the need for, or the desirability of  a socialist or a capitalist 
system, or a mixed, centrally planned, or laissez faire economy, or upon any other particular approach. In 
this regard, the Committee reaffirms that the rights recognized in the Covenant are susceptible of  realization 
within the context of  a wide variety of  economic and political systems, provided only that the 
interdependence and indivisibility of  the two sets of  human rights, as affirmed inter alia in the preamble to 
the Covenant, is recognized and reflected in the system in question.’715 
 
However, in the context of  widespread evidence of  the costs of  structural adjustment and austerity 
measures, the Committee directly highlighted how the withdrawal of  the state from social protections 
and the shift to ‘free-market’ economic policies were disproportionately affecting vulnerable groups.  
Frustrated with receiving regular reports from States listing aggregate statistics, apparently based on 
assumptions that simply generating aggregate economic growth would solve the issue of  economic, social 
and cultural rights for all, including for the most marginalized groups, the Committee called on States (in 
its very first General Comment, adopted in 1989) to provide the Committee not only with ‘aggregate 
national statistics or estimates’, but with a diagnosis and information on the situation of  the ‘worse-off  
regions or areas’ and the ‘specific groups or subgroups which appear to be particularly vulnerable or 
disadvantaged’.716  Alston recorded that seeking more ‘disaggregated’ information, would help the 
Committee to focus on what he defined as its ‘proper, primary concern i.e. the extent to which the most 
disadvantaged individuals in any given society are enjoying a basic minimum level of  subsistence rights.’717 
The Committee’s General Comment 5, on persons with disabilities, also directly addressed the shift 
towards ‘market-based policies’ and the negative impacts of  the results of  ‘market forces’ and economic 
developments over the past decade, which had been ‘especially unfavourable from the perspective of  
person with disabilities’, emphasising the duty of  states to regulate markets and to temper market forces: 
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11. Given the increasing commitment of  Governments around the world to market-based policies, it is 
appropriate in that context to emphasise certain aspects of  States parties’ obligations…. [including] 
regulation to ensure the equitable treatment of  persons with disabilities. … 
12.  In the absence of  government intervention there will always be instances in which the operation of  the 
free market will produce unsatisfactory results for persons with disabilities, either individually or as a group, 
and in such circumstances, it is incumbent on Governments to step in and take appropriate measures to 
temper, complement, compensate for, or override the results produced by market forces.’718 
 
These themes are also reiterated in most of  the Committee’s public ‘Statements’.  In the Statement to the 
1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights for example, the Committee highlighted again that 
‘free markets’ were self-evidently incapable of  protecting the most disadvantaged:  
‘The increasing emphasis being placed on free market policies brings with it a far greater need to ensure that 
appropriate measures are taken to safeguard and promote economic, social and cultural rights.  Even the 
most ardent supporters of  the free market have generally acknowledged that it is incapable, of  its own 
accord, of  protecting many of  the most vulnerable and disadvantaged members of  society.’719   
 
The Committee again repeated the need for the protection of  economic and social rights in times of  
crisis - and even if  older economic policy prescriptions (such as Keynesianism) were now considered 
‘obsolete’ or ‘invalid’, there was still a need to ensure the values social justice shaped policy-making: 
‘5. Factors such as the reduced role being played by the State in a great many societies, an increasing emphasis 
on policies of  deregulation and privatization, a markedly greater reliance on free market mechanisms, and 
the globalization of  an ever larger part of  all national economies, have all combined to challenge many of  
the assumptions on which social policy-makers have previously operated. Indeed, it is increasingly clear that, 
as a result of  these changes, many of  the specific policy approaches endorsed by the international 
community in the past 30 years or so have been called into question and in some cases even rendered 
obsolete or invalid. But it is precisely at a time of  such rapid and unpredictable change in a truly global 
economy that it is essential to reaffirm the fundamental values of  social justice which must guide policy-
making at all levels.’720 
 
It was in this context of  responding to economic crisis, austerity, structural adjustment and the return to 
orthodox prescriptions for free markets - and the insistence that there was no alternative (TINA) -  that 
the Committee developed its interpretations of  the nature and scope of  ESCR, including elaborating 
Article 2.1 of  the Covenant, its concepts of  ‘minimum core’, the obligations to ‘respect, protect and fulfil’ 
and the ‘AAAQ’ (accessibility, availability, acceptability, quality) as described below. 
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4.2.1 Nature and scope of  ESCR - Article 2.1 and the ‘minimum core’ 
The Committee’s early General Comments focused first on establishing ESCR as human rights with 
concrete obligations (as opposed to aspirational goals), suggesting that despite being subject to 
‘progressive realisation’ and the ‘availability of  resources’, ESCR included some immediate obligations 
that would not be costly and could be rapidly implemented.  In the context of  economic crises, structural 
adjustment, and austerity of  the time with the rolling back of  government expenditures, the Committee 
also sought to establish what it called a ‘minimum core’ - an inviolable minimum standard for all rights, 
irrespective of  the economic system in place, and irrespective of  a country’s resources or the level of  
development.  In the Committee’s interpretation of  Article 2.1, it takes resource limitations for granted, 
but through the ‘minimum core’ tried to set a floor below which ESCR cannot fall, trying to prevent all-
out retrogression in times of  austerity and economic crisis.   
The Committee’s General Comment No. 3 on the Nature of  States’ Parties Obligations (Article 2.1 of  the 
Covenant), interpreted Article 2.1 of  the ICESCR, recognising the differences between article 2 of  the 
ICESCR and its mirror article 2 in the ICCPR.  It recognised that Art 2.1 makes ICESCR subject to 
‘progressive realisation’ and ‘acknowledges the constraints due to the limits of  available resources,’721 
taking for granted the understanding of  this phrase as a resource limitations clause, but asserts that this 
should nonetheless not be ‘misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of  all meaningful content’ and 
shows that the ICESCR nonetheless still entails some immediate obligations.722 
As Alston recorded, General Comment No. 3 on Article 2.1 of  the Covenant aimed to show that 
‘contrary to those who argue that the Covenant is wholly aspirational’, and despite the requirement of  
‘progressive realization, the Covenant did in fact impose ‘various obligations of  immediate effect’. 723    
These immediate obligations included the non-discrimination provisions, as well as the obligation to ‘take 
steps’ to implement the Covenant.  And ‘most importantly of  all’, he noted citing General Comment No. 
3 the Committee had established that ‘a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the 
very least, minimum essential levels of  each of  the rights is incumbent upon every State Party.’724  Without 
such an approach, Alston noted, the very raison d’etre of  the Covenant would be undermined, as already 
set out in the 1987 Limburg Principles 25 which unequivocally stated that:  ‘States Parties are obligated, 
regardless of  the level of  economic development, to ensure respect for minimum subsistence rights for 
all.’725  While the concept of  ‘progressive realisation’ provided a ‘necessary flexibility device’ ‘to reflect 
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the realities of  the real world’, this nonetheless imposed ‘an obligation to move as expeditiously and 
effectively as possible’ towards the realization of  the rights, and required avoiding deliberately 
retrogressive measures.726   
Thus the Committee established that a baseline of  a ‘minimum core content’ of  the right must be met 
for all people in all States, that should be protected even in times of  economic recession or crisis: 
‘……the Committee is of  the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very 
least, minimum essential levels of  each of  the rights is incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for example, 
a State party in which any significant number of  individuals is deprived of  essential foodstuffs, of  essential 
primary health care, of  basic shelter and housing, or of  the most basic forms of  education is, prima facie, 
failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant. If  the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not 
to establish such a minimum core obligation, it would be largely deprived of  its raison d’être. By the same 
token, it must be noted that any assessment as to whether a State has discharged its minimum core obligation 
must also take account of  resource constraints applying within the country concerned. Article 2 (1) obligates 
each State party to take the necessary steps ‘to the maximum of  its available resources’. In order for a State 
party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a lack of  available 
resources it must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition 
in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of  priority, those minimum obligations. 
…. Similarly, the Committee underlines the fact that even in times of  severe resources constraints whether 
caused by a process of  adjustment, of  economic recession, or by other factors the vulnerable members of  
society can and indeed must be protected by the adoption of  relatively low cost targeted programmes. In 
support of  this approach the Committee takes note of  the analysis prepared by UNICEF entitled 
‘Adjustment with a human face: protecting the vulnerable and promoting growth, the analysis by UNDP in 
its Human Development Report 1990 and the analysis by the World Bank in the World Development Report 
1990.’727 
 
Although this interpretation starts with a view that the ‘minimum core’ should be met, irrespective of  
resources, in the context of  the serious issues faced by developing countries, it concedes that the level of  
resources will have to be taken into account but puts the burden of  proof  on the State for demonstrating 
that the minimum core has been treated as a matter of  priority.  It suggests that, even in times of  
adjustment and crisis, resources can and should be directed at least to ‘low cost targeted programmes’, 
pointing to the analysis and economic evidence that this should be possible in the reports of  UNICEF, 
UNDP and the World Bank (discussed above).  Governments cannot attribute their failure to a lack of  
available resources unless they can ‘demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all the resources 
that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of  priority, those minimum obligations.’728 
Even if  resources are ‘demonstrably inadequate’, this did not relieve States of  the obligation to at least 
take steps to devise strategies and programmes for their promotion.729 
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The Committee’s approach to Article 2.1 thus took resource limitations for granted, following the way in 
which it was understood during the drafting process of  the Covenant (as we saw earlier), but tried to 
establish some immediate obligations that are less dependent on resource constraints, including 1) the 
obligation to take deliberate and concrete steps towards making progress, 2) the concomitant obligation 
to avoid any deliberate retrogression730 and 3) to protect the ‘minimum core’ as far as possible and as a 
matter of  priority731 - calling on the international community also to assist when possible through 
international assistance or debt relief. 
Oddly however, the Committee never precisely defined ‘the phrase ‘to the maximum of  its available 
resources’ in any detail, except to suggest that ‘available resources’ was intended by the drafters of  the 
Covenant to refer to both the resources existing within a State and those available from the international 
community through international cooperation and assistance.’732  The Committee thus avoided addressing 
issues not only of  government expenditure, but also of  how resources are generated in the first place, as 
well as grappling with the extent to which the availability and use of  resources is intimately bound up 
with the type of  economic policies selected by governments.733 
Even in its 2007 Statement on ‘An evaluation of the obligation to take steps to the ‘maximum available 
resources’ under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant’734 (which further defined Article 2.1 in relation 
to how the Committee would address on receipt of an individual complaint under the Optional 
Protocol735) the Statement largely repeats the provisions of General Comment No. 3.  It again interprets 
the ‘availability of resources’ as a limitation clause, although it repeats that this cannot be used by States 
to justify inaction, and even in times of severe resource constraints, States have a duty at a minimum to 
protect the most marginalised by adopting low-cost targeted programmes.   The Statement does put the 
burden of proof on the State to show, in the context of failures to take any steps or the adoption of 
retrogressive steps, that ‘full use was made of available resources’736 and suggests that if states use 
‘resource constraints’ to explain retrogression, the Committee would consider the information on a 
country-by-country basis taking into account a list of criteria.  These criteria include the country’s level 
of development, the severity of the breach, the economic situation (whether the country was in recession), 
other claims on limited resources, whether the state had sought low-cost options, and whether the state 
                                                           
730 For a detailed review on the evolution of the concept of retrogression, see Nolan, Lusiani, and Courtis 2016. 
731 For a more detailed examination of the ‘minimum core’ concept, see Young 2008; MacNaughton 2013; 
Bilchitz 2002. 
732 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 3’ para 13. 
733 For a clear explanation of this point, see Balakrishnan and Elson 2008b. 
734 UN Doc E/C.12/2007/1, CESCR Statement on ‘An evaluation of the obligation to take steps to the 
‘maximum available resources’ under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant’, 10 May 2007. 
735 For more information on the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR adopted in 2008, see e.g. Courtis 2012. 
736 CESCR Statement on ‘maximum available resources’, 2007, para 9. 
164 
had sought cooperation or rejected resources from the international community (as set out in its 
paragraph 10).   
However, the Committee again did not explore what ‘the maximum of its available resources’ means, 
apart from reiterating that this refers to resources within the State as well as those available from the 
international community.  The Statement does not explore what constitutes ‘available resources’,737 nor 
considers questions that would be relevant with regards to how resources are made ‘available’ (i.e. how 
resources are generated, including for example through taxes, which also raises questions around the 
progressiveness of the tax structure738).  Nor does it explore what the ‘maximum use’ of such resources 
would mean – so it does not begin to consider the issue of Keynesian-style deficit spending in times of 
economic crisis, nor other fiscal policy issues.  It also does not analytically reflect on the extent to which 
‘retrogression’ or reductions in government spending are, by definition, constitutive of structural 
adjustment and the shift to ‘free-market’ economies - except to try to put a limit on retrogression in 
public expenditures for at least a ‘minimum core’ or floor for social protection measures related to ESCR.   
Nolan et al record that, in none of its country reviews of countries in economic crises across the 1990s, 
has the Committee ever deemed structural adjustment policies or public expenditure cuts to be in 
contravention of the Covenant, confining itself rather to expressing its ‘general concern’.  They suggest 
this reticence is ‘consistent with the Committee’s historic, broader reluctance to link budgetary or 
economic policy decisions and their impacts with specific ESR obligations’.739  It may also be consistent 
with the lack of economic policy expertise amongst the Committee members.740  I would argue further 
however, that this was not only due to a lack of understanding or engagement with economic policy 
thinking, or the complexities of judging a particular case, but also the result of few strong alternative 
economic prescriptions to draw from.  As the rights were elaborated in the discursive context of 
neoliberalism and its insistence of ‘TINA’ (‘there is no alternative’741) and the abandonment of 
Keynesianism (as well as other heterodox theories of economics), the Committee had few alternative 
economic theories to draw from to help defend its alternative view.  All the Committee could rely on was 
the alternative analyses of government spending and prescriptions proposed in the main alternative 
available:  UNICEF’s ‘Adjustment with a Human Face’ and UNDP’s ‘Human Development’ reports.  
This is suggested by the frequent references to those frameworks in the Committee’s General Comments, 
as the dominant alternative economic frameworks of the time.      
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In 1990, the Committee held its annual ‘Day of  Discussion’ on the right to housing, including discussing 
Danilo Turk’s final report on ESCR.742  In the discussion, Turk referred to the UNICEF ‘Adjustment with 
a Human Face’ study in terms of  its ‘important conclusion’ that ‘Governments can greatly improve basic 
social services even at times of  great financial stringency by restructuring government expenditures’.  He 
linked this explicitly this to the ‘minimum core’, as the UNICEF study ‘concurred with the opinion of  
some international law experts that the duty of  States progressively to achieve the full realization of  
economic, social and cultural rights existed independently of  an increase in resources.’743  During another 
substantive Day of  Discussion, held in 1993 on the right to health and ‘on the principle of  non-
discrimination and the minimum core content that constituted a floor below which conditions should 
not be permitted to fall in any State party’ (para 1), the report recorded the discussion that: 
 ‘Economic, social and cultural rights had been called into question by the trend towards free market 
economics and the pressures to trim social budgets and to permit economic factors to become dominant. 
The human rights community now had a duty to show why certain economic, social and cultural rights 
should be considered immune from economic pressures and to respond to critics who maintained that the 
right to health was valid only in so far as it contributed to economic progress.’744 
 
In its 1994 annual Day of  General Discussion on  ‘The role of  social safety nets as a means of  protecting 
economic, social and cultural rights, with particular reference to situations involving major structural 
adjustment and/or transition to a free market economies’745, the meeting record captured that ‘[t]he 
question posed was whether major structural changes in a country could be used as an excuse for the 
non-fulfilment of  the obligations contained in the Covenant and whether there should not be some kind 
of  minimum standard of  social protection, a social safety net ( below which a State could not fall’746.’  As 
recorded by Wills, this day of  discussion included a ‘sharply polarised’ debate between the Committee, 
representatives of  intergovernmental institutions (notably the IMF) and participants from a number of  
non-governmental organisations.747  While non-governmental organisations argued that the structural 
adjustment model was incompatible with the realisation of  economic, social and cultural rights given its 
primary focus on economic growth, the representative from the IMF defended structural adjustment, 
arguing that it was necessary to generate economic growth necessary for the realisation of  ESCR.  He 
accepted that structural adjustment could have ‘severe consequences’ in the short term, but argued that 
the reforms would be beneficial in the long run.  He conceded that it might be important to have social 
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safety nets to mitigate the negative impacts in the immediate term, but these should be ‘temporary’ – and 
he insisted that there was really no alternative.748 
The Committee was drawing from the only apparent alternative – the existing (economic) critiques of  
structural adjustment in the reports of  UNICEF and UNDP.  As the Committee’s General Comment 
No. 2 on International assistance measures (Article 22 of  the Covenant) also reiterated, like its General Comment 
No. 3, that in times of  economic crisis protecting ESCR would become more not less urgent, and even 
if  economic austerity was unavoidable, protections should be built into structural adjustment 
programmes, as by UNICEF’s ‘adjustment with a human face’ had illustrated was possible: 
‘9.  …The Committee recognizes that adjustment programmes will often be unavoidable and that these will 
frequently involve a major element of  austerity. Under such circumstances, however, endeavours to protect 
the most basic economic, social and cultural rights become more, rather than less, urgent. States parties to 
the Covenant, as well as the relevant United Nations agencies, should thus make a particular effort to ensure 
that such protection is, to the maximum extent possible, built‑in to programmes and policies designed to 
promote adjustment. Such an approach, which is sometimes referred to as ‘adjustment with a human face’ 
or as promoting ‘the human dimension of  development’ requires that the goal of  protecting the rights of  
the poor and vulnerable should become a basic objective of  economic adjustment. Similarly, international 
measures to deal with the debt crisis should take full account of  the need to protect economic, social and 
cultural rights through, inter alia, international cooperation. In many situations, this might point to the need 
for major debt relief  initiatives.749 
 
 The Committee repeatedly emphasised the same points in its examinations of country reports. For 
example, in its Concluding observations on Nicaragua in 1993, the Committee observed that: 
‘6. To the extent that structural adjustment measures and the privatization of  State property have had 
negative consequences for the enjoyment of  the economic, social and cultural rights of  the Nicaraguan 
people, and more specifically for the standard of  living of  the most vulnerable sectors, the Committee 
expresses its serious concern. It is particularly concerned at the fact that official figures reveal an alarming 
deterioration in the standard of  living and that 70 per cent of  Nicaraguans live below the poverty threshold 
and that 40 per cent suffer from protein deficiency. This reflects the tragedy of  a child population which, in 
the words of  the report itself, constitutes ‘a genuine national emergency’…. 
13. The Committee reiterates the view expressed in its general comment No. 2 that it is precisely in times 
of  acute economic and social problems that respect for the obligations arising under the Covenant assumes 
its greatest importance.  
14. The Committee wishes to bring to the attention of  the State party the need to ensure that structural 
adjustment programmes are so formulated and implemented as to provide adequate safety nets for the 
vulnerable sectors of  society in order to avoid a deterioration of  the enjoyment of  the economic, social and 
cultural rights for which the Covenant provides protection.’750 
 
The Committee’s approach then to the ‘maximum use of available resources’ never challenged 
assumptions of limited ‘available resources’ (as Roosevelt’s NRPB Keynesians had earlier done) but, with 
the concept of the ‘minimum core’, it still sought to challenge the neoclassical insistence on rolling back 
the role of the state in the economy, at least by setting a floor below which state expenditure on social 
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protection and ESCR should not fall – drawing on the work of economists as expressed in the reports 
of UNICEF and UNDP.  In the context of the debt crises of the structural adjustment era, and the 
decline of Keynesianism, this was necessarily a very different approach to the ‘maximum use of available 
resources’ compared to the earlier Keynesian approach of Franklin Roosevelt’s NRPB conceptualization 
of rights, which called for avoiding austerity particularly in times of economic crisis.  As I show later, the 
loss of these earlier (Keynesian) insights developing during the emergence of economic and social rights, 
has also left the Committee less able to later challenge prescriptions of austerity in in our more recent era 
(as I explored further below in the section on the ‘constitutionalisation’ of austerity.) 
The Committee also never explicitly addressed the extent to which structural adjustment policies (and 
hence retrogression) were necessarily constitutive of the ‘Washington consensus’, and how the ‘minimum 
core’ could be implemented in the context of a deliberate neoliberal prescription to ‘roll back’ the welfare 
state.751 
 
4.1.2 Tripartite duties versus classical liberal rights and the ‘minimal state’  
The Committee did however address the role of  the state in relation to ESCR more directly in its later 
adoption of  the ‘respect, protect, fulfil’ framework of  obligations.  While defining the ‘minimum core’ 
to be implemented immediately and without great cost, was one approach of  the Committee aimed at 
countering views that ESC rights were only aspirational goals and not really ‘real’ rights, a second step to 
define the correlative obligations of  the rights also sought to show that ESCR (like CPR) entailed not 
only costly positive duties but also relatively ‘cost-free’ negative duties.  This ‘respect, protect and fulfil’ 
framework of  obligations was also adopted in the context of  challenging assumptions regarding ESCR 
and CPR and the traditional liberal dichotomy of  ‘negative’ versus ‘positive’ rights, linked to the role of  
the state in the economy.  
The ‘respect, protect, fulfil’ framework of  obligations was first adopted by the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights in its 1999 General Comment 12 on the right to food.752  But this drew on the 
earlier work of  a group of  scholars developed in the early 1980s, well before the establishment of  the 
Committee, and efforts focused on establishing a right to basic subsistence (and thus came to be linked 
to the ‘right to adequate food’).753  This work sought to challenge the delegitimation of  rights that had 
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occurred in the period after the adoption of  the UDHR, with their invocations of  ESC rights as being 
not really ‘real’ rights, as well as the charge regarding the ‘vagueness’ of  the duties imposed.754  The target 
of  these scholars were the legal and political critiques of  ESCR, including that of  British scholar Maurice 
Cranston who was one of  the most influential scholars challenging the view of  economic rights as human 
rights.  
Cranston’s classic critique of  international human rights - ‘Human rights: real and supposed’755 - is often 
understood as a direct attack on ESC rights, although Cranston was actually arguing against all the rights 
included in the UDHR, as being merely moral rights, rather than legal rights that would ever be secured 
in positive law (in other words, as Bentham would have more imaginatively put it, that UDHR rights were 
nothing more than ‘nonsense on stilts’). 756 Cranston did however reserve particular scorn for ESC rights 
which he argued did not pass the ‘practicability test’ as universal rights – ‘It is not my duty to do what is 
physically impossible for me to do… If  it is impossible for a thing to be done, it is absurd to claim it as 
a right,’ and, logically then, it could not invoke a correlative duty either.757  ESCR also failed his 
‘paramount importance test’.  Cranston argued that the only rights that should be defined as ‘human 
rights’ should be those that that were essential in the sense of  Kant’s categorical imperative.  For 
Cranston, human rights could include essential civil rights, but should not include economic and social 
rights which ‘it would be nice to see done one day’ - ‘A human right is something of  which no one may 
be deprived without a grave affront to justice’ he opined, taking a rather narrow view of  ‘justice’.758 
Other scholars, including the philosopher Henry Shue, fervently dissented.   For Shue, a lack of  basic 
subsistence which could amount to starvation, was self-evidently both of  ‘paramount importance’ and a 
‘grave affront to justice’.  Shue argued, directly taking on Cranston’s example of  hunger in India and how 
starvation was not a deliberate violation: 
‘Cranston obscures or does not see, the terrible severity of  his view’s implications.  The fact, if  it be a fact, 
that resulting starvation within India would be only allowed to occur, and not intentionally initiated, is of  
little consequence.  If  preventable starvation occurs as an effect of  a decision not to prevent, the starvation 
is caused by, among other things, the decision not to prevent it.  Passive infanticide is still infanticide.’759 
 
For Shue, a basic level of  subsistence (which he defined broadly as a minimum level economic security - 
consisting of  unpolluted air, unpolluted water, adequate food, adequate clothing, adequate shelter and 
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759 Shue 1996, 98. 
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minimal preventive public health care) should be considered a basic right - as essential as, and indeed also 
constitutive of, the right to physical security.760  He insisted that: 
‘It is not enough that people merely happen to be secure or happen to be subsisting.  They must have the 
right to security and a right to subsistence – the continued enjoyment of  the security and the subsistence 
must be socially guaranteed.  Otherwise a person is readily open to coercion and intimidation through threat 
of  the deprivation of  one or the other, and credible threats can paralyze a person and prevent the exercise 
of  any other rights as surely as actual beatings and actual protein/calorie deficiencies can.  Credible threats 
can be reduced only by the actual establishment of  social arrangements that will bring assistance to those 
confronted by forces they cannot themselves handle.’761 
 
Shue’s point on establishing adequate ‘social arrangements’ echoes the old institutional economists, but 
he does not delve into this in great detail.  Rather one of  Shue’s most innovative contributions was to 
challenge the liberal dichotomy between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ rights (as articulated for example by 
Isaiah Berlin).762  Shue attacked the assumption that negative rights required only refraining from acting 
in a certain way, while positive rights required only positive action ‘to do something’, suggesting that the 
lines could not be so neatly drawn. He argued that important distinction to draw was not between the 
rights, but rather between the correlative duties they imposed.  Against the traditional assumption of  only 
one correlative duty per right, he proposed that all rights imposed three kinds of  correlative duties:  
I. Duties to avoid depriving  
II. Duties to protect from deprivation (protection from harm) 
III. Duties to aid the deprived (providing for those unable to provide for themselves.)763 
 
In Shue’s view (as he emphasised further later), the duty to avoid and protect would be the primary duties, 
since if  they are respected, then the duty to provide would be unnecessary.  Extending this argument, he 
even argued that economic strategies that did not provide basic subsistence could be seen as deliberate: 
‘a government that engages in essential [systematic] deprivation – that follows an economic strategy in which 
deprivations of  subsistence are inherent in the strategy – fails to fulfil even any duty merely to avoid 
depriving… Such a government is a direct and immediate threat to its own people.’764 
 
Shue’s 1980 ‘tripartite typology’ of  correlative duties was thus a powerful attack on the overly simplistic 
dichotomy between negative and positive rights, with important implications for the later 
conceptualisation of  both ESCR and CPR.  One of  the implications was that both sets of  rights can be 
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costly to implement, but also that both sets of  rights entail relatively cost-free elements as well - including 
the duty to refrain from interfering with people’s existing subsistence rights.765   
The framework was rapidly adopted by human rights scholars, including Asbjorn Eide, who adopted it 
(renaming the typology as the obligations to ‘respect, protect, fulfil’) in his writings on the right to food, 
including his reports to the UN Sub-Commission for the Prevention of  Discrimination and the 
Protection of  Minorities.  In 1982 the Sub-Commission had requested Eide, as its Rappporteur, to 
produce a study on the right to food and Eide submitted his final report in 1987 (in addition to a 
preliminary report in 1984 and a final progress report in 1998). 766 
Eide’s 1987 report grounded Shue’s philosophical discussion of  the correlative obligations of  the rights 
more closely in human rights terms of  the relationship between the State and the individual (in contrast 
to the individual-to-individual relationship that Shue tended to emphasise).  From that perspective, he 
questioned the classic divide between CPR and ESCR between those rights that imply ‘negative’ freedom 
from the State versus those rights that require positive action by the State.767  He rechristened Shue’s 
tripartite typology as the obligations to ‘respect, protect and fulfil’, defining them as follows:  
‘66. State responsibility for human rights can be examined at three levels: The obligation to respect, the 
obligation to protect, and the obligation to fulfil human rights.  
67. The obligation to respect requires the State, and thereby all its organs and agents, to abstain from doing 
anything that violates the integrity of  the individual or infringes on her or his freedom, including the freedom 
to use the material resources available to that individual in the way she or he finds best to satisfy the basic 
needs… 
68. The obligation to protect requires from the State and its agents the measures necessary to prevent other 
individuals or groups from violating the integrity, freedom of  action, or other human rights of  the individual 
- including the prevention of  infringement of  the enjoyment of  his material resources.  
69. The obligation to fulfil requires the State to take the measures necessary to ensure for each person within 
its jurisdiction opportunities to obtain satisfaction of  those needs, recognized in the human rights 
instruments, which cannot be secured by personal efforts.’768    
 
Thus ESCR rights implied three levels of  duties, including both negative and positive duties.769  Eide 
focused more explicitly on the role of  the State, pointing to its ‘Janus-faced’ nature – ‘The State must 
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than aiding those whose rights had already been violated towards the creation of more effective institutions to 
ensure that the right is honoured in the first place.  See the Afterword in Shue, 1996, 160. 
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respect human rights limitations and constraints on its scope of  action, but it is also obliged to be active 
in its role as protector and provider.’770  In other words, States must be judged not only by its failures to 
refrain from violating rights, but also by its failures to realize an adequate standard of  living for its people.  
Eide’s argument also sought to show - contra arguments that ESCR are aspirational given heavy resource 
implications - that ESCR were not necessarily costly; indeed, ESCR could often best be safeguarded 
through non-interference of  the state: 
‘115. It has sometimes been argued that the economic and social rights differ from the civil and political in 
that the former require the use of  resources by the State, while the obligation for States to ensure the 
enjoyment of  civil and political rights does not require resources.  This argument is tenable only in situations 
where the focus for economic and social rights is on the tertiary level (the obligation to fulfil), while civil 
and political rights are observed on the primary level (the obligations to respect).  This scenario is however 
arbitrary. Some civil rights require State obligations at all levels - also the obligation to provide direct 
assistance, when there is a need for it.  Economic and social rights can in many cases best be safeguarded 
through non-interference by the State, by respecting the freedom and use of  resources possessed by the 
individuals.’771 
 
Eide’s 1987 report does not engage in detailed discussion, but it does address the role of  the state in the 
economy, seeing the respect obligation implying the ‘non-interference of  the State’, while the obligation to 
protect ‘implies the responsibility of  States to counteract or prevent activities and processes which 
negatively affect [people]..., particularly the most vulnerable’.772   He argued that the State should regulate 
to protect against third parties (and not only against persons or corporations but also against activities 
and processes), including against ‘assertive or aggressive subjects such as powerful economic interests 
acting in a ruthless way e.g. protection against fraud or unethical behaviour in trade and contractual 
relations, against the marketing or dumping of  hazardous or dangerous products’.773  Eide also argued 
that the obligation to fulfil also required the State to make direct provision in cases where people were 
prevented from or unable to provide for their own needs, such as during unemployment under recession, 
or during sudden crisis or for those who are marginalized, including for example ‘due to structural 
transformations in the economy and production’.774  Later, during a CESCR annual Day of  Discussion 
on the right to food, Eide also argued that:  
‘When the possibility of  improving one’s situation was adversely affected by aggressive market forces, then 
the State was under an obligation to protect the individual.’775 
 
Although Eide’s final report was submitted in 1987, the Committee did not immediately adopt this 
framework, despite its important implications for strengthening the obligations framework for ESC 
rights.  Indeed, although the framework was presented to the Committee several times from 1989 
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onwards, it was not until ten years later in 1999 (when the Committee adopted its General Comment No. 
12 on the right to adequate food) that this framework made its way into the Committee’s understanding 
and interpretation of  ESCR – although it was consistently reflected in all its General Comments 
elaborating the different economic, social and cultural rights after that.  The Committee’s General 
Comment No. 12 on the right to food, adopted in May 1999, was the first to include a paragraph on the 
three obligations, as follows: 
15. The right to adequate food, like any other human right, imposes three types or levels of  obligations on 
States parties: the obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfil. In turn, the obligation to fulfil incorporates 
both an obligation to facilitate and an obligation to provide. 1 The obligation to respect existing access to 
adequate food requires States parties not to take any measures that result in preventing such access. The 
obligation to protect requires measures by the State to ensure that enterprises or individuals do not deprive 
individuals of  their access to adequate food. The obligation to fulfil (facilitate) means the State must 
proactively engage in activities intended to strengthen people’s access to and utilization of  resources and 
means to ensure their livelihood, including food security. Finally, whenever an individual or group is unable, 
for reasons beyond their control, to enjoy the right to adequate food by the means at their disposal, States 
have the obligation to fulfil (provide) that right directly. This obligation also applies for persons who are 
victims of  natural or other disasters.776 
 
General Comment No. 12 on the right to food also introduced an approach to what would constitute a 
violation of  ESCR obligations – linking this also to the failure to achieve a ‘minimum core’, and a failure 
of  the State to meet its obligations to protect and fulfil the rights, including through failures in the 
regulatory role of  the State: 
‘Violations of  the Covenant occur when a State fails to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, the 
minimum essential level required to be free from hunger. In determining which actions or omissions amount 
to a violation of  the right to food, it is important to distinguish the inability from the unwillingness of  a 
State party to comply. Should a State party argue that resource constraints make it impossible to provide 
access to food for those who are unable by themselves to secure such access, the State has to demonstrate 
that every effort has been made to use all the resources at its disposal in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of  
priority, those minimum obligations. This follows from Article 2.1 of  the Covenant, which obliges a State 
party to take the necessary steps to the maximum of  its available resources, as previously pointed out by the 
Committee in its General Comment No. 3, paragraph 10. A State claiming that it is unable to carry out its 
obligation for reasons beyond its control therefore has the burden of  proving that this is the case and that 
it has unsuccessfully sought to obtain international support to ensure the availability and accessibility of  the 
necessary food.’ 
…..19. Violations of  the right to food can occur through the direct action of  States or other entities 
insufficiently regulated by States.777 
 
The Committee’s tripartite obligations framework therefore, drawing on the work of  progressive legal 
scholars, directly challenged the classical liberal dichotomy between negative and positive rights, by 
establishing that all rights entailed both negative and positive duties.  By establishing how ESCR involved 
negative duties to refrain from violating rights as well as positive duties to regulate and to provide, 
including in instances where the market failed or people were unable to provide for themselves, the 
Committee also (even if  only implicitly) challenged neoclassical economic prescriptions for a ‘minimal 
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state’ that refrained from intervening in the economy.  The Committee was clearer with respect the 
regulatory role of  the state, than with regard to specifying a specifically redistributive role, although again, 
it made clear that the state had a duty to ‘fulfil’ or provide whenever markets could not - at least to allow 
a minimum standard of  living for all.   
The Committee never drew directly from the earlier insights of  the legal realists and the institutional 
economists, although the emphasis on the regulatory role of  the State recalls their earlier more explicit 
insistence on using the countervailing power of  the state to protecting people against the coerciveness 
of  concentrated economic power, including in the supposedly ‘free’ markets imagined in neoclassical 
economics.    
However, although the ‘tripartite’ framework of  obligations addresses the role of  the State in the 
economy, the Committee has not examined the extent to which the trends of  liberalization, deregulation 
and privatization, are constitutive of  economic (neo)liberalism or are an effort to change what 
institutional economists, like John R. Commons, called the ‘working rules’ of  the economy. 778  
Liberalisation, deregulation and privatization have worked, as Harvey points out, to ‘disembed’ the market 
from the ‘web’ of  social, political and institutional constraints that had served to constrain economic 
power and ensure a fairer distribution of  economic resources during the post-war era of  ‘embedded 
liberalism’ that the institutionalists had helped to establish.  Indeed, as Balakrishnan and Elson have 
pointed out (echoing the lessons of  the institutionalists), ‘de-regulation is actually a form of  re-
regulation’: deregulation changes the rules of  the economy to benefit and re-regulate in favour of  some 
actors over others.779  De-regulation does not necessarily reduce regulation, but rather changes the ‘rules 
of  the game’, as the State shifts to re-regulate and enforce different rules and different rights, and their 
different distributional effects.  Similarly, ‘liberalisation’ means ‘freeing’ markets, shifting conceptions of  
‘economic freedom’ from freedom of  people from the markets (the conception of  ‘embedded liberalism’ 
and Roosevelt’s rights), to freedom of  the markets from the constraints protecting people.  
In addition, unlike the earlier legal realists and institutional economists, the Committee’s challenge to 
liberal legal orthodoxy in its tripartite framework, has not needed to challenge the primacy of  the right 
to property, that had earlier inhibited expressions of  economic and social rights.  Indeed, since the ‘right 
to property’ was excluded from the Covenant during the drafting process (and since most economies 
have been ‘mixed economies’) the Committee has never had to deal directly with the stark challenges 
faced earlier with respect to the insistence over its ‘absoluteness’ or its ‘primacy’ over other rights, or the 
role of  the State in its enforcement in ‘free’ markets.  Given widespread acceptance of  the substantive 
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positive role of  the state in economies, challenging the primacy of  property rights was less immediately 
important in the modern context.    
However, the fact that Committee has not had to clearly clarify the relationship between ESCR and the 
right to property, or even between human rights and the right to property may also mean that it has not 
been possible to invoke the Committee’s authoritative interpretations against the narrowing down of  
human rights and the re-assertion of  legal and economic orthodoxies.  For example, as O’Connell has 
warned in his ‘The Death of  Social Rights’, notions of  ESCR are being narrowed down in courts across 
the world to be more consistent with ‘neoliberalism’ (even in Constitutional courts that had earlier 
established ground-breaking jurisprudence on ESCR, such as South Africa, India and Canada).780  
O’Connell argues that ‘in the context of  neoliberal globalisation domestic courts are unlikely, because of  
a tacit and implicit acceptance of  neoliberal orthodoxy, to advance the protection of  socio-economic 
rights.’781  Baxi has also warned of  the narrowing down of  human rights to ‘market-friendly’ rights 
particularly in the context of  international trade.782 Jessica Whyte has observed how even non-
governmental human rights organisations have worked to re-define ‘human rights’ in ways that exclude 
ESCR.783 
The Committee has not then drawn on some of  these earlier insights from the emergence of  economic 
and social rights in their normative elaboration of  the rights in the more modern era.  There is some 
evidence however that the Committee has nonetheless drawn from the dominant heterodox economist 
of  the time, the Indian economist, Amartya Sen, via the concept of  ‘human development’ captured in 
the UNICEF and UNDP reports, as well as through the ‘AAAQ’ criteria (as defined below).  
 
4.1.3 AAAQ, ‘human development’ and influence of  the heterodox economist, Amartya Sen 
In addition to setting out the ‘tripartite framework’, the Committee’s General Comment No. 12 also set 
out the core content of  the right to adequate food as including the elements of  availability, accessibility, 
acceptability and quality, which have come to be called the ‘AAAQ’ criteria.784  This framework was first 
used in the context of  the right to food, but also later taken up in the General Comments on other rights.  
I suggest below that this came into the framework for ESCR via Eide’s 1987 report on the right to food, 
which in turn drew on the work of  the economist, Amartya Sen and explore how Sen influenced the 
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Committee’s work, not only through notions of  ‘AAAQ’, but also through his work on ‘entitlements’, 
‘capabilities’ and ‘human development’. 
Asbjorn Eide’s 1987 ‘Report on the right to adequate food as a human right’ highlighted the availability 
and accessibility of  food as key elements of  the emerging new concept of  ‘food security’ under the UN’s 
Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and other bodies, a definition driven in part by the work of  
the economist, Amartya Sen.785  Eide argued that the right to adequate food required a focus not only on 
availability, but on people’s access to food and its cultural acceptability, adequacy and safety (in terms of  
being free of  adverse or toxic substances).  
This drew on the work of  the Indian economist, Amartya Sen who, in his book on Poverty and Famines, 
had argued against the thesis that most famines are caused by a collapse in the availability of  production 
of  foodcrops.786  Rather, he argued that famine, like endemic hunger and starvation, was due to the lack 
of  ‘access’ to available food, as for example in the Great Bengal famine when over 2 million people 
perished, yet ‘people died in front of  well-stocked shops protected by the state’.  There was no problem 
of  food availability, but poor people did not have access to that food as their incomes and jobs had been 
decimated by floods, and they had no other ways of  accessing available food.  What Sen labelled as their 
‘entitlements’ (i.e. ownership or any legal means or rights they had to ‘command’ or have access to food) 
had collapsed, and so their families starved, even while wealthier people did not.  Their rights were not 
actively violated, but the prevailing institutional framework gave them no other right or way of  accessing 
food.  They starved ‘because of  lack of  legal entitlement not because of  their entitlements being 
violated’.787    
Sen thus suggested that institutional factors, as well as economic factors, could affect entitlements – 
including legal rights as well as other laws, customs, traditions, as well as social policies such as welfare 
transfers or charity.  Like the earlier institutionalists he saw that ‘market forces, can be seen operating 
through a system of  legal relations (ownership rights, contractual obligations, legal exchanges etc)’.  Thus 
he concluded viscerally: ‘The law stands between food availability and food entitlement.  Starvation deaths 
can reflect legality with a vengeance.’788 
Eide in his 1987 report adopted some of  this thinking, suggesting that Sen’s ‘entitlement approach’ 
provided a bridge between human rights and development (and economic) thinking.  This approach 
required: 
‘…a shift in thinking from what exists to who can command what. The entitlement approach therefore fits well 
with human rights thinking, and can provide a link between the analysis of  how various development 
processes affect people's command over food in different ways, and the right to have a command at all. It 
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provides a bridge between legal and ‘development’ thinking, making it possible to avoid simplistic 
assumptions such as the one that the fulfilment of  the right to food for all can be achieved simply by 
distribution of  available food resources. Concretization of  the entitlements provides an opportunity to 
develop some of  the indicators that will be needed to assess the impact on household food security of  
economic or social changes that take place at more distant levels.’789 
 
Sen’s influence on the early work of  the Committee is evident through this work on availability and 
accessibility of  food, as well as through efforts to strengthen understanding of  the right to food as a 
‘human right’.  An article of  Sen’s entitled ‘The Right not to be Hungry’ was reprinted in Philip Alston 
and Katerina Tomasevski’s edited 1984 book The Right to Food given that, as the editors noted, it 
established the validity of  the right to food as a basic human right.790   Denying a stark distinction between 
‘moral’ and ‘legal’ rights, Sen argued that the right to be free from hunger could be a concrete, institutional 
or legal right in some countries (e.g. as concretised in social security system priorities), but it could also 
exist as a rather abstract, moral, background right in others (where it is not institutionalized but may still 
be understood as a ‘right’) or a ‘metaright’ to a policy.791   As he argued elsewhere, authors such as Maurice 
Cranston who followed a Bentham-like rejection of  human rights as ‘nonsense on stilts’ if  they were not 
already enshrined in law, had largely missed the point of  ‘human rights’. 792  From Sen’s perspective, rather 
defining human rights as only those rights that were already justiciable in court, it would be more 
productive to understand them as a demand for the institutionalization or ‘formalisation’ of  such rights, 
given their ethical importance as entitlements of  all human beings.793  Further challenging Maurice 
Cranston’s ‘feasibility’ critique of  ESCR, Sen also insisted that the ‘non-realization [of  a right] does not, 
in itself  make a claimed right a non-right’ – the lack of  supposed feasibility of  a right should be an 
empirical question, not a normative claim nullifying the existence of  economic and social rights.  
Attempts to exclude ‘all economic and social rights from the inner sanctum of  human rights, keeping the 
space reserved only for liberty and other first-generation rights, attempts to draw a line in the sand that 
is hard to sustain.’794 
Amartya Sen:  One of  the ‘most influential’ (heterodox) economists of  the 20th century 
Amartya Sen, who won the Nobel Prize of  Economics in 1998, has been described as ‘one of  the most 
influential development economists of  the twentieth century’795 for the impact of  his work, including his 
concepts of  ‘entitlements’, ‘capabilities’ and ’human development’ on economics, particularly in 
development economics.   
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Sen’s work has taken a critical approach, challenging theories of  rights and justice in political philosophy, 
from Nozick to Rawls, but his main target has always been mainstream neoclassical economic theory, 796 
particularly in the form of  modern welfare economics797 (all of  his work can be read as a critique of  the 
underlying assumptions of  neoclassical economics).  Sen thus falls into the ‘heterodox’ tradition within 
economics, although he is not a direct heir to the old institutional economists nor to the Keynesian 
economists, but he shares with those theorists the aim to ‘humanise’ economic theory.798  He has 
challenged the negative conception of  freedom in economics and its privileging of  utility, by promoting 
a conception of  positive freedom in his concept of  ‘capabilities’ and advocating the replacement of  a 
focus on aggregate economic growth, with a focus on ‘human development’.  He has also challenged 
assumptions in orthodox neoclassical economic theory that militate against public action, in an attempt 
to rescue welfare economics from the ‘free-marketeers’799  Perhaps more than any other contemporary 
economist, Sen has also to clarify the linkages between economics, freedom and human rights, providing 
as Vizard has carefully demonstrated, ‘a ‘scholarly bridge’ between human rights and economics.’800  Yet 
Sen has at the same time been criticised for a tendency to adopt ‘evocative but ambiguous, politically safe 
labels and an avoidance of  seeking debate on all fronts’801 and his work is less ‘radical’ than the work of  
the institutional economists of  the first ‘law and economics movement’ and less prescriptive than the 
Keynesians that influenced the conceptualisation of  ESCR in the Depression era.  His work has been 
very important for the conceptualisation of  ESCR in our more modern era, but offers fewer intellectual 
resources for challenging economic power and the ‘rules’ of  the economic game, as I show further below.   
A central focus of  Sen’s work has been to challenge negative conceptions of  freedom, including by 
criticising liberal (or rather, libertarian) theories of  rights and justice in political philosophy.  Thus, arguing 
for example against Nozick’s 1974 Anarchy, State and Utopia, Sen has contended that this ‘demanding 
version of  libertarian theory’ and the uncompromising priority it gives to the classical liberal rights of  
life, liberty and property is  ‘problematic since the actual consequences of  the operation of  these 
entitlements, can quite possibly include rather terrible results.’802  As he shows, Nozick’s ‘entitlement 
theory of  justice’ put procedural justice over distributive justice, and suggests that justice has little to do 
with outcomes or the fairness of  income distribution, but rather on the process entailed.  Thus, while 
Nozick argues that, as long as there are no violations of  peoples’ rights (especially ‘property rights’) in 
the process, any resulting outcome is fair, even if  this means extremely high levels of  inequalities.803  From 
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Sen’s perspective however, any theory of  rights must take account of  outcomes and consequences  -  as 
his book Poverty and Famines had shown ‘even gigantic famines can result without anyone’s libertarian 
rights (including property rights) being violated.’804   For Sen, it is unacceptable that the libertarians care 
little if  their rights regime results in starvation or endemic hunger for masses of  people.  Sen counters 
any regime of  rights (or other institutional framework) should be judged, in part, on the basis of  whether 
or not it can ensure substantive freedoms.  It cannot be morally acceptable if  a particular ‘[s]et of  property 
rights leads, say to starvation’ so he argues, ‘the need for consequential analysis of  property rights is 
inescapable whether or not such rights are seen as having any intrinsic value.’805 
The main focus of  Sen’s work as an economist however has been to question the underlying assumptions 
of  neoclassical economic theory, particularly in the field of  welfare economics.  While modern 
neoclassical economics is built not on libertarian foundations but rather on a specific form of  
utilitarianism called welfarism, it remains similarly suspicious of  positive state intervention or ‘public 
action’. Welfarism is ‘deeply rooted in the utilitarian tradition’, but while Bentham’s utilitarianism 
encouraged the calculation of  utilities (with the ultimate objective of  allowing for some redistribution of  
wealth from the rich to the poor who would value it more), modern welfare economics rejects the 
possibility of  calculating the sum of, and comparing, people’s utilities in favour of  what is called the 
‘Pareto criterion’.806  A state of  ‘Pareto optimality’ is said to occur when in any policy/distributional 
change, no one can be made better off  without making someone else worse off.807  Sen has pointed out 
however, that Pareto Optimality can be entirely consistent ‘with some people in extreme misery and 
others rolling in luxury, so long as the miserable cannot be made better off  without cutting into the luxury 
of  the rich’:808 Sen thinks this makes little sense – for him it is obvious that ‘making more resources 
available to individuals who are starving will improve overall well-being, even if  some resources must be 
taken away from multi-millionaires, and even if  utilities cannot be directly compared’ – and he argues that 
‘the fact that traditional welfare economics fails to arrive at this conclusion is both a major flaw and severe 
limitation of  this approach.’809  
Arguing that neoclassical economic theory is ‘supremely unconcerned with distributional issues’,810  Sen 
has also called into question the implications of  one of  the central theorems of  welfare economics - 
called ‘Arrow’s impossibility theorem’.  This proves mathematically that there is no logical way of  defining 
the ‘public interest’ on the basis of  calculations of  individual self-interest.  For Sen however, the 
implications are extremely problematic for welfare economics – because, as he argues: ‘Arrow’s results 
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call into question any policy or strategy that might improve economic welfare by reducing economic and 
social inequalities.  Any policy proposal or any approach could be easily dismissed as being arbitrary... or 
dictatorial...’811  In other words, there can be no rational basis for economic or social policies that improve 
human well-being – thus orthodox economic theory militates against ‘public action’.  Sen’s believes 
however that policy change can and should improve people’s lives and has therefore worked to counter 
Arrow’s conclusion by developing an alternative set of  rules for making social choices, and showing how 
interpersonal utility comparisons should be used under certain circumstances for making social choices 
about important issues.812  This fundamentally challenges the underlying assumptions of  orthodox 
economic theory. 
Similarly, Sen has argued that economists should focus less on maximising utility - or maximising 
aggregate economic growth - and more on maximising people’s ‘capabilities’ and opportunities.  His aim 
to ‘replace the concept of  utility with that of  capability was a conscious attempt to incorporate a positive 
freedom concept, human development, at the heart of  analytical welfare economics.’813  In searching for 
an alternative to maximising utility, Sen had earlier explored the ‘basic needs’ approach pioneered by 
development economist Paul Streeten and others, which argued that everyone should have not only a 
basic income, but access to primary goods and services necessary to satisfy basic needs like food, 
healthcare, clean water.  Contra Rawls’ Theory of  Justice, Sen also pointed out however that it may be 
necessary to have an unequal distribution of  primary goods, in order to ensure substantive equality – for 
example, a person with disabilities may need more resources than an able-bodied person to achieve the 
same result.814  Sen eventually also moved the focus beyond ‘basic needs’ and the goods and services 
themselves, towards a focus on the valuable things they enabled people to do or be - in other words their 
‘capabilities’.    
He argued that ‘capabilities’ should serve as both the means and end of  ‘human development’.815 
Economic and social development, Sen argued, should be a process of  ‘expanding the real freedoms that 
people enjoy’816 and ‘removing unfreedoms and extending the substantive freedoms of  different types 
that people have reason to value’.817   Negative freedom could never be enough since it can give rise to 
inequality in substantive freedoms and can be consistent with people starving to death or with 
extraordinary inequalities in income and wealth.  From this perspective, he sought to ‘humanise’ 
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economics, calling for a shift away from a narrow focus on aggregate economic growth (or GDP per 
capita) towards a focus on people and the expansion of  their (positive) freedom.    
Putting the ‘human’ back into development: the concept of  ‘Human Development’ 
This concept of  ‘capabilities’ or positive freedom that Sen developed through the 1980s had a significant 
practical impact in the 1990s, when it was adopted and developed by the UN Development Programme’s 
Mahbub ul Haq in UNDPs ‘Human Development Reports’, and the ‘Human Development Index’.818 
The first Human Development Report (HDR) was launched in 1990 (after UNICEF’s 1987 ‘Adjustment 
with a Human Face’) and aimed ‘to shift the focus of  development economics from national income 
accounting to people-centred policies’.819  It defined ‘human development’ as the process of  enlarging 
people’s freedoms, or capabilities, expressed in the HDRs as expanding peoples’ ‘choices’.820   It also 
explicitly sought to challenge the economic policy prescriptions of  structural adjustment and the one-
size-fits-all neoclassical (or neoliberal) policy prescriptions of  the ‘Washington Consensus’.  As Richard 
Jolly noted,  
‘[the] Human Development (HD) approach embodies a robust paradigm, which may be contrasted with the 
neoliberal paradigm of  the Washington Consensus.  There are points of  overlap, but also important points 
for difference in objectives, assumptions, constraints and in the main areas for policy and in the indicators 
for assessing results.’821   
 
Although Sen initially opposed it, UNDP also developed the ‘Human Development Index’ (HDI), as 
UNDP’s Haq who drove these developments, believed that a single number, measuring human 
development, would be critical if  the paradigm of  ‘human development’ were to compete with the 
paradigm of  economic growth and GDP per capita.  The HDI index thus includes three key capabilities 
(literacy and schooling, life expectancy and adjusted income) – and eventually a country’s HDI rank, along 
with its GDP per capita rank, became an important tool for assessing economies.   
This had an impact on shifting the focus of  structural adjustment from a narrow focus on economic 
growth towards a broader focus on ‘human development’.  As Fukuda-Parr points out: Sen’s ideas 
provided a flexible framework for policy analysis, rather than ‘imposing a rigid orthodoxy with a set of  
policy prescriptions’.822  At the same time however, the lack of  clear policy prescriptions, left Sen’s 
alternative less effective in shifting the basic macroeconomic policy prescriptions of  the ‘Washington 
Consensus’.    
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Despite his deep critique of  the underlying assumptions of  orthodox economic theory, Sen has been 
criticised for his methodological individualism, and lack of  attention to the structural factors that shape 
underdevelopment, including with regards to unequal trade rules, disadvantageous international divisions 
of  labour, and the global power exercised by the International Financial Institutions.823  While Sen, like 
Commons, did bring some renewed focus on the role of  law in political economy though his focus on 
‘entitlements’, this approach has also been seen as a framework for descriptive analysis, rather than a 
normative prescription for changing those entitlements and institutions. 824   In contrast to the old 
institutional economists, who put a significant focus on the economic power within markets (particularly 
when the participants do not have equal bargaining power)  Sen has also been criticised for ignoring ‘the 
coercive aspect of  the market mechanism, by seeing the ‘free’ market in an abstract manner rather than 
as ‘a social institution which is itself  a product of  historical circumstances.’825  Prendergast suggests that 
Sen’s own work was disciplined by the discursive context of  neoliberalism of  the period in which he 
worked:   
‘Amartya Sen’s positive evaluation of  the market evolved during the 30 years when free market ideology was 
in the ascendancy and de-regulation of  markets became a world-wide phenomenon. While his approach 
emphasises the importance of  access to education, health and other factors which contribute to individual 
and social capability, his view of  markets as a pure social and individual good tends to accommodate, if  not 
reinforce, the pro-free market ideology of  the period.’826 
 
Indeed, Sen’s approach to ‘free markets’ has been far less critical than the earlier institutionalists.  Sen has 
argued that ‘[t]o be generically against markets would be almost as odd as being generically against 
conversations between people… The freedom to exchange… is part of  the way human beings in society 
live and interact with each other (unless stopped by regulation or fiat).’827  Sen has supported Adam 
Smith’s argument that free markets operated as a progressive force against feudal social relations - and 
sees this as still important in India, where feudalistic labour relations (ie bonded labour) still persist.  Sen 
further declares that ‘It is hard to think of  any process of  substantial development can do without very  
extensive use of  markets’ although he argues that this should ‘not preclude the role of  social support, 
public regulation or statecraft when they can enrich-rather than impoverish- human lives.’828  
Sen has also insisted that this ‘is not to deny the importance of  judging the market mechanism 
comprehensively in terms of  all its roles and effects’829 including the ‘persistence of  deprivations among 
segments of  the community that happen to remain excluded from the benefits of  the market oriented 
society’.830  Sen encourages the constant interrogation of  the ‘actual performance of  actually existing 
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economic systems and to press for reform to the degree that they fail to meet the demanding standard 
of  capabilities equality’831: 
‘Individuals live and operate in a world of  institutions.  Our opportunities and prospects depend crucially 
on what institutions exist and how they function.  Not only do institutions contribute to our freedoms, their 
roles can be sensibly evaluated in the light of  their contributions to our freedom.  To see development as 
freedom provides a perspective in which institutional assessment can systematically occur.’832 
 
Sen's work has thus challenged the negative conception of  economic freedom that lies at the heart of  
neoclassical economics and its privileging of  utility, by promoting his concept of  positive freedom in his 
concept of  ‘capabilities’ and replacing the focus on economic growth with a focus on human 
development.  He has also carved out a clear justification for public action and the positive role of  the 
State in the economy.  Sen’s work has thus provided a bridge between human rights and economics, and 
an alternative paradigm of  ‘human development’ that challenged structural adjustment and the 
‘Washington Consensus’ (and taken up by the Committee through its references to the UNICEF and 
UNDP reports, that in turn influenced the Committee’s early work).  However his work has offered fewer 
intellectual resources for challenging the ‘institutions’ that constitute ‘free’ markets (than the earlier 
institutionalists) and has offered fewer concrete prescriptions for human rights in relation to specific 
economic, and particularly macroeconomic, policies (than the Keynesians).   
More recently, Sen has been more critical of  markets in the context of  the 2008 global economic crisis 
and has challenged the harsh imposition of  fiscal austerity: ‘How was it possible, it has to be asked, for 
the basic Keynesian insights and analyses to be so badly lost in the making of  European economic policies 
that imposed austerity?’833  Sen has argued that the 2008 was a failure of  markets (and specifically financial 
institutions, after the financial regulations put in place during the Depression and rolled back from the 
Reagan era onwards), and criticized how this was so soon translated into being a problem of  the role of  
the state and public debt (which had largely resulted from the banking bailouts and fiscal stimulus).  As 
he writes: 
‘There are many odd features of  the experience of  the world since the crisis of  2008....after the massive 
decline in 2008 of  financial markets and of  business confidence had been halted and to some extent reversed 
through the intervention of  the state, especially through stimulating the economy, often paid for by heavy 
public borrowing, the state had large debts to deal with.  The demand for a smaller government which had 
begun earlier, led by those who were sceptical of  extensive public services and state provision, now became 
a loud chorus, with political leaders competing with each other in frightening people with the idea that the 
economy could not but collapse under the burden of  public debt.’834 
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In this same article however, Sen’s uncritically accepts the need for expansionary monetary policy (rather 
than Keynesian fiscal policy) as a welcome response to saving the global economy – he argues in relation 
to the plan of  the European Central Bank: 
‘which we have every reason to welcome, to deliver a trillion euros of  ‘quantitative easing’ (not unlike 
expanding the money supply) – with decisive expansionary effect – is a result of  that belated recognition 
which is slowly changing the European Central Bank: that expansion rather than contraction is what the 
economy needs.’835   
 
Sen has offered little critique of  this extra-ordinary expansionary monetary policy (which has come to be 
implemented at the same time as contractionary fiscal policy, with markedly unequal distributional effects) 
and his work has not helped human rights to define any particular position in relation to contemporary 
trends of  the ‘constitutionalisation of  austerity’ in the midst of  our contemporary Great Recession.  
 
4.3 The Global Economic Crisis of  2008 and the Great Recession  
The recent global financial and economic crisis of  2007/2008, which rapidly turned into the ‘Great 
Recession’ has been called the worst global recession since the Great Depression of  the 1930s836 - with 
mass unemployment, evictions and a rapid rise in poverty devastating developed economies as well as 
developing countries. Unemployment rates rose to levels not seen since the Great Depression of  the 
1930s, particularly youth unemployment.837  Housing bubbles collapsed across Europe and the United 
States leading to mass foreclosures and evictions.  The human cost has been measured in rising poverty, 
malnutrition and mortality levels - with the World Bank estimating that over 1.2 million infants would die 
before the age of  five as a direct result of  the global economic crisis.838   
These impacts came in successive waves, first from the financial and economic collapse, but then through 
a wave of  austerity measures, that saw deep cuts imposed on public spending in countries across the 
world, once the immediate threat of  the collapse of  the global financial and economic system was averted.  
As I have written elsewhere, in the immediate response to the crisis, there was an initial unprecedented 
and coordinated global response to prevent a collapse of  the financial and banking system and to prevent 
a collapse in economic growth (including a return to Keynesian-style fiscal policy), but, once the 
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immediate threat was over, policies responses shifted towards a combination of  monetary easing with 
fiscal tightening: 
‘Initial government responses were unprecedented in terms of  the scale of  public intervention in markets.  
Government authorities, especially in the countries where the credit crisis struck hardest, mounted a massive 
and globally coordinated effort to prevent systemic financial meltdown, injecting trillions of  dollars into the 
banking system. Simultaneously, many governments engaged in expansive, counter-cyclical fiscal and 
monetary stimulus measures to mitigate the social consequences of  the crisis and to spur demand and 
economic growth so as to prevent a full-blown global depression. These stimulus measures were largest in 
developed countries, but many developing countries also adopted significant counter-cyclical fiscal measures 
in this period.  However, the massive resources devoted to saving the financial sector far exceeded the 
resources devoted to fiscal stimulus or social protection programmes. Worldwide, the financial sector in 
2010 reportedly received about US$20 trillion (30 per cent of  global GDP) in public support, while public 
funding for stimulus packages totalled only US$2.6 trillion (4.3 per cent of  global GDP).  In addition, just 
as these steps began to result in a muted economic recovery, albeit largely jobless and wageless, by 2009 and 
2010, many governments shifted away from fiscal stimulus measures towards implementing fiscal austerity 
policies to cut down the government debt incurred from lost tax revenue and from injecting liquidity into 
the financial system.’839 
 
Despite the initial resurgence of  Keynesian policy responses840 and a re-emergence of  questions over 
neoclassical economic theory (and its assumptions of  automatic equilibrium),841 this questioning rapidly 
gave way to the reassertion of  the orthodox economic policy prescriptions, little changed from the 
‘Washington consensus’.  As a response to high debt levels that resulted in part from bailing out the 
financial system, many governments moved to cut the debt by imposing fiscal austerity, cutting back on 
social programmes even in the midst of  the negative social impacts of  the crisis.  In some countries, such 
as Greece, measures were imposed like the structural adjustment era, as conditions for receipt of  loans 
by the IMF, the European Central Bank and the European Commission - known as the ‘Troika’ - which 
required permanent reductions in public spending, drastic labour market reform, extensive privatisation 
and a ‘welfare state retrenchment unprecedented in the post-war period.’842  These policy prescriptions 
have been followed in many countries, despite the arguments of critical economists, that ‘inflicting 
austerity on a weak economy leads to deeper recession, rising unemployment and increasing misery’ and 
questionable evidence over the impact of austerity on economic growth.843 
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This austerity-driven conditionality in European countries since the crisis has brought close comparisons 
with the structural adjustment programmes carried out in the 1980s and 1990s across the developing 
world - even a former World Bank vice president has observed that ‘few lessons have been learned’ and 
‘the SAPs being imposed on Europe now by the IMF are very similar to those that were being pushed 
on developing countries in the 70s and 80s by the World Bank and the IMF.’844  The IMF recognised in 
a report on the May 2013 reforms of  Greece that ‘the burden of  adjustment was not shared evenly across 
society’.845  Despite all the lessons learned during the era of  structural adjustment, none of  these lessons 
were followed - as Salomon poignantly observes: ‘The people of  Greece were treated as if  there is no 
history.’846 
Response of  the Committee on ESCR to the 2008 global economic and financial crisis 
The response of  the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to this 2007/2008 economic 
crisis has been to again reiterate the importance of  protecting ESCR in times of  crisis - as it did in the 
era of  ‘structural adjustment’ – reasserting the standard of  the ‘minimum core’ while introducing a new 
‘tests’ for retrogressive measures and policy changes, as well as calling for ‘human rights impact 
assessments’ of  austerity measures. 
The Committee’s General Comment No. 19 on the right to social security (published in 2008, although 
it was being developed before the global economic crisis) suggested that deliberate retrogressive measures 
are assumed to be prohibited, introducing a test as follows:    
‘There is a strong presumption that retrogressive measures taken in relation to the right to social security are 
prohibited under the Covenant. If  any deliberately retrogressive measures are taken, the State party has the 
burden of  proving that they have been introduced after the most careful consideration of  all alternatives 
and that they are duly justified by reference to the totality of  the rights provided for in the Covenant, in the 
context of  the full use of  the maximum available resources of  the State party.  
The Committee will look carefully at whether: (a) there was reasonable justification for the action; (b) 
alternatives were comprehensively examined; (c) there was genuine participation of  affected groups in 
examining the proposed measures and alternatives; (d) the measures were directly or indirectly 
discriminatory; (e) the measures will have a sustained impact on the realization of  the right to social security, 
an unreasonable impact on acquired social security rights or whether an individual or group is deprived of  
access to the minimum essential level of  social security; and (f) whether there was an independent review of  
the measures at the national level.  847 
 
                                                           
functional way to reduce deficits in the medium run.’ McBride 2016, 11.  See also the disputes over the paper on 
the positive impacts of  austerity by Reinhart and Rogoff  – Cassidy, 2013. 
844 Salomon 2015, 13. 
845 Ibid., 6. 
846 Ibid., 27. 
847 U.N.Doc E/C.12/GC/19, CESCR, General Comment No. 19: The right to social security (Art. 9 of the 
Covenant), adopted 23 November 2007, para 42. 
186 
Reasserting the ‘minimum core’, this concluded that ‘the adoption of  deliberately retrogressive measures 
incompatible with the core obligations’ could constitute a violation of  the Covenant.848   
On 16 May 2012, the Committee also finally directly addressed the global economic crisis when the 
Chairperson addressed a letter to States Parties on behalf  of  the Committee ‘in relation to the protection 
of  Covenant rights in the context of the economic and financial crisis’ providing ‘certain important 
guideposts which can help States Parties to adopt appropriate policies that deal with the economic 
downturn while respecting economic, social and cultural rights’.849  It noted ‘the pressure on many States 
Parties to embark on austerity programmes, sometimes severe, in the face of  rising public deficits and 
poor economic growth’ and that ‘[d]ecisions to adopt austerity measures are always difficult and complex, 
and the Committee is acutely aware that this may lead many States to take decisions with sometimes 
painful effects, especially when these austerity measures are taken in a recession’.850  But it warns States 
against infringing the Covenant, not only because this is contrary to their obligations, but also because it 
can lead to social insecurity and political instability with significantly negative effects, particularly on the 
most marginalised people.851   
The letter recalls that progressive realization requires making progress: ‘…at the heart of  the Covenant 
is the obligation on States Parties to respect, protect and fulfil economic, social and cultural rights 
progressively, using their maximum available resources’ which requires states to ensure constant progress 
through incremental improvements.852  However it also recognises that economic and financial crises as 
well as a lack of  economic growth can impede progress and lead to retrogression, recognising that ‘some 
adjustments in the implementation of  some of  these Covenant rights are at times inevitable’ but insists 
that states should not breach their obligations, setting out a test that any policy change or adjustment 
should be:  
1. A temporary measure, covering only the period of  the crisis 
2. Necessary and proportionate,  
3. Non-discriminatory and should mitigate inequalities that can grow in times of  crisis (including through 
tax measures to support transfers to the most marginalised)  
4. It should identify and protect the ‘minimum core content’ or ‘social protection floor’ (as defined by the 
ILO) of  the rights and ensure the protection of  this core content at all times.853 
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The letter also further reiterates that ESCR obligations should be respected including in agreements with 
international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF.  
In its country reviews, the Committee has warned that austerity measures in a number of  countries 
(including Spain, Iceland, New Zealand and Greece) are threatening ESCR, and has called on 
governments to ensure that any policy changes meet the test set out in its May 2012 letter - although it 
has not yet explicitly deemed any cases a breach of  the Covenant.854   In the case of  Greece for example, 
the Committee focused on the austerity measures adopted under the memorandums of  understanding 
with the Troika, noting the efforts mentioned by the government to uphold the Covenant rights in its 
negotiations with its creditors, but reiterating the need for effective protection of  the rights, including 
suggesting the ‘progressive waiving’ of  austerity measures once economic recovery starts:    
The Committee reminds the State party of  its obligation under the Covenant to respect, protect and fulfil 
economic, social and cultural rights progressively, to the maximum of  its available resources. While 
acknowledging that certain adjustments are at times inevitable, the Committee draws the State party’s 
attention to the Committee’s open letter of  16 May 2012 to States parties on economic, social and cultural 
rights in the context of  the economic and financial crisis, in particular to the recommendations contained 
therein with regard to the requirements resulting from the Covenant regarding the applicability of  austerity 
measures. In that context, the Committee recommends that the State party review the policies and 
programmes adopted in the framework of  the memorandums of  understanding implemented since 2010, 
and any other subsequent post-crisis economic and financial reforms, with a view to ensuring that austerity 
measures are progressively waived and the effective protection of  the rights under the Covenant is enhanced 
in line with the progress achieved in the post-crisis economic recovery. The State party should further ensure 
that its obligations under the Covenant are duly taken into account when negotiating financial assistance 
projects and programmes, including with international financial institutions.855  
 
The Committee has also, in a July 2016 Statement on ‘Public debt, austerity measures and the ICESCR’ 
(adopted after the Committee’s examination of  Greece) directly addressed situations where governments 
claim they are unable to comply with their obligations due to ‘fiscal consolidation programmes, including 
structural adjustment programmes and austerity programmes’ as a condition for obtaining loans.856  It 
emphasises that any conditions attached to a loan that would require unjustifiable retrogressive measures 
would constitute a violation of  the Covenant, reiterating the tests for retrogression set out in its May 
2012 letter and its General Comment No. 19 on social security.  It also clarifies the obligations of  
borrowing states, as well as for international organisations in their role as lenders, and for states in their 
role as members of  international organisations and for states that are lenders.   In relation to the IFIs, 
the statement explicitly rejects that interpretations by the IMF and the World Bank that their Articles of  
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Agreement prohibit them from including human rights considerations.857  The statement emphasises the 
duty of  all the actors involved to assess the likely impact on the rights of  the Covenant of  any 
international agreements government enter into, and the need to take all measures possible to ensure 
‘that any negative impacts are reduced to the bare minimum,’858 calling on both lending and borrowing 
states to carry out, prior to the provision of  the loan, a ‘human rights impact assessment’.859   
 
4.3.1 A ‘powerless companion’ to the ‘constitutionalisation of  austerity’ and neoliberalism? 
In his discussion of  the Committee’s 2012 letter, Warwick has warned that, at the very time it mattered 
most in the worst international economic crisis since the inception of  the international human rights 
framework, the Committee has backtracked on its own previous work on non-retrogression, potentially 
allowing ‘derogation-style deviations from the Covenant’.860  While his critique appears somewhat 
overblown,861 Warwick is particularly concerned by the notion of  ‘temporariness’ introduced in the 
Committee’s new test for policy changes, since he warns that this may allow for a ‘state of  exception’ and 
emergency derogation from the Covenant rights.862  
What seems more problematic however, is that this notion of  ‘temporariness’ obfuscates the reality that 
many of  the austerity measures have not been implemented as necessary, temporary measures over the 
period of  crisis.  Rather, the crisis has been used as an opportunity to further entrench permanent cuts 
to social protections and ESCR.   This is certainly clear in the case of  Greece, where its MoU with the 
IMF explicitly sets out that cuts will be permanent:   
To bring the fiscal deficit to a sustainable position, we will implement bold structural spending and revenue 
reforms. The adjustment will be achieved through permanent expenditure reductions, and measures to this 
end have already been implemented as prior actions. [...] We remain committed to our ambitious privatization 
plans.863 
 
The real issue is the changes being imposed are neither ‘temporary’ nor ‘exceptional’.  As O’Connell has 
pointed out, ‘the current age of  austerity is not so much an exceptional and objectively necessary 
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response’864, as it is a political project to further entrench (neoliberal) economic orthodoxy.  As O’Connell 
puts it: ‘in a truly astounding slight of  the proverbial invisible hand of  the markets, a crisis created by the 
structural contradictions inherent within neoliberal capitalism, has been turned to the advantage of  the 
same class of  people who were central in causing, through a seamless transition to an age of  seemingly 
perpetual austerity’865 Nolan has also argued:   
‘Far from putting an end to the dominance of  anti-statist, unregulated free market liberalism that predated 
and contributed to the crises, it is strongly arguable that by rescuing the financial markets (through taxpayer 
money and mass socialisation of  debt), mainstream neoliberalism has actually contrived an opportunity to 
intensify the dominance of  individualistic, anti-statist unregulated free market liberalism. Indeed, 
commentators such as Grant and Wilson have noted the ongoing dominance of  what they term ‘neoliberal 
Washington consensus policies’ following the global financial crisis.  This contrasts with earlier financial 
crises which resulted in major shifts in policy paradigms.866 
 
Civitarese and Halliday have also suggested that it is mistaken to see the current ‘age of  austerity’ as 
triggered by the great financial crisis of  2008, since austerity policies were well established and were being 
implemented well before the crisis, as part of  the economic model imposed over the past four decades.  
As they argue ‘[r]esponses to the 2008 crisis are rather a chapter in the phase of  neoliberalisation, rather 
than a major rupture’.867 Indeed, focusing on the situation in European countries, Civitarese and Halliday 
have argued that the post-crisis period has seen not only the further rolling back of  social rights 
protections, but that this is now being formalised and ’constitutionalised’ in law; in other words, there is 
a ‘constitutionalisation of  austerity’.868 
They see this austerity being constitutionalised in a number of  different ways - from the 
constitutionalisation of  rules on balanced budgets, to the establishment of  new institutions such as Fiscal 
Councils to undertake independent analysis of  public finances, to enforced spending reviews.869  In Italy 
and Spain for example, constitutional amendments adopted after the receipt of  loans (from the same 
‘Troika’ that has imposed austerity on Greece - the IMF, the European Commission and the European 
Central Bank) have entrenched commitments to ‘budgetary and financial stability’, in ways that have ‘cast 
a dark constitutional shadow over public spending, particularly social welfare spending (which constitutes 
a large proportion of  national budgets), and weaken the purchase of  entrenched social rights’.870  
They cite other contributors to their book, arguing that this may be ‘regarded as instances of  a wider and 
longer trend whereby neoliberal economics has been constitutionalised within the European Union.’871 
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They recall that the welfare state has always been ‘Janus-faced’ in being both about the welfare of  the 
poor and the health of  capitalism (regulating capitalism’s inherent capacity of  self-destruction), citing 
Garland’s 2014 article that:  ‘The welfare state is an essential basis for human flourishing in capitalist 
society and an essential basis for capitalist flourishing in human society.’872  But they suggest that, while 
in the post-war period, it came to be understood that public spending and welfare was necessary for 
capitalism to flourish, those lessons have now been forgotten to the point where today, orthodox 
prescriptions suggest that capitalism can be protected only by containing spending and ‘neoliberalising’ 
welfare policies.  They highlight, citing Couso’s work on international treaties and human rights, that: 
 ‘international human rights law embodies an economic policy ‘frozen’ in time from the mid-twentieth 
century (in the form of  social-democratic, social-Christian or ‘New Deal’ thought).  This philosophy has 
been ‘transported’ into our time by the social and economic provisions of  the Universal Declaration of  
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which are now 
incompatible with some of  the core principles of  contemporary mainstream economic thinking.’873 
 
McBride elsewhere points out that many of  these rules on debt and budget deficits were already 
formalised in Europe under the 1993 Maastricht Treaty and the 2012 EU Fiscal Compact which 
‘constitutionalised’ binding rules on balanced budgets to ensure fiscal discipline of  EU member states, 
stating that these ‘rules…. shall take effect in the national law of  the Contracting Parties.  Through 
provisions of  binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed 
to be fully respected and adhered to through national budgetary processes.’874 Hence fiscal discipline, 
along with other structural reforms (such as labour flexibilities) were intended to ‘be a set of  permanently 
embedded rules through being constitutionalized.’875 He cites German Chancellor Angela Merkel's 
comment about the European Fiscal Pact:  
‘The Fiscal Pact is about inserting debt brakes permanently in the national legal systems. They shall possess 
a binding and eternal validity’.876  
 
This then brings us full circle.  As I have argued in the earlier parts of  this thesis, the legal realists and 
the economic institutionalists had challenged formalism, not for the sake of  formalism itself, but rather 
because of  what was being formalised and what was being given a similar kind of  ‘binding and eternal validity’, 
through the ‘constitutionalisation’ of  laissez faire liberalism in that earlier period.  The New Dealers in 
turn challenged laissy faire constitutionalism by pushing for a ‘new’ set of  economic and social rights, 
changing the role of  the state in enforcing different ‘institutions’ of  the economy, and later even 
attempting to formalize commitments to Keynesian anti-austerity policies in the 1945 Full Employment 
Bill.  Although these new rights were never constitutionalised in US, these ideas were formalised in 
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international law in the ICESCR.  But despite this attempt to ‘freeze’ ESCR in international human rights 
law, this has not been strong enough to counter the resurgence of  economic and legal orthodoxy, and it 
has failed to reverse the contemporary trend towards the constitutionalisation of  austerity and 
(neo)liberalism in our modern era.  Thus Moyn has warned that human rights today appear a 'powerless 
companion' to 'market fundamentalism'.877  
In this context, I suggest that recovering the insights of  the era of  the Great Depression – and drawing 
on their more modern equivalents that have emerged since the 2007-2008 global economic crisis – could 
usefully strengthen the power of  the Committee’s interpretive framework to prevent further retrogression 
of  these rights and institutions in the future.  The recent economic crisis has precipitated a new wave of  
critiques of  both neoliberalism and formal neoclassical economic theory that have emerged since the 
crisis, many of  which recall the lessons of  the Great Depression and echo some of  the insights of  the 
earlier institutionalists and the Keynesians.878   
For example, in 2009, the UN’s Report of  the Commission of  Experts on Reforms of  the International 
Monetary and Financial System (the so-called ‘Stigliz’ report) highlighted how the financial and economic 
crisis had thrown again into question the ‘belief  that unfettered markets are, on their own, quickly self-
correcting and efficient.’879 This reflected a renewed critique of  the mathematical models of  neoclassical 
theory that assume a tendency towards equilibrium, and thus assume that ‘free’ and unfettered markets 
are intrinsically stable (an assumption which in turn militates against any state intervention).  As the earlier 
institutionalists and Keynesianism had shown, economic and financial crises suggest that markets are 
actually intrinsically unstable and need to be stabilised by an active role of  the government (including in 
regulating the speculative financial sector).  This Stiglitz report similarly reflects a heightened awareness 
of  the lessons of  those earlier economists that rising inequalities also contribute to the the instability of 
the market system, including through reducing what Keynes had called ‘aggregate demand.’  Recalling 
the lessons of history, the Stiglitz report states: 
One of  the most important lessons of  the Great Depression was that markets are not self-correcting and 
that government intervention is required at the macroeconomic level to ensure recovery and a return to full 
employment. In the aftermath of  the Great Depression, governments introduced policies that provided 
automatic stabilizers for aggregate demand and implemented discretionary policy frameworks to reduce 
economic instability. But as the Great Depression and earlier panics and crises faded from memory, 
confidence in the self-stabilizing nature of  the market returned.880 
 
The report also highlighted the dangers of  rolling back of  measures of  social protection, which had 
previously served not only to redress the inequalities produced by the operation of  free markets, but also 
to insulate economies against risks by increasing the size of  ‘automatic stabilizers’.  It suggests that today 
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‘economic systems may have become more unstable as a result of  weakening both public and private 
automatic stabilizers through the reduced progressivity of  tax structures, weakening of  safety nets, greater 
wage flexibility, and the movement from defined- benefit to defined-contribution schemes for workers’ 
retirement accounts’.881 It further blames this on the deregulatory push of  the era of  neoliberalism, 
including of  the financial sector:  
There is now a consensus that inadequate regulations and regulatory institutions, some of  which failed even 
to implement effectively those regulations that existed, contributed to this crisis. While “blame” should rest 
on the financial sector, government failed to protect the market from itself  and to protect society from [its] 
excesses…’882 
 
It also suggests the need to the debate about institutions: 
‘The debate about appropriate institutional practices and arrangements and the economic, political, and 
social theories on which they rest will continue for years. The ideas and ideologies underlying key aspects of  
what have variously been called neo-liberalism, market fundamentalism, or Washington Consensus doctrines 
have been found wanting.’883 
 
While many recent critiques (at least in the immediate aftermath of  the crisis) have called for bringing 
back Keynesian policy prescriptions for counter-cyclical spending in times of  crisis, this is also a reminder 
that it may be useful to return to the lessons of  the old institutional economics.  884  As institutionalists 
such as John R. Commons had shown, the ‘working rules’ or rights and obligations that govern the 
economy can be changed – and different regulations and institutions bring about very different 
distributional outcomes.  Commons argued that it was ‘incorrect to speak of  government intervention 
versus nonintervention’, but rather it was important to look at which rules and rights were enforced, and 
to whose benefit.885  This has its modern equivalent for example in the insistence of  heterodox economist 
Radhika Balakrishnan and Diane Elson (who have worked recently on developing a human rights-
approach to macroeconomics) that deregulation is actually a form of  re-regulation.886  In other words, 
de-regulation is not about taking away regulation, but rather re-regulates who benefits from government 
enforcement of  which rules.   
Another modern equivalent of  the ‘old institutional economics’ lies in work of  heterodox economist Ha-
Joon Chang in what he calls the ‘new institutionalist political economy’.887  Chang reiterates the need to 
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focus on the ‘rights-obligations structure underlying markets,’888 i.e. ‘which rights and obligations are 
regarded as legitimate and what kind of  hierarchy between these rights and obligations is (explicitly and 
implicitly) accepted by the members of  the society, since the same state action could be considered an 
“intervention” in one society and not in another’.889  He emphasises that ‘markets are in the end political 
constructs in the sense that they are defined by a range of  formal and informal institutions that embody 
certain rights and obligations, whose legitimacy (and therefore whose contestability) is ultimately 
determined in the realm of  politics.’890 He argues that neoliberals are ‘dressing up their own political views 
as objective’  and as above politics,891 but their views are political and their theories normative rather than 
descriptive – and thus can and should be questioned:  
…the ‘market rationality’ that the neoliberals want to rescue from the ‘corrupting’ influences of  politics can 
only be meaningfully defined with reference to the existing institutional structure, which itself  is a product 
of  politics (see Vira, 1997 for further exposition of  this point). And if  this is the case, what the neoliberals 
really do when they talk of  de-politicization of  the market is to assume that the particular boundary between 
market and the state they wish to draw is the ‘correct’ one, and that any attempt to contest that boundary is 
a ‘politically minded’ one. However, as we argued in section 3.1, there is no one ‘correct’ way to draw such 
a boundary. If  there appears to be a solid boundary between the two in certain instances, it is only because 
those who are concerned do not even realize that the rights-obligations structure underpinning that 
boundary is potentially contestable. So, if  some people feel that central banks should be politically 
independent, it is only because they contest the right of  the people to influence monetary policy through 
their elected representatives, and not because there is some ‘rational’ reason that monetary policy should not 
be politically influenced.892 
 
In another recent theoretical advance, which is less grounded in institutional economics but similarly 
echoes some of  these earlier insights, Jacob Hacker in a 2011 policy paper entitled ‘The Institutional 
Foundations of  Middle Class Democracy’ has called for a ‘rebuilding the institutional foundations of  
middle-class democracy’ to ‘shift back the uneven organisational balance between concentrated economic 
interests and the broad public’.893 He argues that there needs to be more focus on what he labels ‘pre-
distribution’ (rather than redistribution) i.e. a focus on the rules of  the market that shape how its rewards 
are distributed: 
‘When we think of  government’s effects on inequality, we think of  redistribution – government taxes and 
transfers that take from some and give to others. Yet many of  the most important changes have been in 
what might be called “pre-distribution” – the way in which the market distributes its rewards in the first 
place. Policies governing financial markets, the rights of  unions and the pay of  top executives have all shifted 
in favour of  those at the top, especially the financial and non-financial executives who make up about six in 
ten of  the richest 0.1 % of  Americans.’894  
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Focusing on ‘pre-distribution’ brings the focus back to the institutions or rules that are enforced by the 
government as the ‘rules of  the game’.  Instead of  focusing on and adopting policies that focus on 
redistribution to redress the inequalities produced by the market, this perspective suggests that it is rather 
possible to change the ‘rules of  the economic game’ so that market outcomes are not so unequal.  He 
points out that this avoids the need for ‘require major programmes of  redistribution – never easy to enact 
– but rather [requires] measures to reshape the market so that it distributes its rewards more broadly in 
the first place.’895  The question also then becomes less about the resources available for public spending 
(including in terms the ‘maximum available resources’), and more about focusing on how the institutions 
of  the economy can be changed to shift the distributional outcomes.   
While these ideas are not closely grounded in the ‘old institutional economics’ of  the institutional 
economists that we examined in the first part of  this thesis, this approach similarly opens up ways for 
rethinking how rules – and rights – are structured and enforced by states in contemporary economies.  
This also serves as a reminder that, while human rights, like the welfare state or Keynesian policies, might 
be criticised as ‘minimalist’ or merely ‘saving capitalism from itself ’, the post-war institutions of  the New 
Deal and welfare states, did serve restructure the rules and institutions governing the economy and did 
have very material impact on reducing levels of  inequality and improving wellbeing in the post-war era 
from 1945 to the 1970s.896  This was true up until these trends were reversed in the 1980s under neoliberal 
economic reforms, ‘structural adjustment’ and the project of  ‘disembedding’ the economy from this 
‘embedded liberalism’.   
Finally, as a last additional point, I would also suggest that the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (like the human rights world more broadly) also needs a deeper engagement on economic 
policy, to be able to address the contemporary shift in economic crisis-responses towards the 
unconventional, extra-ordinary expansionary monetary policy of ‘quantitative easing’897 given that this 
has more regressive impacts than expansionary fiscal policy.898  While governments have imposed fiscal 
austerity (cutting back particularly on social protections), they have maintained expansionary monetary 
policies, including extra-ordinary levels of monetary stimulus that have kept the banking and financial 
markets effectively on life support for ten years since the crisis (and allowed them to make extraordinary 
profits from ultra-low interest rates).  While this combination of fiscal austerity and monetary easing may 
have prevented an even deeper economic recession, it has arguably also disproportionately benefited the 
financial sector while contributing to an escalation of income inequality in several countries since the 
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2008 global economic crisis.899  Understanding this is also significant since the ‘unwinding’ of quantitative 
easing that has recently started, ten years after the crisis, may be setting the stage for the next great global 
financial and economic crisis.900 
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5. CONCLUSIONS: BACK TO THE FUTURE? 
5.1  Lessons from history: ESCR from the Great Depression to the Great Recession  
Taking a ‘law in context’ and ‘history of ideas’ approach, this thesis has explored the following questions:  
1) How and why did ‘second generation’ economic and social rights come to be included in the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights? 
2) How have these rights been shaped by their economic context and the economic theories of 
the times in which they emerged and have later been elaborated?   
By tracing just one strand of the history of human rights – and more specifically this history of the 
emergence and elaboration of economic and social rights as international human rights – this thesis has 
ultimately argued that the international human rights regime was born, not only out of the horrors of the 
Holocaust901, but also out of the mass misery of the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the profound 
shift in liberal legal and economic orthodoxies that occurred at that time – the lessons of which remain 
profoundly relevant today.    
I have argued that ‘economic and social rights’ came to be included in the international bill of rights, not 
only as an afterthought or on this insistence of socialist states, but because they were also central to shifts 
within ‘western liberalism’ during the Great Depression, that came to be reflected in the post-war 
consensus on ‘embedded liberalism’.  Indeed, I have shown that these shifts within ‘western liberalism’ 
occurred even in the United States, and that economic and social rights were forged, in part, in New Deal 
efforts to re-define rights, freedom and the role of the state in the economy.  This sought to challenge 
the ‘do nothing’ prescriptions of economic liberalism and the ‘laissez faire constitutionalism’ of the US 
Supreme Court in the Depression era economy.  What put the ‘human’ in ‘human rights’ was the addition 
of a new set of economic and social rights to the classical liberal rights, to ‘humanise’ the prescriptions 
of both legal and economic orthodoxies, and to mitigate the negative impacts of the Depression on the 
lives and livelihoods of ordinary people.  What was new about ‘international human rights’ was not only 
accountability to a supra-state power, but a new conception of the responsibilities of the state towards 
its citizens, extending beyond securing narrow, liberal freedoms, towards securing a ‘larger freedom’ from 
fear and want – a vision that required active intervention of the state in the economy to protect people 
from the vicissitudes and inequalities produced by ‘free’ markets. 
The central thesis of this work is that ‘economic and social rights’ have been shaped by, and shaped, the 
economic context and the economic theories of the times in which they have emerged and been 
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elaborated.  I have shown how, at their emergence (in the United States) in the economic crisis of the 
Great Depression, they were shaped first by the heterodox theories of the institutional economists, and 
later by the theories of economic Keynesianism that both challenged neoclassical economic theory.  
These ideas that were later to influence the drafting of the 1945 UN Charter that emerged in the discursive 
context of Keynesianism, as well as the later 1948 UDHR and the 1966 ICESCR, through the surprising 
role of US on ESCR in the drafting of the international bill of human rights.  I have also shown how 
these rights have later been elaborated, after the establishment of the Committee on ESCR in 1987, again 
in the context of economic crisis (this time the crises of structural adjustment and the transition to market 
economies in both developed and developing countries), and again as part of a challenge to (neo)liberal 
economic orthodoxy, and this time influenced by the one of the dominant heterodox economists of this 
period, Amartya Sen.   
I have traced how the work of Amartya Sen, like the ‘first great law and economics movement’ and 
Keynes too, has sought to challenge both the primacy of classical liberal rights, as well as the assumptions 
of mainstream neoclassical economic theory, which together buttress economic (neo)liberalism, today as 
they did in the past.   However, I have also shown that their elaboration has occurred with the very 
different discursive environment of neoliberalism, and that many of the insights that shaped the earlier 
emergence of these rights in liberal thought have been lost in the contemporary elaboration of economic 
and social rights, in ways that circumscribe their potential to challenge economic power and economic 
inequality.   Indeed, I have argued that Sen’s work has itself been disciplined by discursive context of 
neoliberalism, leaving his work (and by extension, the work of the Committee since it had few other 
economic theories on which to draw) as less ‘radical’ than the work of the institutional economists and 
less prescriptive than Keynes, particularly in addressing the negative impacts of economic crises, 
structural adjustment and the ‘constitutionalisation of austerity’ in our own time.    
 While this thesis has focused on drawing out a lost history of economic and social rights, I have 
concluded that recovering some of key theoretical insights that shaped the emergence of these rights may 
therefore be useful for rethinking the contours of economic and social rights for the future.   In making 
this point, I do not seek to suggest that these earlier insights better reflect the ‘origins’ or ‘essence’ of 
these rights.  I have rather sought to explore this ‘pre-history’ and ‘post-history’ of economic and social 
rights and their historical, linguistic and economic context in order - as the historian Quentin Skinner has 
suggested – to ‘free us to re-imagine [these concepts] in different and perhaps more fruitful ways.’902  
Similarly, I have sought to juxtapose human rights and economic context not to draw strict causal links 
or correlations, but rather to see what insights can be drawn from this juxtaposition.  From this 
perspective too, these insights need not be applied in a mutually exclusive way, but can be seen as 
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complementary – in other words, it may be possible to draw on Keynesianism, institutionalism, Sen or 
others, applying their different insights at the same time, wherever these might prove fruitful. 
Recovering these insights has potentially practical implications – including for the work of the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  As I have begun to draw out in the last section 
(4.3), the Committee could use some of these insights to strengthen its interpretive framework for 
addressing the Great Recession, giving the Covenant renewed meaning in our contemporary context and 
addressing the contemporary trend towards the ‘constitutionalisation’ of austerity, which marks a 
renewed effort to formalise or ‘freeze’ this new form of (neo)liberalism in law.   More research will still 
be needed to draw out the practical lessons in more detail.  But for example, I have argued that Keynesian 
insights offer a useful lens for re-imagining the contemporary understanding of Article 2.1 and the 
interpretation of the use of the ‘maximum available resources’, and the Committee’s approach to 
austerity.903   Equally, the institutionalist insights show the importance of also moving beyond the 
question of resources, to examine the institutions that make up the market economy - including which 
institutions are enforced by the state and for whose benefit – and examining how these shape, or aim to 
re-shape, the distributional outcomes of markets (looking in other words at what Hacker has called ‘pre-
distribution’, rather than redistribution).  This perspective also helps us to see how liberalisation, 
privatisation and ‘de-regulation’ (or re-regulation in the interest of others) are part of the pattern of dis-
embedding markets from the social constraints of post-war ‘embedded liberalism’.  It also helps us to see 
why ESCR remain important in this context – indeed, one of the central lessons of the legal realists and 
the institutional economists, who so carefully studied the legal-economic nexus, is that our world is 
structured and constituted by the law, and markets are made of legal rights – so any challenge to the 
economic order must necessarily be a legal challenge in terms of rights.  
5.2 Contributions of this thesis  
This thesis has also made a number of original contributions to the literature on human rights.  
One of these original contributions is the discovery and discussion of previously unexamined primary 
material from the UN and US archives, mysteriously absent from other histories of human rights, which 
has thrown new light on the US role in shaping the nature and scope of economic and social rights, as 
they emerged as international human rights.   I have traced the history of this document – the July 1947 
‘United States Suggestions for Aricles to be Incorporated in an International Bill of Rights ’ – through both the UN 
archives and the US national government archives, finding that the official US position on ESCR was 
significantly different from what many conventional narratives suggest.  This document sits at the heart 
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of my research – and I have traced it backwards and forwards over time, including back through the ‘pre-
history’ of the ESCR in the Roosevelt era, as well tracing its impact forwards on the conceptualisation 
and ‘constitutionalisation’ of ESCR during the drafting process of both the UDHR and the ICESCR.   I 
have shown how these 1947 US Suggestions are historically significant, not only because they belie 
conventional narratives about the US position on ESCR, but also because a number of concepts and 
phrases that were later to become part of the lexicon of the ESCR have clear roots in this 1947 US 
proposal -  including the concepts of ‘maximum available resources’ and ‘progressive’ realisation’ that 
came to be enshrined in Article 2.1 of the ICESCR and have shaped the nature and scope of ESCR in 
the more modern era.   This offers a new contribution to the literature on this history of ESCR, that goes 
well beyond other existing analyses – including those that trace some of its roots in the US liberalism, 
such as Whelan’s detailed history of ESCR – as well as the broader history of the international bill of 
human rights. 
Another original contribution emerged out of my methodological approach of placing texts and concepts 
in their historical, economic and linguistic context, which pushed me to revisit the meaning of ‘maximum 
available resources’, drawing out and exploring the early Keynesian connotations of that phrase, and 
eventually to the Keynesian contribution to the conceptualisation of ESCR in the New Deal era.   
Although I show that this economic understanding of the phrase was quickly lost the drafting process, 
this nonetheless unsettles our contemporary interpretation of this phrase and opens up new possibilities 
for re-imagining this concept in ways that are profoundly relevant in the context of contemporary trends 
of the ‘constitutionalisation of austerity’. This is because (at least in its initial incarnation), this Keynesian 
phrasing was not meant as a clause relating to the limited availability of resources, but rather the opposite 
– it was an exhortation to avoid austerity, particularly in times of economic crisis.   
In tracing the ‘pre-history’ of these concepts in the New Deal era, my work also offers new primary 
material to challenge Samuel Moyn’s assertion that ‘human rights’ first appeared in the 1940s by accident.  
Responding to his declaration that ‘no evidence has been discovered to explain why and when the phrase 
appeared as it did,’904 I have excavated evidence (including from press articles at the time) which shows 
the phrase ‘human rights’ was in popular usage in the United States even in the 1930s and was certainly 
not accidental, but was deliberately deployed to challenge ‘laissez faire constitutionalism’, carving out a 
justification for an active government response to the economic crisis of the Great Depression in the 
New Deal era. While the New Deal administration was influenced by the legal realist concern to keep 
economic and social rights out of the hands of (conservative Supreme Court) judges, much of the New 
Deal was still popularly framed in terms of ‘human rights’ including in what the New York Times called in 
1934 ‘the greatest conflict of constitutional and economic philosophy of the times’, and Roosevelt’s 1936 
                                                           
904 Moyn 2012, 49. 
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‘constitutional moment’ as well as the 1937 ‘court-packing plan’ which set ‘human rights’ against ‘property 
rights’ (as chronicled in section 2.2).   
While Moyn notices in his more recent 2018 book that Roosevelt called for a ‘re-definition of rights’ and 
a new ‘economic constitutional order’ right already in 1932 – he misses much of the other evidence 
chronicled here.  Indeed, Moyn alleges that the New Deal was not framed in terms of rights, and that 
Roosevelt only ‘flirted with social rights’ at the end of his tenure, at the ‘end of reform’ when the more 
egalitarian and institutional visions of the New Deal were waning.  Moyn argues that what is most 
significant about Roosevelt’s 1944 Second Bill of Rights is the moment when it was articulated: ‘Easily 
the most significant fact about the Second Bill of Rights package, then, is that it came so late, when the 
energies of the New Deal were nearly spent and in the very different context of wartime.’905   I would 
suggest however that in making this argument, Moyn has relied too heavily on one interpretation of New 
Deal history – that of Brinkley’s ‘End of Reform’906 - which is an excellent overview of the shifts in the 
philosophical underpinnings of New Deal liberalism, but also has its own limitations.   
Brinkley chronicles the shift from the radicalism of the institutionalists who aimed to restructure the 
economy, towards the later Keynesians who aimed rather to balance out the booms and busts of the 
economy without changing the structure of capitalism – which he disappointedly labels the ‘end of 
reform’.907  However, Brinkley also sets up a debatable dichotomy between what he calls the earlier 
‘reform liberalism’ and a later ‘rights-based liberalism’ to support his narrative.908  While he recognises 
that the New Dealers rejected ‘the classical laissez faire liberalism of the nineteenth century’, he argues 
‘they were not yet particularly concerned with (or at first, even much aware of) the rights-based liberalism 
that would become central to the post-war era’,909  glossing over Roosevelt’s early efforts to redefine 
‘rights’.  In my retelling of this history, contra Brinkley, rather than being antithetical to what he calls 
‘reform liberalism’, human rights had their early roots in this kind of liberalism and its efforts to challenge 
the institutions being formalised in both the law and economics of laissez faire constitutionalism.910   With 
the new evidence outlined here, my work thus also contributes in this small way to the historiography of 
the New Deal, as well as to that of human rights.  
My work, like Moyn’s recent 2018 book, also seeks to contribute to contemporary debates within the 
human rights literature over the relationship between human rights and economic (neo)liberalism. I trace 
this relationship back through history to the Great Depression and the New Deal, as Moyn does too, but 
I cover far more detail than he does and while he picks up on some of the more egalitarian roots of 
                                                           
905 Moyn 2018, 34. 
906 Moyn recognises that Brinkley informs his account throughout, see note 16, ibid., 51. 
907 Brinkley 1996. 
908 Showing how historiography is so important. 
909 Brinkley 1996, 10. 
910 As Weber had long ago pointed out, and institutionalists took forward, the legal institutions are central to the 
workings of capitalism, and as Marx had pointed out, legalism plays a role in legitimizing capitalism. See Trubek 
1972. 
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human rights in the New Deal, I would suggest his argument lacks clarity because he sometimes appears 
to be arguing with his own premise: that human rights are merely ‘minimalist’.  Moyn argues that, since 
the triumph of market fundamentalism in the 1970s, human rights has ‘accommodated itself to the 
reigning political economy’, with social rights offering only minimalist protection.911  My own thesis, by 
contrast, by bringing an additional focus on economic theory, as well as a detailed look at the drafting 
history, makes a more nuanced argument, arguing that in their emergence, elaboration and evolution, 
‘human rights’ have consistently (if not always effectively912) sought to provide a (liberal) challenge 
economic (neo)liberalism, drawing from the theories of heterodox economists as well as progressive 
jurists (precisely with the intention to ‘humanise’ economic liberalism and the liberal rights that underpin 
it, rather than to overthrow it).   
While Moyn has earlier described human rights as rising in the 1970s as ‘the last utopia’, and ESCR as re-
emerging in the 1980s merely as an automatic response to the waning of concerns over totalitarianism 
and authoritarianism,913 my analysis suggests an alternative thesis.  By locating the watershed year for 
economic and social rights in the 1980s (or 1987 to be exact!) at the establishment of the Committee, I 
suggest that this was a reaction to the height of ‘neoliberalism’, since this was the same year that Reagan 
announced his 1987 bill of rights that directly countered Roosevelt’s.  My thesis thus suggests that rise of 
these rights was driven not by the decline in totalitarianism as Moyn would have it, but rather by a reaction 
to the vigorous re-assertion of (neo)liberal orthodoxy and a ‘free market’ model that promises a far more 
‘stark utopia’.914    
As I show in detail in the last section, the definition and evolution of economic and social rights in the 
interpretations of the Committee on ESCR since the 1980s, has challenged the negative social impacts 
of ‘neoliberalism’, reacting to the impacts of structural adjustment and the transition to ‘free market’ 
economies, as well as to the social impacts of the 2007-2008 Great Recession.  While the Committee’s 
interpretation has sought to establish a ‘minimum core’ in its elaboration of Article 2.1 of the Covenant, 
its work has not been merely to set ‘minimalist standards’ that Moyn seems to suggest now constitute 
social rights.915  The ‘minimum core’ is less ambitious than Keynesian prescriptions (and even less so 
than the institutionalist prescriptions), but it has nonetheless been conceptualized with the aim of 
preventing the all-out roll-back of the social state, just as the ‘respect, protect and fulfil’ framework 
challenges the ‘minimal state’, and the AAAQ criteria set standards based on adequacy and quality, which 
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912 I have suggested that, if ‘human rights’ is perhaps less effective in this challenge today than it was in previous 
times, that is also because there have been few powerful alternative theories to draw from.   
913 Moyn writes that ‘as totalitarianism and authoritarianism waned, social and economic rights consciousness 
could not help but surge’, and laments that ‘human rights were compelled to assume exactly the sort of burden 
that had brought other ideologies low’, Moyn 2012, 223. 
914 As Karl Polanyi already warned in 1944, and as discussed more recently by Block and Somers, see Polanyi 
1944; Block and Somers 2014. 
915 Moyn’s assertion that human rights are about minimum standards relates more to the implementation and 
framing of constitutional rights, and he does not look at the work of the Committee.   
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are more about relative than absolute minimums.  It is clear however that there are other persistent efforts 
by other actors, well beyond the reach of the UN Committee’s official interpretations, who are working 
narrow down even further these interpretations of ESCR, or to exclude ESCR altogether from notions 
of (human) rights (including national courts).   
Moyn and others have thus suggested that human rights as they are currently interpreted are ‘not enough’ 
in this ‘unequal world’,916 and that they fail to address inequalities.  But efforts have started to rethink the 
approach of human rights to extreme levels of economic inequality, which have now risen in many 
‘western countries’ to levels not seen since before the 1929 Great Crash917 and it is in this context too 
that I would suggest that recovering the insights of  the era of  the Great Depression would be useful.  In 
the financial and economic crisis of  the 1930s, both the institutionalists and Keynes highlighted 
important insights as to the inherent fragility of  the market system, challenging ideas of  the economy as 
a law-like, self-stabilising economic system and justifying public intervention in the economy in the face 
of  the inequalities and instabilities produced by so-called ‘free’ markets.   Those earlier debates were also 
more alive to how economics – like the law – encodes particular assumptions with normative 
implications, thus even apparently ‘neutral’ assumptions like equilibrium in neoclassical economics can 
have conservative implications by militating against any state intervention against the ‘invisible hand’.918   
In tracing this more detailed history and examining these heterodox economic theories in some depth, 
this thesis also aims to contribute to contemporary debates in the literature on the human rights and 
economics,919 going beyond the scholarly debates that point to the ‘non-conversation’920 or ‘foundational’ 
tensions921 between these two disciplines, by tracing a more complex story of the interweaving of human 
rights and economics from the Great Depression to the Great Recession.  
  
 
  
                                                           
916 Moyn 2018. 
917 See for example, Alston, 2015. 
918 For a modern discussion on this point, see Keen, who argues that ’ideology lurks within ‘positive economics’ 
in the form of the core belief in equilibrium. Keen 2011, 173. 
919 As well as contextualising the ICESCR in its (macro)economic context, as Dowell-Jones has admonished, though 
my analysis and conclusions remain different from hers.  Dowell-Jones 2004a. Glasius suggests her prescriptions 
are based ‘not just macro-economic analysis per se, but a particular kind of economic orthodoxy that is known to 
its proponents simply as sound economics, but to others as neo-liberalism’, Glasius 2006, 165. 
920 Reddy 2011. 
921 Wills and Warwick 2016, 633. 
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